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CINCLANT HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF CUBAN CRISIS - 1963 (U)



THE ATLANTIC COMMAND
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NORFOLK 11, VIRGINIA

THE ATLANTIC COMMAND
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Norfolk 11, Virginia

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LETTER OF PROMULGATION

From: Commander in Chief Atlantic
To: Distribution List

Subj: CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis 1962, promulgation of (U)

Encl: (1) CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis 1962

1. The attached report is forwarded herewith.
2. The objective of the subject record is to present a comprehensive account of the actions taken within the Atlantic Command to meet the requirements of the situation created by the introduction of Soviet offensive weapons into Cuba in the fall of 1962. Further objectives are to note the achievements of and the cooperation accorded by associated and subordinate commanders in the critical test of the Unified Command, Atlantic.
3. Extracts of this report shall be classified by content. The commands making extracts shall be responsible for the security control thereof.


ROBERT L. DENNISON

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CG, XVIII ABN CORPS	1	41
COM 19th AF	1	42
COMSECONDFLT	1	43
COMPHIBLANT	3	44-46
CG, FMFLANT	1	47
CG, 2D MARDIV	1	48
CG, 2D MAW	1	49
COMNAVAIRLANT	1	50
COMSERVLANT	1	51
COMSUBLANT	1	52
COMERUDSLANT	3	53-55
COMASWFORLANT	3	56-58
CINCPACFLT	1	59
COMPHIBPAC	1	60
CG, FMFPAC	1	61
COMWESTFOR	1	62
COMNAVBASE GTMO	1	63
COMCARIBSEAFRON	1	64
COMSEASTSEAFRON	1	65
COMFAIRJAX	1	66
COMFAIRWINGSLANT	1	67
NAV WAR COLLEGE	2	68-69
NAT'L WAR COLLEGE	2	70-71

List of Effective Pages

<u>Content</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Page No(s) Inclusive</u>
Letter of Promulgation		1 through ii
List of Effective Pages		iii through iv
Introduction		1 through 3
Chapter I	Intelligence	4 through 16
Enclosure (1)		3 Pages
Enclosure (2)		1 Page
Enclosure (3)		1 Page
Chapter II	Status of Cuban Contingency Plans	17 through 23
Enclosure (1)		13 Pages
Enclosure (2)		3 Pages
Chapter III	Communications	24 through 38
Enclosure (1)		1 Page
Enclosure (2)		1 Page
Enclosure (3)		1 Page
Chapter IV	Initial Actions	39 through 48
Chapter V	CINCLANT Contingency Staff Operations	49 through 57
Chapter VI	CINCARLANT Operations	58 through 85
Chapter VII	Naval Operations	
Section 1	312/316 Tasks	86 through 89
Section 2	Naval Base, Guantanamo	90 through 102 -
Section 3	Cuban Quarantine Operations	103 through 109
Section 4	Task Force 135	110 through 119
Section 5	Anti-Submarine Force Operations	120 through 125
Enclosure (1)		12 Pages
Section 6	South Atlantic Force Operations	126 through 131
Section 7	Submarine Operations	132 through 135
Section 8	Service Force Atlantic Operations	136 through 140
Section 9	Amphibious Force Atlantic Operations	141 through 152
Section 10	Fleet Marine Force Atlantic Operations	153 through 161

List of Effective Pages (Cont'd)

Chapter VIII	Air Force Atlantic Operations	162 through 167
Chapter IX	Joint Unconventional Warfare	168 through 174
Chart (1)	Task Force Atlantic	1 Page

INTRODUCTION

On the evening of 22 October 1962, President John F. Kennedy, speaking to the Nation on radio and television, described an ominous build up of Russian missiles in Cuba. The President announced the establishment of a naval quarantine to be effective as of 0900, 24 October. The quarantine was to prevent the shipment of additional offensive armaments into Cuba. The President also made clear that he intended to assure the removal of Russian missiles from Cuba. If necessary, the United States was prepared to take additional action.

While the immediate background of the crisis - widely described as the most serious since the end of World War II - was one of steadily deteriorating Cuban - U.S. relations, the President made clear that this was far more than a Cuban - U.S. crisis. It was, in fact, a direct confrontation between the security of the United States and the challenge posed by the Soviet Union. The President dramatized this fact by asserting that any missile fired from Cuba against a country of the Western Hemisphere would be considered a direct attack by the Soviet Union. Our response would be appropriate to that situation.

For the public, the President's address was the first alarm bell of danger. But for many days the Commander in Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT) had been preparing to counter this newest aspect of the Russian build up in Cuba. Eventually there emerged under CINCLANT's command a many-sided and extremely complex military organization involving over 400,000 personnel of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

The purpose of this study is to record the principal actions taken by the Atlantic Command in response to the threat. It covers the period from 1 October when subordinate commands were notified of the requirement for increased readiness to 1 December when IL-28s were being removed from Cuba. While it has been prepared primarily from the standpoint of the Headquarters of the Unified Command, the integrated CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT Staff necessarily placed greater emphasis in this document on details of naval activities than on the Army and Air Force Components.

At the beginning of October the Atlantic Command was in its normal peacetime configuration. Headed by Admiral Robert L. Dennison, U.S. Navy, its Headquarters was in Norfolk, Virginia. The Unified Command Staff was integrated with the Staff of Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet, also commanded by Admiral Dennison,

The Army and Air Force Components of the Unified

Command were not activated.

A JCS conducted world-wide CPX of the build up and initial phases of general war * had been completed in late September. Units of the Command soon to be involved in Cuban Contingency Operations were carrying out or preparing for routinely scheduled exercises upkeep, overhaul and deployments. Exercise "BLUE WATER," a CPX of Commander Joint Task Force FOUR plans, was conducted from 2 to 5 October in Puerto Rico.

Of the seven CVAs in the Atlantic Fleet, three were in the Mediterranean on 1 October. ENTERPRISE was scheduled to return to Norfolk and arrived one day early on 11 October. LEXINGTON had just arrived from the Pacific Fleet. She completed an interim overhaul on 27 October, ahead of schedule, and was loaded as a CVA. SARATOGA completed her overhaul on 13 November. SHANGRI-LA was in overhaul throughout. Thus on 20 October only ENTERPRISE and INDEPENDENCE were available.

Of the six cruiser types, two were in overhaul and two in the Mediterranean throughout, leaving CANBERRA and NEWPORT NEWS available.

In the Amphibious Force, the only AGC immediately available was MT McKINLEY, participating in PHIBRIGLEX-62. POCONO was sailed back from SIXTH Fleet arriving Norfolk on 12 November. TACONIC was in overhaul throughout. All three LPHs were available.

Amphibious Brigade Landing Exercise (PHIBRIGLEX-62) was routinely scheduled for the period 15 October - 3 November. The mission was to train and exercise naval forces in the conduct of amphibious assault and associated naval operations. The objective area was Puerto Rico - Vieques Island. The OCE was Vice Admiral Rivero, COMPHIBLANT.

Forces involved included: Striking and Covering Force under COMCARDIV SIX; Amphibious Task Force under COMPHIBGRU FOUR composed of two PHIBRONS; a Landing Force under BGEN Tompkins organized as the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade consisting of a Regimental Landing Team Headquarters and three Battalion Landing Teams; an ASW HUK Group under COMCARDIV SIXTEEN; and a Logistic Support Force commanded by COMSERVRON FOUR.

In all, about 20,000 naval personnel and 4,000 marines were to participate.

Seventy-four FMFLANT Troop Carrier Helicopters of the eighty-six available had been deployed to Mississippi in early October. They had returned to New

River, North Carolina by the evening of 11 October. Loading of these helicopter squadrons along with 4th Marine Expeditionary Battalion Headquarters and Battalion Landing Teams 3/2 and 1/6 in PHIBRON TWELVE ships commenced 15 October. Embarkation was completed on schedule on 17 October when the force sailed for the objective area. BLT 2/2 embarked in PHIBRON EIGHT was already in place as the CARIB READY PHIBRON and BLT. After skirting Hurricane ELLA, the forces sailed on 17 October from the Camp Lejeune-Morehead City area and were due in the Exercise Objective area on 22 October.

It is of interest that as early as about 10 October the National Military Command center began inquiring informally of CINCLANT as to the nature and scope of PHIBRIGLEX-62. Without ever relating the exercise to the Cuban situation, there were indications of high-level interest in it.

CHAPTER 1

INTELLIGENCE

So as to provide a proper setting for the Cuban contingency operation, it is necessary to take the intelligence picture back to the initial support of Cuba by the Soviet Union. This support started with economic assistance and trade agreements, and then expanded to include military equipment of a defensive nature, such as small arms and machine guns. Eventually, armored vehicles, tanks, and more complex weapons were introduced into the Cuban armed forces, and finally, Soviet offensive weapons were included in the military buildup of the island.

1. Events Leading to the Quarantine.

On achieving power in 1959, Castro openly collaborated with the Communists and allowed them to operate as a political power. Relations of the 26th of July movement with the Communists were at times strained during the early period of the regime, especially in competition for control of the national labor organizations.

The USSR watched and waited until February 1960 before responding to Castro's growing need for its support. Sugar purchasing agreements were followed in rapid progression by a variety of trade and credit agreements and by a flow of Bloc technicians and arms to Cuba. This Bloc assistance was indispensable to the survival of the Castro regime and had the effect of Cuba's alignment with the Bloc.

In the early part of 1962 the old line Communists attempted to gain ascendancy over Castro. Whether the move was Moscow directed or not is unproved but there is little doubt that the Soviets felt uneasy dealing with Castro. In April 1962, Castro won and the Soviets lined up behind him -- endorsing his purge of several leading communists and viewing Castro's formation of the new Cuban Revolutionary Party as a good step toward a true Marxist - Leninist Party.

The 14 May 1962, a Soviet-Cuban supplementary trade protocol signified Moscow's acceptance of Castro and his ability to retain leadership. The agreement called for a total of 750 million dollars in trade, and increase of 40% over 1961.

The proximity of Cuba to the U.S., its strategic location in the Caribbean Sea, and its location in the Western Hemisphere increased the importance of any activity undertaken there which is not in the best interest of the U.S. and the Free World. Castro's intention of establishing

a communist state in Cuba and his increased anti-U.S., pro-Communist actions also justified our increased surveillance and intelligence in the Cuban area.

June 1962 was marked by an increase in physical harassment of the Naval Base, Guantanamo -- a 6 mile area around the base was declared a "militarized" zone, families were removed, farms vacated and travel restrictions on roads to and from the Base were imposed. Daily radio broadcasts claimed U.S. use of the base for espionage and over 180 alleged U.S. aircraft violations of Cuban territorial limits and of ships at sea were itemized.

On 2 July 1962, Raul Castro arrived in Moscow for two weeks of talks with Khrushchev and other high ranking Soviet officials. This was correctly deduced as an attempt to secure additional military equipment. This meeting resulted in an immediate and complex military buildup in Cuba that was not to end until the sighting of offensive missiles in Cuba in October.

a. Merchant Shipping.

A large-scale increase in Soviet ship movements to Cuba became apparent in July 1962. Thirty Soviet merchantmen arrived in Cuban ports during that month, a 50 percent increase over the month of June.

The increase became even more evident in August, when 55 Soviet ships arrived in Cuba, a number that more than quadrupled the August 1961 figure of 12. September was the peak month, with 66 Soviet ship arrivals recorded. This three-month total of 151 ships exactly equaled the total Soviet ship arrivals for the first six months of 1962.

The buildup was continued into October, when 40 Soviet ships arrived in Cuba, despite the fact that, on the institution of the Naval Quarantine, 16 Soviet ships believed to be headed for Cuba turned back to Soviet ports. Approximately four flights a day were flown between Guantanamo Naval Base and Key West for shipping surveillance. Strategic material was photographed inbound to Cuba but was not associated with the buildup of offensive weapons, until just prior to October when intelligence confirmed that fact.

Bloc shipping, other than Soviet, arriving in Cuba remained at a fairly constant level, with an average of about eight ships arriving per month. This figure included Cuban ships. During the key months of August and September when Soviet shipping activity was at its highest, only eight Bloc ships, other than Soviet, arrived in Cuba. This indicated that the weapons provided to

Castro were carried in Soviet vessels, with other Bloc ships carrying on normal shipping activity.

b. Army

There were Soviet Bloc military personnel in Cuba prior to August 1962. A large influx occurred during August and September, when a total of 9 Bloc passenger ships arrived in Cuba. These 9 ships had a capacity to carry 20,000 passengers, yet with no basis for a firm estimate, national intelligence estimated 5,000 came on these ships.

By 13 November 1962, it was evident that Soviet military personnel were present in Cuba in much greater strength than previously estimated. At this time it appeared that the total could be as high as 16,000. Subsequent intelligence showed that there were about 21,000 Soviet military personnel there.

Following the removal of the missiles and light bombers about 4,000 missile personnel and airmen departed. There is no indication that Soviet ground forces or naval personnel have departed or intend to depart. On the contrary, the construction of permanent barracks type buildings at Soviet camps indicates a prolonged stay.

The breakdown of the estimated 17,000 total personnel indicated 7,500 with the Air Force, 7,500 serving with the ground forces, and approximately 2,000 with the Cuban navy.

Although Bloc arms deliveries to Cuba commenced in 1960 and continued throughout 1961, it was not until January 1962, during the New Year's Day Parade, that the extent of these deliveries could be ascertained. From the parade and other reliable intelligence, in early 1962 realistic estimates were made of Castro's newly acquired ground equipment -- 120 medium tanks, 20 to 30 heavy tanks, 50 assault guns, a small number of truck-mounted rocket launchers, 400 artillery pieces, 600 anti-aircraft weapons, 600 to 700 mortars, and about 300,000 rifles, carbines and sub-machine guns, all Soviet Bloc supplied.

During the period January through March 1962, the consolidation of Cuban Ground Forces into three distinct elements was confirmed -- 75,000 in the standing Army; 100,000 in the ready reserve; and 100,000 comprising the Home Guard.

Analysis of photographs taken in August 1962 of various deck loading of Soviet merchant ships revealed an impressive supply of advanced military weapons. The introduction was confirmed of Soviet and Czechoslovakian

multiple-barrel, truck-mounted, barrage-type rocket launchers new to Cuba. In September Soviet amphibious vehicles and armored personnel carriers were added to the growing arsenal.

c. Navy

Prior to 1962, Cuba's Navy consisted of obsolete U.S. supplied vessels, 3 PF boats, and 2 PCE boats. A few had undergone overhaul and modernization in the United States in 1954 and 1955.

During the first months of 1962, a buildup of the Cuban Naval Forces began. From 15 January to 26 March, various Soviet merchant ships delivered a total of 12 P-6 Class PT's and 6 KRONSTADT Class Patrol boats. These modern ships provided a significant increase in the Navy's coastal defense capability. The normal method of transfer was by means of a merchant ship carrying 4 PT's on deck and a KRONSTADT in tow. Intelligence from reliable sources had indicated that approximately 500 Cuban personnel had undergone training in the Soviet Union in preparation for the delivery of these ships.

Between 12 and 18 August, two Soviet merchant ships were photographed enroute to Cuba with strangely configured crates on deck. Preliminary analysis showed that these crates contained Soviet KOMAR Class missile-launching boats. This was later confirmed when the first KOMARS were photographed on 26 September operating in Cuban waters. Twelve of these missile-equipped boats were delivered to Cuba by September 1962. On 18 October, 4 of the boats departed Mariel and operated from the port at Banes, about 75 miles northwest of the Naval Base at Guantanamo. They remained there during the quarantine, operating from the port, and only recently returned to Mariel. All are now operating in the Havana-Mariel area. It is not confirmed that Soviet personnel are sole operators of these boats. They are still Soviet controlled and Cuban personnel are being trained in their operation.

The KOMAR class is basically a PT hull on which 2 missile tubes have been installed. It is estimated that the missile utilized in the KOMARS has a line of sight range of 10 to 12 nautical miles probably contains an automatic pilot, and carries a warhead of 2,000 pounds of high explosives. There is no at sea reload capability.

d. Air Force

Modern Soviet aircraft began to arrive about mid-1961. By January 1962 the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force had about 60 MIG-type jet fighters. These consisted primarily of the Sub-sonic MIG-15 (FAGGT) and the MIG-17 (FRESCO), with limited number of the Mach 1 MIG-19 (FARMER). In addition

small numbers of helicopters and light transports had been provided.

Intelligence substantiated the return to Cuba during the summer of 1961 of approximately 75 Cuban pilots who had received MIG jet training in Czechoslovakia. These pilots were to form the nucleus of the new Air Force. Under Soviet tutorage, a pilot training school was established near Havana at San Antonio de Los Banos Airfield.

In preparation for the MIG fighters, Castro's airfields had undergone major improvements. Runways were lengthened, new airfields were constructed, and refugios, or revetments were built. By October 1962, Castro had 20 airfields able to support the operation of MIG fighters.

On 10 September 1962, it was confirmed that MIG-21 jet fighters were in Cuba. This is a Mach 2 fighter, one of the Soviet Union's latest and most modern day fighters.

From ~~2~~ ⁹ Photographs of Santa Clara Airfield taken in October, after the quarantine was established and later, ~~it was confirmed that a total of 42~~ ~~was~~ the new generation fighter interceptor. Also, from this same photograph, it was found that these MIG-21s were, ~~and still are,~~ being flown by experienced Soviet pilots.

The Cuban Revolutionary Air Force is patterned after its Soviet benefactor. At the present time the entire MIG fighter force occupies four airfields--San Antonio de Los Banos, where its headquarters is located, Santa Clara, Camaguey International and Holguin in Oriente Province only about 70 nautical miles from Guantanamo.

The buildup of Castro's Air Force fighter interceptor capability was probably motivated by his concern over invasion and by Moscow's determination to retain him in power, and for the defense of the later discovered NREB and IRBM sites. The buildup was quickly followed by missile systems of a defensive nature.

e. Defensive Missiles.

In early September 1962, the existence of surface-to-air missiles in Cuba was confirmed. The missile used at these sites and referred to as the GUIDELINE, or SA-2, is capable of an effective altitude of 60,000 feet with a limited capability up to 80,000 feet, and a minimum altitude capability of 1,200 to 1,500 feet. Its slant range capability is estimated to be about 25 miles.

Seven of these sites were observed on 1 September 1962. It was apparent that the construction of these sites was a rapid and coordinated

endeavor, since some missiles were even placed on launchers in firing position before their revetments were completed. By 6 September, the number of confirmed sites had grown to 10. By 1 October the number of sites had grown to 24 where it now stands. Three of the 24 sites have since been moved short distances to provide better coverage in more poorly defended areas.

On 19 September we were able to confirm another type of missile located at Banes. Although our information regarding the capability of this missile is limited, we know that it is a cruise, or air-breathing missile, and is employed for coastal defense, probably against amphibious landings and ships at sea. We estimate the range of this missile at 25 to 35 nautical miles. The missile is probably controlled from the launching site. Two additional sites of this type were found on 28 September, and the number had grown to 5 by the middle of October. These sites remain.

All of the defensive missile sites were manned by Soviet personnel and will probably remain so for at least a year since adequate training will take that length of time. There is no information that the Cubans have started such training.

g. Offensive Threat.

It is now clear that the Soviet Union undertook to establish a Soviet offensive capability in Cuba during the spring of 1962. The introduction of a mixed-force of offensive aircraft, the IL-28 (BEAGLE), light jet bomber, and medium range missiles closely following the defensive buildup.

It had been suspected that the BEAGLES might be enroute to Cuba when we photographed Soviet ships on 16, 28 and 29 September and on 2 October, because of the size and shape of the crates on deck. BEAGLE fuselages were

transported by truck to San Julian Airfield on the western end of the Island for assembly. The first bomber was assembled during the period 12-17 October. In a photograph of San Julian Airfield taken on 6 November an assembled BEAGLE can be seen being towed down the taxiway and others in various stages of assembly. The existence of 9 additional crates of BEAGLES at Holguin Airfield near Guantanamo was later confirmed. Of a total of 42 crated bombers, 20 were in various stages of assembly before being shipped back to the Soviet Union.

It is estimated that the construction of the Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) sites began in early September. Confirmation of the existence of the sites was made on 14 October of the San Cristobal missile complex which consisted of 4 sites, each with 4 launch positions. Two additional sites at Sagua Grande were confirmed on 17 October, bringing the total of 6 sites, or a total of 24 launch positions. The missile used at these sites is known as the SS-4 and has a range capability of about 1,100 nautical miles.

Confirmation of the construction of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) sites came on 15-17 October. Photography was taken on 1 November of the Caimito Site, one of two such sites in the Guanajay Complex. The other identified site was at Remedios. Again, each of these sites contained 4 launch positions. This missile has a range of 2,200 nautical miles.

The IRBM range could cover practically all of the United States. The combat radius of the BEAGLE bomber is 740 nautical miles and it has the capability to deliver nuclear weapons.

A total of 42 MRBM missile transporters and some other missile-associated equipment have been removed from Cuba aboard eight ships. Photographic verification has been obtained of the missiles on these transporters. No IRBM's were observed in Cuba or being removed from there. Some were probably on the large hatch Soviet merchant ships enroute to Cuba that turned back when the quarantine was established.

h. Soviet Submarine Activity.

On 17 October, a sighting of the Soviet navy replenishment ship TEREK in the North Atlantic was considered unusual. Naval patrols kept this ship under surveillance as it worked its way to the southwest. The effort was rewarded on 22 October when the TEREK was sighted in the vicinity of the Azores refueling a ZULU type submarine. The topside condition of the submarine and the requirement for fuel indicated that she had been at sea for a long period. If two possibly valid contact reports are also

accepted, this could have meant that she had been on a covert patrol in the western Atlantic near the east coast of the United States.

Low level reports that Soviet submarines would be based in Cuba had been received for some time. These reports took on added significance with the discovery of the medium range missiles in Cuba and the large buildup of defensive weapons. The discovery of the ZULU submarine indicated that the Soviets might be deploying some submarines to the western Atlantic on covert patrols. Anti-submarine warfare commanders at sea were alerted to this possibility.

Soviet submarines were, in fact, in the western Atlantic. The first positive submarine to be flushed was a conventional FOXTROT class which surfaced 300 miles south of Bermuda. Sighting of this submarine was shortly followed by others. Altogether there were 6 positive sightings of Soviet conventionally-powered submarines in the approaches to the Caribbean. Five sightings were photographed.

Shortly after their discovery the submarines began a return to the Russian Northern Fleet bases. One of these submarines had a casualty which required surface transit to the USSR. U.S. Navy aircraft and ships followed it until its return was assured. Although there were six positive sightings in the quarantine area, it is probable that not over four submarines were deployed into this area.

The fact that these submarines were sighted so soon after the quarantine was established shows that they had left their Northern Fleet bases in early October. Time and distance factors require this if they were to have made an undetected passage to the sighting area.

1. Aerial Photographic Reconnaissance.

From 1 to 20 October, routine peripheral photo missions were flown around Cuba. Photo missions were also flown inside the fenceline at Guantanamo Naval Base. In addition, high altitude U-2 photo missions over Cuba were flown in October and it was by this means that the offensive threat was discovered. On 14 October sufficient information was obtained from the U-2 flights to confirm that offensive missile bases were completed and that other bases were under construction.

2. Events from 20 October to 1 December.

The President's announcement of the naval quarantine put an additional requirement on the intelligence effort. Most significant was the need for information concerning ship cargoes, locations of ships, status of missiles and bases in Cuba, and the Cuban armed forces order of battle.

a. Merchant Shipping.

When the quarantine was put into effect, suspect ships were designated by the JCS and CINCLANTFLT and located by surveillance aircraft or surface vessels prior to interception. The basis for designation was the capability to transport missiles below decks. In some cases extensive searches were necessary to locate the ships.

Sixteen Soviet ships enroute to Cuba altered course away from Cuba shortly after the quarantine was put into effect indicating that these ships were carrying cargo that the Soviets felt would not pass the quarantine. Two ships stopped dead in the water for several days prior to proceeding into the quarantine area. Some sort of cargo was transferred by high line from a Bloc ship headed for Cuba to one that was enroute from Cuba. One Swedish ship did not stop when requested and would not reveal her cargo. No action was taken by the intercepting ship and the suspect ship proceeded into Havana harbor. It was later learned that the Captain misunderstood instructions from his company that he was to submit to inspection and reveal his cargo.

Enclosure (1) of this chapter shows the shipping trade to Cuba during the crisis.

b. Army.

Existence of 48 Cuban divisions and 300 battalions, (some of which were subordinate to the 48 divisions), was verified in the period 20 October to 1 December. On 25 October, the Soviet FROG--Free Rocket Over Ground--unguided field artillery rockets and the SNAPPER wire-guided, anti-tank, scout car-mounted missiles were seen at Remedios in Central Cuba, and the modern Soviet T-54 medium tanks were confirmed at Santiago de Las Vegas. The PT-76 Amphibian tank was also confirmed.

These observations and other intelligence available through low-level photographs indicated the presence in Cuba of Soviet ground force troops drawn from Elite Guards units. Subsequent low level flights indicated these troops to be stationed at four locations throughout Cuba: Artemisa, Santiago de Las Vegas, Remedios, and Holguin.

Soviet Personnel strength approximated 1,000 to 1,500 at each camp and the organization at each camp was that of a regimental-sized task force composed of the following units: A medium tank battalion (32 medium tanks), and armored reconnaissance company, an armored infantry company (or possibly battalion), a multiple rocket launcher battery, a nuclear-capable FROG artillery battalion (of at least two launchers), and a SNAPPER anti-tank company with about nine triple launchers.

It is believed that the FROG's and SNAPPER's are under Soviet control and are maintained principally at the four camps mentioned. In addition, a family of tracked and wheeled armored personnel carriers was verified in Cuba. Although it is believed that most of these are connected with the four Soviet camps, it is possible some of this new equipment may have been issued to Cuban Army units.

Evidence indicated that the Cuban Army division may have begun to assume control of operations over subordinate units. Previously, it was estimated that the Cuban Army battalion, (of which there are two types) was the parent ground force unit.

Cuban Army forces were mobilized on or about 22-23 October and remained in a mobilized status for about one month. Demobilization was begun on 22-23 November and it is estimated that the demobilization process was completed on approximately 25 November. Cuban Army activities during the mobilization period indicated that training under Soviet and Bloc advisors paid off. Cuban Army units mobilized and assumed defensive positions quickly and with a minimum of confusion. This mobilization was carried out in spite of the logistic deficiencies which continued to plague the Cuban Army. These deficiencies consisted principally of a shortage of motor transport, lack of proper individual field clothing and equipment, and lack of adequate provisions for tactical feeding in the field. Unverified reports allege that several Cuban Army units left their field positions without authority when they experienced hardships due to lack of food and proper rainwear.

c. Offensive Missiles.

Additional construction and camouflage continued on the missile bases after the U.S. demanded that they be removed from Cuba. However, on 1 November initial evidence was obtained by low level aerial photography that dismantled

ing had begun on the MRBM bases and construction had stopped on the IRBM bases. One IRBM site had been destroyed. All the missiles from the MRBM sites have probably been removed from Cuba. Some were photographed in the dock areas prior to being loaded for shipment. A total of 42 MRBM missiles were removed from Cuba on 8 ships. The Soviets cooperated to a degree in the verification of missiles leaving Cuba. The names of the missile-carrying ships and their positions for intercepts were given to the U.S. authorities. Although much information given on the positions was erroneous, all the ships were located and photographed by U.S. forces.

The missiles were transported as deck cargo and were covered by canvas over the shipping crates and transporters and by a tight-fitting plastic covering over the missile. While the Soviets removed the entire canvas coverings, the plastic coverings were never removed. The only verification was that the objects on the ships conformed outwardly to the known shape of the suspect missiles. Enclosure (2) of this chapter is a picture of the missiles aboard the "BRATSK" enroute from Cuba.

Photographs of the suspect ships were taken by a P27 equipped with infrared photographic equipment. No significant results were obtained by this method and flights were discontinued.

d. Aerial Photographic Reconnaissance.

After the locations of the missile bases were known, low level photo missions over Cuba were commenced to obtain accurate information on the status of these bases. These low level flights plus the continued high level photo reconnaissance proved extremely valuable in information obtained. A total of 158 low level sorties were flown by the Navy and Air Force planes during the period from 23 October to 15 November. Only two known incidents occurred. One mission of two planes was fired upon by anti-aircraft weapons believed to be 57mm. No damage was sustained. The other incident involved the sighting by the reconnaissance pilots of a MIG-21 which appeared to be on an intercept course. The plane followed the flight inbound from the target but no hostile action was taken. One U-2 was lost on a high altitude mission over Cuba.

In addition to the routine photo flights around Cuba, KC-97 aircraft

were also used in peripheral photography of Cuba using both 100 inch and 240 inch focal length lenses. Results from these flights were not as useful as from overflights.

The most significant and unique aspect of the photo reconnaissance was the rapid development of the films, movement by jet courier to photo interpretation centers, and availability of interpretation results for use in military planning and diplomatic negotiations. This effort was coordinated by the JCS and was very successful.

e. Air Force.

The IL-28 BEAGLE/MASCOT medium bombers introduced in Cuba were first seen on high-level photography at San Julian Airfield in shipping crates. Assembly began in mid-October and continued even after the missile bases were being dismantled. A total of 11 BEAGLE/MASCOTS were completely assembled and two were in various stages of assembly when the decision was made to disassemble and remove them from Cuba. This first became evident from high-level photography taken between 15 and 25 November. All were removed from San Julian Airfield by 2 December.

On or about 4 November the first IL-28 fuselage crates were observed at an airfield other than San Julian; nine crates were located on the field at Holguin, but none had been opened and assembly had not commenced. These nine aircraft were never assembled and were removed from the field on or about 25 November. Photographs were also taken of the fuselage crates in the dock areas prior to being loaded for shipment and also aboard the ships while being taken back to Russia. Enclosure (3) of this Chapter is a picture of the fuselage crates aboard the "KASIMOV".

The MIG-21 aircraft in Cuba were assembled in greater numbers during this period. The MIG-21 is a first-line Soviet fighter and with the AA-2 ATOLL air-to-air missile, it possesses an intercept and kill capability up to 50,000 feet. The ATOLL missile was confirmed to be in Cuba by aerial photography in mid-November.


f. Defensive Missiles.

The surface-to-air missiles in Cuba were operational prior to 20 October, but one site was moved from Cabanas to Maldando which was about 10 miles to the northwest. There were several reports by fighter pilots of possible firings of these missiles in November. The pilots observed an object trailing flame which eventually burned out and disappeared. If this was a firing, it was believed to be a test. The possibility of an actual attempt to shoot down the aircraft has been discredited.

g. Air Quarantine.

An Air Quarantine was also proposed to prevent entrance of prohibited material into Cuba by air. The intelligence support for this proposed quarantine was also adequate.


The routes that could be utilized were limited both by capabilities of the Soviet aircraft and the landing facilities available. Several countries denied landing rights to Soviet Bloc Aircraft.



Enclosure (1) - Chapt I

Page 1 of 3 Pages


Enclosure (1)
to Chapter 1




Enclosure (1) -
Chapter I

Enclosure (1)
to Chapter 1

316 OPLAN
Naval Task Force Command Relations Diagram




22



Enclosure (1) -
Chapter I

Enclosure (1)
to Chapter 1



Enclosure (3)
to Chapter 1

CHAPTER II

STATUS OF CUBAN CONTINGENCY PLANS

The build up of Cuban military capability which threatened the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay combined with the danger of Communist aggression in the Caribbean and Latin American areas required that the U.S. be prepared to conduct military operations against Cuba if necessary.

Since Cuba lies within the CINCLANT area of responsibility, the task of developing plans for military operations in Cuba fell to Admiral Robert L. Dennison, the Unified Commander for this area. Supporting plans for Cuban contingencies were prepared by CINCLANT Service Component Commanders, Commander Joint Task Force 122, and designated Army, Navy and Air Force Task Force Commanders. CJTF 122 was subsequently disestablished for Cuban operations, CINCLANT assuming his tasks and controlling operations through his component commanders, CINCARLANT (CG CONARC), (CINCLANTFLT), and CINCAFLANT (COMTAC).

In order to cope with the Cuban situation CINCLANT developed several plans of action. These plans were either tentatively or fully approved by the JCS and provided for various degrees of response and reaction for Cuban operations.

The basic provisions of the CINCLANT 312/314/316 OPLANS are discussed in the paragraphs below:

CINCLANT Contingency Operation Plan No. 312-62.

The 312 OPLAN provided for the rapid response of U.S. air power against Cuba from a no warning condition if the need should arise. It also provided for a variety of requirements ranging from strikes against a single target to wide spread air attacks throughout Cuba. Thus the mission could be limited to the destruction of a SAM site or the destruction of several missile sites or large scale attacks against targets that posed a threat to the U.S. or other countries in the Western Hemisphere.

On 20 October CINCLANT published Change 2 to CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62. This change was Annex L to the basic plan and was devoted to the defense of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. This change was generated because of the likelihood that a Cuban attack against Guantanamo would occur upon execution of the basic 312 OPLAN. The Commander Antilles Defense Command was charged with the overall defense of the base.

Change 4 to the 312-62 OPLAN divided the 312 Plan into three different categories of action for a variety of requirements and response. These categories along with their assigned code names were:

Category I - FIRE HOSE - This category provided for the selective destruction of a SAM surface-to-air missile site or sites as directed by CINCLANT. CINCLANT acted as target coordinator and would conduct operations with his forces when directed.

Category II - SHOE BLACK - This category provided for a wider selection of targets under limited operations prescribed by CINCLANT. Strikes against a single or multiple target might be ordered by CINCLANT. "SHOE BLACK" missions were grouped by types, (i.e. airfields, SAM sites, missile complexes, and combat air patrols), CINCLANT was designated as target coordinator. Forces included air elements from the Naval Task Force.

Category III - SCABBARDS 312 - This category was for the conduct of large scale air strikes against Cuba.

The execution of the 312 Plan required that essential aviation support equipment and ordnance be prepositioned in the southern Florida and Caribbean area. Because of the heavy base loading at available military airfields in southern Florida, it was necessary that military aircraft not included in 312 Plan be relocated temporarily. It was also necessary for the JCS to make the decision to relocate SAC aircraft from those SAC bases in southern Florida required to support AFLANT forces.

CINCAFLANT (TAC) forces required in support of the 312 Plan initiated extensive training exercises on 18 September 1962. These exercises included flight profiles which closely approximated planned combat missions.

The actual deployment of TAC elements to Florida on 21 October was substantially assisted by these training missions, since many of the TAC units committed to the 312 OPLAN were at deployment bases in southern Florida.

Naval forces, including the CVAs INDEPENDENCE and ENTERPRISE with Air Groups SIX and SEVEN embarked were deployed as a part of Naval Task Force 135. One Marine A4D squadron consisting of 20 light attack aircraft was embarked in ENTERPRISE instead of the regularly assigned Heavy Attack Squadron. This action bolstered close air support capability in the eastern Cuba area.

Commander Carrier Division SIX was designated CTF 135. This force was in position for possible execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 on 20 October 1962. CINCLANTFLT OPORD 43-62 provided for the conduct of air strikes by LANTFLT forces against assigned targets in eastern Cuba and supported the CINCLANT 312 OPLAN. One Marine Air Group (MAG) at Key West and two Carrier Air Groups in the Jacksonville area were directed to report to CINCAFLANT for planning and for OPCON upon execution of the 43-62 OPORD.

Command Relations. The U.S. Naval Forces Atlantic under the Command of Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN and U.S. Air Forces Atlantic under the command of General Walter C. Sweeney, Jr., (CG-12A3) provided the Air Forces for unified action under the CINCLANT 312 OPLAN.

The Commander Antilles Defense Command (COMANTDEFCON), Rear Admiral Allen H. Smith, USN was responsible for the defense of Guantanamo. COMANTDEFCON is a Subordinate Unified Commander under CINCLANT.

For all operations under the 312 OPLAN CINCLANT would exercise operational command through CINCPACFLT, CINCLANTFLT, and COMANTDEFCON.

The Commander Strike Command (CINCSSTRIKE) provides U.S. Air Forces to CINCLANT when made available by the JCS.

CINCLANT Contingency Operation Plan 314-61

The CINCLANT 314 OPLAN provided for joint military operations in Cuba by combined Navy, Air Force and Army forces. The plan called for a simultaneous amphibious and airborne assault in the Havana area by a Joint Task Force within eighteen days after the receipt of the order to execute.

In eastern Cuba,

Annex G to the 314 Plan provided for achieving a four day reaction capability by suspending the execution of the 314 OPLAN at D-4. This plan was designated 314 GOLF. Further, it envisioned that the projection of U.S. Military Force encompassed in the 314 OPLAN would lead to the overthrow of the Castro Government.

Supporting plans by subordinate commanders had been prepared and were capable of being executed if directed. The 312, 314 and 316 OPLANS were kept current by issuing changes as necessary.

Command Relations. The principal Commanders in the task organization for the 314 OPLAN were Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Commander Joint Task Force 122 (CJTF 122), 3d Marine Airborne Corps, Commander 19th Air Force, Commander Antilles Defense Command and Commander Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Atlantic. To assist CINCLANT in planning for contingency operations envisioned in the 314 OPLAN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command designated the Commanding General XVIII Airborne Corps and the Commander 19th Air Force as interim Army and Air Force Task Force Commanders in Joint Task Force 122. Commander Amphibious Task Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet was designated as Commander Naval Task Force. These Commanders prepared plans in support of the 314 OPLAN.

In addition to designating Army and Air Force Task Force Commanders, CINCSTRIKE was to provide Army and Air Forces to CINCLANT as directed by the JCS.

On 26 October upon recommendation of CINCLANT, the JCS directed that planning and preparation for execution of the 314 OPLAN be abandoned in favor of the CINCLANT 316 OPLAN, except for those portions of the 314 OPLAN which were applicable to both the 314 and 316 OPLANS.

CINCLANT Contingency Operation Plan 316-62

The CINCLANT 316-62 OPLAN was developed as an alternative to the 314 OPLAN.

The 316 Plan envisioned the eventual employment of the same forces as indicated in the 314 OPLAN.

On 17 October as planning progressed the 316 OPLAN was readjusted upon request of the JCS to provide for a 7 day period between the beginning of air strikes and a simultaneous assault by airborne and amphibious forces. CINCLANT advised the JCS that it would be necessary for the XVIII Airborne Corps to reschedule their movements to utilize the additional two days made available by the change from a five day to seven day plan.

The seven day version afforded the following advantages:

a. The full force of the Second Marine Division, (minus), and the parachute elements of the ten battle groups of the XVIII Airborne Force would arrive simultaneously and reduce the risk substantially.

b. The delay of D-day by two days in effect moved the follow on forces and equipment two days sooner after D-day. This strengthened and enhanced the ground forces capabilities.

c. The additional two days permitted a slight margin for delay due to weather or other contingencies in the movement of initial combat forces.

It was further pointed out by CINCLANT that a change from a five day to seven day plan would not place an extensive planning burden on commanders concerned.

Since the 312 OPLAN would be executed prior to the 316 OPLAN. CINCLANT clarified responsibilities for air operations during the transition from the 312 Plan to the 316 Plan. No later than twenty-four hours prior to D-Day of the 316 OPLAN, and based on recommendations from subordinate commanders, CINCLANT would declare 312 operations completed. At this time the command and control arrangements, tasks, and operational areas set forth in the CINCLANT 316-62 OPLAN would become effective. CINCAFLANT would be responsible for air operations in the Western Zone of Cuba, less the amphibious objective area. The Commander Naval Task Force would be responsible for operations in the Eastern Zone of Cuba. Air operations in the amphibious objective area would be carried out through the appropriate Amphibious Task Force Commander.

Upon activation of Commander Joint Task Force Cuba, the Commander Air Force Task Force would control all air operations in Cuba for CJTF Cuba. Marine Air Group 14 would be chopped to Commander Naval Task Force upon completion of 312 operations.

Command Relations. The principal commanders in the task organization under CINCLANT were Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Atlantic, (CINCLANTFLT), Commander Antilles Defense Command, (COMANTDEFCON), Commander Joint Task Force 122, (CJTF 122). The JTF 122 consisted of Army, Navy, and Air Force Task Forces. In addition Commander Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic was included in planning and would conduct operations, as directed by CINCLANT when activated. A Commander, Joint Task Force Cuba would also be established when directed by CINCLANT to assume operational control of forces assigned and to conduct operations in Cuba as directed by CINCLANT.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command, (CINCSTRIKE), provided Army and Air Forces to CINCLANT as directed by the JCS. CINCSTRIKE was also to designate Army and Air Force Task Force Commanders in the JTF 122 organization. CINCSTRIKE also performed augmentation force planning involving Army and Air Force units assigned to the United States Strike Command.

On 20 October 1962 a significant change in command relationships for CINCLANT contingency operations as envisioned under the CINCLANT 312, 314 and 316 Plans occurred. The Commanding General United States Continental Army Command, (USCONARC), General Herbert B. Powell, and the Commander Tactical Air Command, (COMTAC), General Walter C. Sweeney, Jr., were designated as Commander in Chief Army Atlantic, (CINCARLANT), and Commander in Chief Air Force, (CINCAFLANT), to assist CINCLANT in contingency planning. For operations under CINCLANT OPLANS 314 and 316, the CG XVIII Airborne Corps

remained as Commander Army Task Force, Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet remained as Commander Naval Task Force and Commander 19th Air Force remained as Commander Air Task Force. The Headquarters of Joint Task Force 122 was dissolved for Cuban operations on 20 October and its functions were assumed by CINCLANT. CINCLANT would exercise operational command of individual service task forces through each of his service component commanders.

With respect to operations under the 312 OPLAN, CINCAFLANT would exercise operational control of all Air Forces assigned targets which were not related to the defense of the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay Cuba. Operational control of Air Forces related to the defense of Guantanamo would be exercised by CINCLANTFLT through the Commander Naval Task Force.

Although Joint Task Force 122 was dissolved insofar as Cuban operations were concerned the existing JTF 122 supporting plans were to remain in effect until modified or cancelled by CINCLANT.

On 22 October another significant action occurred when CINCSTRIKE passed temporary OPCON of all Army and Air Forces included in the CINCLANT 312, 314, and 316 OPLANS to CINCLANT.

The status of units designated for CINCLANT OPLANS 312/316 on 18 October is indicated in enclosure (1) and charts depicting command relationships are contained in enclosure (2) to this chapter.

STATUS OF NAVAL FORCES DESIGNATED FOR CINCLANT OPLAN 315 EFF 10-18-62

316

UNIT	OPCON	TASK DESIG	LOCATION	EMPLOYMENT	REMARKS
ENTERPRISE CVAN-65	2ND FLT		NORVA	IN PORT	
INDEPENDENCE CVA-62	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	33-00N 75-10W	UNDERWAY	VA-13 VF-84 VA-72 VA-64 VA-75 VAH-11 DET VFP-62 DET
CANBERRA CA-2	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT	
NEWPORT NEWS CA-148	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT	
W. M. WOOD DDR-715	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT	
HAWKINS DDR-873	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	26-04N 80-03W	UNDERWAY	
HARWOOD DD-861	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	MAYPORT	IN PORT	
ZELLERS DD-777	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	MAYPORT	IN PORT	
MAC DONOUGH DLG-8	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	CHARLESTON	IN PORT	
DAHLGREN DLG-12	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT	
BORDELON DDR-881	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	CHARLESTON	IN PORT	
E. A. GREENE DDR-711	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	CHARLESTON	IN PORT	

Page 1 of 13 Pages

Enclosure (1) - Chapter II

FURSE DDR-882	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	CHARLESTON	IN PORT
C. F. ADAMS DDG-2	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	37-00N 73-00W	UNDERWAY
BIGELOW DD-942	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	MAYPORT	IN PORT
A.M. SUMNER DD-692	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	MAYPORT	IN PORT
W. C. LAWE DD-763	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	MAYPORT	IN PORT
VESOLE DDR-878	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	CHARLESTON	IN PORT
PRATT DLG-13	OPTEVFOR	TG 123.2	VA CAPES OP AREA	ISE
O'HARE DDR-889	PHIBLANT	TG 123.2	34-00N 71-24W	
FISKE DDR-842	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	26-04N	ENR MYPT
CORRY DDR-817	CRUDES LANT	TG 123.2	34-00N 71-24W	
BEATTY DD-756	ASWFORLANT	TG 123.2	NWPT	IN PORT
MC CAFFERY DD-860	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	MAYPORT	IN PORT
C. R. WARE DD-865	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	MAYPORT	IN PORT
BRISTOL DD-857	CRUDES LANT	TG 123.2	NWPT	IN PORT

Page 2 of 13 Pages

Enclosure (1)- Chapt II

HYMAN DD-732	ASWFORLANT	TG 123.2	NWPT	IN. PORT
SELLERS DDG-11	CRUDESANT	TG 123.2	MAYPORT	IN PORT
W. R. RUSH DDR-714	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	26-04N 80-03W	ENR MYPT
DEWEY DLG-14	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT
PURDY DD-734	ASWFORLANT	TG 123.2	NWPT	IN PORT
LAWRENCE DDG-4	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT
BIDDLE DDG-5	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT
STICKELL DDR-888	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT
F. ROYAL DD-872	OPTEVFOR	TG 123.2	MAYPORT	IN PORT
C. P. CECIL DDR-835	CRUDESANT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT
N. K. PERRY DDR-883	2ND FLT		CHARLESTON	IN PORT
STEINAKER DDR-863	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT
LEARY DDR-879	2ND FLT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT
VP-7	NAVAIRLANT	TG 123.2	NAS JAX	

Page 3 of 13 Pages

Enclosure (1) -
Chapter II

VP-18	SOLANT	TG 123.2	SANTIGO CHILE	
WASP CVS-18	ASWFORLANT	TG 123.2	BSN	IN PORT
R. A. OWENS DD-827	ASWFORLANT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT
NEW DD-818	ASWFORLANT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT
HOLDER DD-819	ASWFORLANT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT
RICH DD-820	ASWFORLANT	TG 123.2	NORVA	IN PORT
R.L. WILSON DD-847	ASWFORLANT	TG 123.2	GTMO	IN PORT
MC NAIR DD-679	CRUDES LANT	TG 123.2	PHILA	IN PORT
BASILONE DD-824	ASWFORLANT	TG 123.2	GTMO	IN PORT
DAMATO DD-871	ASWFORLANT	TG 123.2	GTMO	IN PORT
ELOKOMIN AO-55	2ND FLT	TG 123.3	NORVA	IN PORT
TRUCKEE AO-147	2ND FLT	TG 123.3	31-00N 73-58W	
AUCILIA AO-56	2ND FLT	TG 123.3	NORVA	IN PORT
SABINE AO-25	PHIBLANT	TG 123.3	31-00N 73-58W	

MAZAMA AE-9	PHIBLANT	TG 123.3	UNK	
MAVNALOA AE-8	2ND FLT	TG 123.3	BAY ON NE	IN PORT
WRANGELL AE-12	2ND FLT	TG 123.3	36-30N 74-06W	
SALINAN ATG-161	OPTEVFOR	TG 123.3	MIAMI	IN PORT
MOSOPELEA ATF-158	SERVLANT	TG 123.3	GTMO	IN PORT
SENECA ATF-91	SERVLANT	TG 123.3	NORVA	IN PORT
PAPAGO ATF-160	SERVLANT	TG 123.3	GTMO	IN PORT
VULCAN AR-5	SERVLANT	TG 123.3	NORVA	IN PORT
ESCAPE ARS-6	CARIBSEAFRON	TG 123.3	SAN JUAN	IN PORT
WINDLASS ARSD-4	SERVLANT	TG 123.3	MOREHEAD CITY	IN PORT
YELLOWSTONE AD-27	SERVLANT	TG 123.3	MAYPORT	IN PORT
QUILLBACK SS-424	SUBLANT	TG 123.4	GTMO	IN PORT
ATULE SS-403	SUBLANT	TG 123.4	KEY WEST	IN PORT
TIRANTE SS-420	SUBLANT	TG 123.4	KEY WEST	IN PORT

Page 5 of 13 Pages

Enclosure (1)
Chapter II

SEA LION APSS-315	PHIBLANT	TG 123.4	NORVA	IN PORT
AEWRON VAW-33	NAVAIRLANT	TG 123.6	QUONSET PT	IN PORT
VMCJ-2 DET	CG 2ND MAW	TG 123.6	CHERRY PT	IN PORT
BJU-2	PHIBLANT	TG 123.6	LITTLE CRK	IN PORT
MT McKINLEY AGC-7	PHIBLANT	TF 128	32-30N 72-05W	UNDERWAY
BOXER LPH-4	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	NORVA	IN PORT
OKINAWA LPH-3	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	18N 65-30W	UNDERWAY
CHILTON APA-38	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	18N 65-30W	UNDERWAY
ROCKBRIDGE APA-228	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	18-05N 65-30W	UNDERWAY
MONROVIA APA-31	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	18-05N 65-30W	UNDERWAY
F. MARION APA-249	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	18-05N 65-30W	UNDERWAY
UVALDE AKA-88	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	NORVA	IN PORT
ALGOL AJA-54	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	SAN JUAN	IN PORT
THUBAN AKA-19	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	LITTLE CRK	IN PORT
RANKIN AKA-103	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	NORVA	IN PORT

Page 6 of 13 pages

Enclosure (1)
Chapter II

VERMILION AKA-107	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	32-02N 72-05W	UNDERWAY
CAPRICORNUS AKA-57	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	18-05N 65-30W	UNDERWAY
SPIEGEL GROVE LSD-32	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	LITTLE CRK	IN PORT
FORT SNELLING LSD-30	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	LITTLE CRK	IN PORT
PLYMOUTH ROCK LSD-29	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	32-20N 72-05W	UNDERWAY
LINDENWALD LSD-6	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	18-05N 65-30W	UNDERWAY
CASA GRANDE LSD-13	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	MOREHEAD CITY	IN PORT
DONNER LSD-20	TRALANT	TG 128.1	LITTLE CRK	IN PORT
SHADWELL LSD-15	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	MOREHEAD CITY	IN PORT
LIDDLE APD-60	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	18-05N 65-25W	UNDERWAY
E.F. HALL APD-107	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	32-20N 72-05W	UNDERWAY
LORAIN COUNTY LST-1177	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	LITTLE CRK	IN PORT
DESOTO COUNTY LST-1171	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	18-05N 65-30W	UNDERWAY
TRAVERSE CTY LST-1160	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	LITTLE CRK	IN PORT

TERREBONE PARISH PHIBLANT LST-1156	TG 128.1	LITTLE CRK	IN PORT
TALBOT COUNTY PHIBLANT LST-1153	TG 128.1	29-05N 72-15W	UNDERWAY
WAHIAKUM CTY PHIBLANT LST-1162	TG 128.1	LITTLE CRK	IN PORT
GRANT COUNTY PHIBLANT LST-1174	TG 128.1	28-30N 81-00W	UNDERWAY
WOOD COUNTY PHIBLANT LST-1178	TG 128.1	32-20N 72-05W	UNDERWAY
MEADOW LARK MINLANT MSC-196	TG 128.1	CHARLESTON	IN PORT
KING BIRD MINLANT MSC-194	TG 128.1	CHARLESTON	IN PORT
PARROT MINLANT MSC-197	TG 128.1	CHARLESTON	IN PORT
FIDELITY MINLANT MSO-443	TG 128.1	CHARLESTON	IN PORT
FEARLESS MINLANT MSO-442	TG 128.1	CHARLESTON	IN PORT
BULWARK PHIBLANT MSO-425	TG 128.1	11-05N 65-30W	UNDERWAY
BOLD PHIBLANT MSO-424	TG 128.1	18-05N 65-30W	UNDERWAY
AGGTESSIVE PHIBLANT MSO-442	TG 128.1	GTMO	IN PORT
AGILE PHIBLANT MSO-421	TG 128.1	GTMO	IN PORT

AVENGE MSO-423	MINLANT	TG 128.1	32-41N 79-45W	UNDERWAY
EXULTANT MSO-441	MINLANT	TG 128.1	CHASN	IN PORT
BORIE DD-704	CRUDES LANT	TG 128.1	NORVA	IN PORT
MANLEY DD-940	CRUDES LANT	TG 128.1	GTMO	IN PORT
J. P. KENNEDY DD-850	OPTEVFOR	TG 128.1	NEWPORT	IN PORT
COURTNEY DE-1021	CRUDES LANT	TG 128.1	NEWPORT	IN PORT
MITSCHER DL-2	ASWFORLANT	TG 128.1	NEWPORT	IN PORT
VAN VOORHIS DE-1028	ASWFORLANT	TG 128.1	NEWPORT	IN PORT
SOLEY DD-707	SECONDFLT	TG 128.1	NORVA	IN PORT
HAZELWOOD DD-531	CRUDES LANT	TG 128.1	NEWPORT	IN PORT
H. PURVIS DD-709	CRUDES LANT	TG 128.1	NEWPORT	IN PORT
C. H. ROAN DD-853	CRUDES LANT	TG 128.1	NEWPORT	IN PORT
W. L. LIND DD-703	CRUDES LANT	TG 128.1	18-42N 69-30W	UNDERWAY
CROMWELL DE-1014	CRUDES LANT	TG 128.1	NEWPORT	IN PORT

Page 9 of 13 Pages

Enclosure (1)
Chapter II

J. WILLIS DE-1027	CRUDES LANT	TG 128.1	NEWPORT	IN PORT
BARTON DD-722	SECONDLT	TG 128.1	NORVA	IN PORT
HAMMERBERG DE-1015	CRUDES LANT	TG 128.1	NEWPORT	IN PORT
DEALEY DE-1006	ASWFORLANT	TG 128.1	NEWPORT	IN PORT
WREN DD-568	CRUDES LANT	TG 128.1	GALVESTON	IN PORT
J. K. TAUSSIG DE-1030	ASWFORLANT	TG 128.1	NEWPORT	IN PORT
J. R. PIERCE DD-753	SECONDFLT	TG 128.1	NORVA	IN PORT
ENGLISH DD-696	SECONDFLT	TG 128.1	32-00N 71-00W	UNDERWAY
HANK DD-702	SECONDFLT	TG 128.1	32-00N 71-00W	UNDERWAY
HARTLEY DE-1029	ASWFORLANT	TG 128.1	NEWPORT	IN PORT
NAHANT AN-83	COMFIVE	TG 128.1	HALIFAX	IN PORT
PANDEMUS ARI-18	MINIANT	TG 128.1	CHASN	IN PORT
ORLEANS PARISH MCS-6	MINLANT	TG 128.1	HALIFAX	IN PORT
TACRON 21	PHIBLANT	TG 128.1	LITTLE CRK	IN PORT

UDT DET

PHIBLANT

TG 128.1

LITTLE CRK

IN PORT

Page 11 of 13 Pages

Enclosure (1)
Chapter II

STATUS OF NAVAL AND MARINE AIR UNITS DESIGNATED FOR CINCLANT OPLAN 312
EFF 10-18-62

UNIT	OPCON	LOCATION	TYPE	AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE		
				6 Hrs	12 Hrs	24 Hrs
VF-31	COMNAVAIRLANT	CECIL	F3H-2	6	8	9
VF-32	COMNAVAIRLANT	CECIL	F8U-2N	3	4	4
VA-34	COMNAVAIRLANT	CECIL	A4D-2N	4	7	7
VA-36	COMNAVAIRLANT	CECIL	A4D-2N	4	7	7
VAH-9	COMNAVAIRLANT	SANFORD	A3D-2	4	6	7
VAH-3	COMNAVAIRLANT	SANFORD	A3D-1	6	8	10
VF-62	COMNAVAIRLANT	CECIL	F8U-1E	6	8	9
VA-46	COMNAVAIRLANT	CECIL	A4D-2N	4	7	7
VA-106	COMNAVAIRLANT	CECIL	A4D-2	4	7	7
VA-176	COMNAVAIRLANT	JAX	AD-6	7	10	10
VA-44	COMNAVAIRLANT	JAX	AD-6	7	10	12
VA-44	COMNAVAIRLANT	JAX	A4D-2N	6	8	8
VA-44	COMNAVAIRLANT	JAX	A4D-2	8	10	10
VAP-62	COMNAVAIRLANT	JAX	A3D-2P	3	5	6
VF-174	COMNAVAIRLANT	CECIL	F8U-1	4	6	8
VF-174	COMNAVAIRLANT	CECIL	F8U-2	6	8	9
VF-174	COMNAVAIRLANT	CECIL	F8U-2N	6	8	8
VF-174	COMNAVAIRLANT	CECIL	F8U-2N	2	4	4
VFP-62	COMNAVAIRLANT	CECIL	F8U-1P	3	6	6
VNF-333	CG FMFLANT	ROOS RDS	F8U-2	12	16	16
VMA-324	CG FMFLANT	BEAUFORT	A4D-2	0	0	12
*VMA-331	CG FMFLANT	ROOS RDS	A4D-2	12	12	12
INDEPENDENCE 2ND FLT		UNDERWAY	CVA-62	-	-	-
WITH COMCARDIV SIX AND CV AIR GROUP 7						
VF-13	2ND FLT	33-00N	F3H-2	10	10	10
		75-10W				
VF-84	2ND FLT	33-00N	F8U-2	9	9	10
		75-10W				
VA-72	2ND FLT	33-00N	A4D-2N	10	12	12
		75-10W				
VA-64	2ND FLT	33-00N	A4D-2N	9	11	11
		75-10W				
VA-75	2ND FLT	33-00N	AD-6	9	11	11
		75-10W				
VAH-11	2ND FLT	33-00N	A3D-2	3	6	6
		75-10W				

* 4 A4D's AT GTMO; OPCON COMCARIBSEAFRON

Status of CINCAFLANT 312 Forces 18-20 October

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>In Place</u>
474	Homestead AFB	18 October
4 TFW	McCoy AFB	19 October
354 TFW	McCoy AFB	19 October
401 TFW	Homestead AFB	19 October
479 TFW	Key West NAS	20 October
31 TFW	Homestead AFB	18 October
4156 CCTW	Homestead AFB	20 October

NOTE: Units from Luke AFB and Nellis AFB augmented forces at Homestead and McCoy along with aerial tankers. Thus before the President's quarantine speech the Tactical Air Command had in excess of 500 aircraft deployed to employment bases in Florida. Actual deployment of TAC forces to Florida was directed by TAC FRAG ORDER NO. 2 to AFLANT OPLAN 312. Although this order was issued on 21 October many units were actually in place under TAC OPS ORDER 173-62.

1. TAC ltr ser 62 5691 of 6 Nov 1962

CHAPTER III

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications Plans to support CINCLANT Contingency operations were in existence prior to the Cuban crisis, and were designed to provide the necessary command and control circuits for CJTF 122, the designated "on the scene" commander. Command lines of communication between CINCLANT and CJTF 122 and between CJTF 122 and his subordinate forces - XVIII Airborne Corps, (Army), COMSECONDEFLT, (Navy), and 19th AF, (Air Force), had been tested during Exercise "AXLE GREASE" and "QUICK KICK".

Essential communication facilities were already in operation to support CINCLANT during the initial period and to provide command and control circuits until CJTF 122 could go afloat and establish operational control. The JCSAN, (JCS ALERT NET), was available and included conference call capability. Full utilization of all available Defense Communications System circuits was planned. The inter-area Single Sideband Net, (E-33.1), and the Atlantic Area SSB Net, (E-33.2), was available for voice communications. The fleet Broadcast, Naval Teletype Net, NAVOPNET, STARCUM and AIR-COMNET were operational and prepared for increased traffic. CJTF 122 plans provided for the communication requirements in the objective area.

During the September - October 1962 period CJTF 122 had conducted several communication conferences to develop tactical radio communications, plan frequency requirements, analyze previous training exercises and to discuss mutual communications problems. Representatives from CINCLANT, TAC, FMFLANT, 19th AF, XVIII Airborne Corps, COMSECONDEFLT, U.S. Army Signal Radio Propagation Agency and other organizations attended, and aside from developing communications requirements the conferees also benefited by becoming acquainted and working together. Although the command structure was changed later, this preliminary planning facilitated the expansion of CINCLANT communications which followed.

The command reorganization to direct Cuban Contingency Operations was approved by the JCS and placed in effect on 20 October 1962. The communications staff had initiated action commencing 15 October to implement the existing communications plans, to incorporate and finalize the previous planning of CJTF 122 and to develop additional communications capabilities which would suffice regardless of what further command changes might occur.

On Monday, 22 October CINCLANT representatives attended a conference in Washington and briefed J-6, the JCS and the Communications Directors of the Army, Navy, Air Force and DCA on CINCLANT communications. During the meeting important agreements were reached between the services for optimizing

support of CINCLANT requirements.

On 26 October 1962 JCS directed that the CINCLANT 316 Plan be used as the primary operational plan. The major changes in the communications plans had been made and all essential actions initiated by this date. Plan changes actually occurred to the communications annex of the 314 Plan, since most of the provisions of this annex had been incorporated in the 316 Plan. The tempo of activity increased to a maximum at this period. Planning and implementation were intertwined, with orders, changes and directives going forth by telephone, message and sometimes courier. This period can best be presented by a brief discussion of the following subjects.

- a. Communications between CINCLANT, component commands and forward bases.
- b. Mobile communications.
- c. Fleet communications.
- d. Internal communications.

Communications between CINCLANT, Component Commands and Forward Bases.

In order to satisfy the communication requirement in the event of major changes in organizational structure and to provide the necessary communications with the commander in the objective area numerous full duplex, direct, on-line, top secret circuits were established from CINCLANT Headquarters to all probable key subordinates. While this provided excess circuit capability in some instances, it had the highly beneficial effects of insuring redundancy for stability and reliability so essential to the control of operations.

/ Primary communication requirements for the new command structure were satisfied by lease of commercial circuits. There was insufficient mobile equipment to meet demands, Communication sets available had to be held in reserve for possible deployment to the Cuban area. The limited network already in use was expanded with first priority going to circuits with AFLANT, (Langley AFB, Va.), and ARLANT, (Ft. Monroee, Va.).

This was followed by engineering circuits to the forward area and making additions to circuits called up by AFLANT and ARLANT. Common user circuits in operation were committed to use where possible. The flow of operational and coordinative types of information generated a need for some special circuits. Telephone calls could be made through commercial switching facilities. Messages could be sent via common user routing to most locations

but would have been inadequate during the crisis, creating traffic backlogs at many communications centers and providing unsatisfactory service.

A good example of limited communications available can be found in the study of the Key West development. There were no direct telephone lines between CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT and Key West for administrative and operational calls. A hot line for passing ASWFORLANT information existed, being a party line along the east coast with many locations tied in. Classified messages were sent over the Naval Operation Net, which was on-line¹ but required the messages to be retransmitted through the Naval Communications Station, Norfolk. The Naval 8031 teletype system was available for passing unclassified traffic to stations in the system. The communications building at Key West had to be modified before additional circuits for handling classified traffic could be installed.

JCS policy for a joint command to obtain leased circuits is for the request to be submitted to the Defense Communications Agency; which allocates circuits and provides information where circuits must be engineered⁴ and provided by the commercial telephone company. Time was a critical factor since most of the circuits had never been engineered.

At the request of CINCLANT, DCA sent representatives to provide direct liaison with DCA in meeting CINCLANT circuit requirements.

(1) On-line - The message is sent via teletype with the circuit passing through an encryption device automatically encoding the outgoing message while a similar machine decodes the message on the other end.

Off-line - Term applied to a method of handling classified traffic. Messages are received and then placed on an encode/decode device to obtain the clear text.

(2) Engineered - (or EMG): Engineered military circuit - Circuits ordered from a commercial telephone company for call up when required. The circuit may consist of several links between various switching centers. These lengths are scheduled to become a part of a complete circuit when call up is received. The two ends of the circuits are installed to the two respective military bases. Charges are made for the two ends, (tails), and for the standby availability of the circuit, but this is much less than ordering up the complete circuits for full period use. An EMG circuit can generally be ready within one hour. Most of the circuits called up were placed on an EMG status. As an example of the cost difference, one of the representative telephone-teletype leased line systems which included part of the circuits placed in operation during the initial period, cost \$88,389.90 per month when in full use. When these circuits reverted to EMG status the cost dropped to \$15,500.00 per month. The approximate cost of all circuits ordered by the Navy for Cuban operations was quoted at \$390,000.00 for FIVE in 1961 and eight additional FIVE to CINCLANT.

Meanwhile, coordination was maintained with AFLANT and ARLANT to insure that required circuits were ordered without having duplication. In some areas throughout the southeast there is a shortage of available circuits and/or circuit terminal facilities. However, the commercial companies provided excellent support and met every request with minimum delay.

AFLANT had also established some of the required circuits in advance of this period. The Command had a plan named "ROCKPILE" with the objective of complete destruction of the Cuban air order of battle. This plan later became a part of the CINCLANT 312 Plan. Communications requirements to support this plan had been started in anticipation of having the plan approved. These circuits were fitted into the overall communications systems.

The rapid increase in commercially leased circuits occurred during the latter part of October. Starting with 106 circuits already in use by CINCLANTFLT, AFLANT and ARLANT, the number had increased to 511 at the stage of maximum preparation, (see enclosure (1) to this chapter for diagram of major telephone circuits from CINCLANT).

Military installations in the forward area required voice and teletype circuits with CINCLANT and/or the component commands. The Naval Base at Key West required an increase in communication facilities since reconnaissance ASW and air defense activities operated from there. The installation of the ATCU-100 for circuit extension to Guantanamo required 8 base circuits to the communications center for local termination and patch-through to CINCLANT. Local circuits at Key West and in the immediate area were necessary for the new operational activities in addition to those trunk lines previously mentioned. Homestead AFB, Florida, became the Forward Command Post for AFLANT and ARLANT. This created a requirement for circuits with their rear area Headquarters, with CINCLANT and with other operating locations in the forward area. Lines were leased between the Third Army at Ft. McPherson, Georgia, and ARLANT and to the staging area bases. The XVIII Airborne Corps, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina was tied in to ARLANT, AFLANT, (FWD), and other terminal points. Installations for conducting air operations, staging of troops and supplies, logistic support and other functions were brought together by voice and teletype circuits to handle the flow of administrative and operational traffic. Included were: MacDill, McCoy, Opa-locka, Eglin and Seymour-Johnson Air Force Bases; Jacksonville NAS, Port Everglades and many other locations. Some circuits and facilities were not used extensively since the 316 Operation Plan never advanced to the execution stage, but the capability was there - a requisite for any successful operation.

Full cooperation was obtained from all military and civil agencies while obtaining circuits. The establishment of voice circuits to COMANTDEFCON required a circuit from Norfolk to Cape Canaveral which extended on to West Palm Beach, where it entered an AT&T cable to San Juan. NASA circuitry was

put into use between Cape Canaveral and San Juan. A 10 kilowatt mobile transmitter located at Cape Canaveral was offered to the Naval Communications Station San Juan, by the Air Force.

Important circuits extending into the area included teletype and telephone circuits between CINCLANT and COMANTDEFCON; a teletype circuit from CINCLANT via Patrick AFB, Florida and on to San Juan, and SSB links between Key West, Guantanamo and San Juan.

Common user circuits were utilized whenever possible. These included DCA circuits into Washington, Puerto Rico, Guantanamo, Panama, Key West, Camp Lejeune and others. The CINCSAC SSB radio net was available for use and had stations in Florida and San Juan where entry to other SAC installations could be made. The CNO Composite Fleet SSB Command Net, (E33.1), was also available for use. The SCAN³ system was entered by leased circuits to the switching central at Frederick, Maryland, providing access to major trunk circuits throughout the U. S.

(5) T-2 - Engineered for passing a 3000 cycle signal, (AUDIO), with minimum delay distortion.

This mad shuffle and installation of cryptographic equipment started early in October and continued with the Cuban build up, reaching the final stages of installation about 25 October as the peak flow of classified traffic hit the circuits. By then an excellent network of secure circuits had been developed using land lines and single sideband radio where required,

Mobile Communications.

Facilities were needed to increase the number of circuits from CINCLANT to San Juan and Guantanamo, and to immediately establish communications back to CINCLANT when forces were landed. Some flexibility of communications between installations along the east coast of the U. S. was also necessary. These functions called for employment of mobile communication equipment.

The 507th Command and Control Group was committed to support Air Force needs, the 50th Signal Battalion was to provide Army circuits and the 8th Communications Battalion was assigned communication responsibility for the USMC. At a conference between CLT and component representative it was determined that very little equipment was available to meet CINCLANT requirements due to internal requirements of each Service and because of commitments for other contingencies.

Equipment utilization was also affected by the lack of compatibility between sets of the Service organizations. The Army had an AN/TSC 20 multi-channel set to provide circuits from the objective area back to Fort Bragg, branching north and south to the Department of the Army and ARLANT FORWARD. There were some single channel AN/TSC-15s available. There was a general shortage of single sideband sets, since this type equipment had only recently been included in unit tables of allowances. The dilemma was solved by obtaining 4 airborne transportable communication units from the Navy. These were on standby at Washington, Norfolk, San Juan and Balboa, C. Z. It was decided to move the ATCU-100 from Balboa to Key West for extending circuits into Guantanamo. This link would provide 16 channels for Voice and/or teletype, with 5 channels terminating at Key West and the rest patched through to Norfolk and the Washington area. This system would also provide alternate routing for the Guantanamo - San Juan - Washington circuits. The ATCU-100A in Washington was deployed to Glyco for standby and possible circuit termination requirements. The ATCU-100A at Norfolk was used for training and was scheduled for movement into the objective area.

The ATCU-100A was to be air transported from Norfolk as soon as an airfield was secured. The Army Midwest Relay at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was selected as an entry point for this multi-channel set since it wasn't too heavily occupied with the present operation and was centrally located for

entry into all DCS circuits. Radio propagation was also suitable for this location. Circuits would then be routed back to the east coast for tie-in to the north-south relay system between Fort Ritchie and Fort Bragg. Four teletype and two wire circuits between CINCLANT and Fort Lee were leased to retain flexibility in case the Fort Leavenworth entry had to be switched to Fort Ritchie or Fort Bragg.

The ATCU-100A at Norfolk was a good example of joint coordination to accomplish a task. While the equipment was furnished by the Navy, the Army gathered an operating team to train on the set and to accompany it to Cuba, had it been deployed. Training was also conducted by the Navy team manning the ATCU-100A at Glynco. During the readiness period communications was established with the Midwest Relay and other DCS entry points.

One additional facility was brought into the operation to insure flexibility and reliability of command communications. The Navy brought the ATCU-200 from the Pacific area for additional support. This is an airborne transportable communications unit with single sideband equipment installed, providing 16 channels of voice and/or teletype, 6 of which may be secure circuits using installed . A diesel generator is mounted aboard the aircraft for the power supply. Communications can be maintained while airborne and continued immediately upon landing. Plans called for landing the aircraft as soon as an airfield was secured, to provide communications back to CINCLANT while the ATCU-100A was being air-shipped and placed in operation.

The crew manning the ATCU-200 conducted training exercises in preparation for the operation, flying to San Juan, Key West and Bermuda. Voice and teletype communications were established with Fort Leavenworth, Fort Bragg and the Norfolk Communications Station, gaining entry at these locations into DCA circuits.

As combat units moved into Cuba they were to be supported communications-wise by their organic personnel and equipment, maintaining links with their respective Task Force Commanders until such time as the Command Headquarters went ashore. Single sideband multi-channel equipment with teletype channels secured by cryptographic devices was planned where possible, with operational and authentication codes available for passing information over voice circuits. Other tactical equipment such as the AN/GRC-10 and AN/TRC-24 was planned for field communications. A tactical Radio Relay Net for command and functional use was to be established in accordance with the SOPs of the tactical units. Other radio nets scheduled included the Caribbean Emergency Net, Joint/Combined Scene of Action Net, Air Coordination Net, Naval Gunfire Support Nets and other facilities to fulfill command, control and coordinative requirements. As commercial facilities located in Havana and other areas came under military control they were to be rehabilitated and placed into use.

Fleet Communications.

The Naval Communication System had been in operation all along and little change or adjustment was necessary to handle increased requirements for the Cuban activity. However, the reliability of communications with the various shore commands and task force commanders was effected by programmed changes in progress and by those immediate changes directed by CNO and CINCLANTFLT to solve operational exigencies.

Traffic to ships in the Atlantic area is generally broadcast over the Fleet Radioteletype Broadcast emanating from Washington, (Whiskey Romeo), Norfolk, (November Romeo), Newport, (Mike Romeo), Port Lyautey, Morocco, (Kilo Romeo), and San Juan, (Tango Romeo). A modernization program for replacing 60 WPM teletypes with 100 WPM equipment had been in progress during the previous year. The Norfolk station had made the transition and as Fleet ships changed to 100 WPM equipment they copied the Norfolk Broadcast. The Washington Broadcast did not complete the change until 25 October, the work having been expedited in order to be ready for increased traffic. As a result, many ships were copying Norfolk at this time and didn't swing to Washington until later directed. All this occurred during the build up period and contributed to the backlog of traffic. As Fleet ships changed to the Washington Broadcast and were more evenly distributed among other stations, the traffic flow improved. Ships in the Atlantic normally select the shore broadcast by the Atlantic area of operation. However, flexibility is permitted depending on the propagation characteristics and other factors affecting the ability to copy. The increased amount of traffic did not permit this wide latitude in the selection of the station broadcast. All amphibious forces afloat were assigned to the San Juan Broadcast and the Quarantine force was retained under the Norfolk Broadcast. The Balboa broadcast was also activated and keyed from San Juan. Other changes in conjunction with the installation of 100 WPM equipment improved the overall communications picture.

A special broadcast at NAVCOMSTA Norfolk, (November Romeo Alpha), was placed in operation during October. This net included the major fleet operating commands and was essential to relieve the November Romeo Broadcast of the heavy amount of classified traffic emanating from CINCLANT.

Special ship/shore circuits were established by CINCLANTFLT permitting on-line Top Secret links between the commands afloat and CINCLANT. Flexibility was obtained by establishing ship/shore communications with any one of the shore stations in the Naval Operations Net, where circuits were available for patch to NAVCOMSTA, Norfolk and hence to CINCLANT.

The Fleet Submarine Broadcast operated in a normal manner without

difficulty during the period with most of the traffic passed via the stations at Cheltenham, (Whiskey Sierra), and Cutler Maine, (Oscar Sierra). Coincident with the establishment of an ASW Barrier off Newfoundland, a special broadcast was activated at Argentia, Newfoundland, for the submarine barrier operations to provide a facility which would be immediately responsive for the ASW Barrier Commander.

The Caribbean Emergency Network was also brought into use with COMNAVBASE, GTMO at the Net Control Station. This was a SSB simplex voice/CW network with the Key West Naval Station, Naval Mission Haiti, AMCONGEN Santo Domingo and COMCARIBSEAFRON in the net.

Ship/shore communications with the commands afloat and tactical communications between the task force units were excellent throughout most of the period of crisis. Radio propagation phenomena and other factors affecting reliability caused less than 10% outage on radio circuits. Losses were attributed to mutual interference, noise generation aboard ship, equipment, propagation and HERO restrictions.⁹

Communication personnel and equipment aboard fleet ships were heavily tasked especially on some of the destroyers. The need for additional SSB sets was brought to the attention of CNO who obtained release of 45 sets for installation aboard destroyers. This project was not completed before the end of activities due to the wide dispersion of ships.

Fleet units in Guantanamo Bay were receiving traffic via the local NAVRAD-STA. Their transmitter originally in use was limited to a power output of 1 kw. Engineers from Headquarters, NAVCOMSYS installed a 10 kw transmitter and then modified and reworked the antennas increasing their output efficiency. New equipment also provided an increase in the number of channels from 6 to 16. Upon completion of this work the team moved to San Juan to improve the installation.

Facilities for classified communications with South American ships were

(9) Hero Restriction - When carriers are arming aircraft on the flight deck, electronic radiation must be restricted to reduce the possibility of triggering a missile or other armament. All transmitters aboard ships cease operation during the loading operation.

in the process of completion when the operation ended. Teams of USN communications personnel were to be placed aboard with ADONIS cryptographic equipment. The Balboa transmitters were placed in operation to broadcast COMSOLANT Traffic. The COMSOLANT flagship MULLINIX was scheduled to receive on-line cryptographic equipment for a circuit with COMCARIBSEAFRON. These additions would have provided improved communications for the quarantine operation.

Occasional changes of command ships by the commands afloat caused communication difficulties. All fleet ships are not fully equipped to handle increased communications requirements brought on by placing a task force command aboard. When the Commander SECOND Fleet, (CTF 136), passed the Quarantine Command to COMCRUDESFLT SIX, (CANBERRA), on 13 November 1962, there were not sufficient aboard to provide covered circuits with Norfolk. Similar problems arose when COMCRUDESFLT SIX shifted his flag to the USS MITSCHER. The changing commands also created routing problems with the Army and Air Force relay centers not fully understanding these changes and not keeping abreast of the Navy temporary on-line routing indicators. The CINCLANTFLT Communications Center solved the problems by temporarily accepting all the traffic for further relay.

Internal Communications.

CINCLANTFLT communications center had progressed through several stages of expansion and change since its inception and was in the middle of another modification when the Cuban crisis developed. The results of Exercise "HIGH HEELS" had indicated that the facility in its present state could not handle a large increase in traffic.

A conference with representatives of Headquarters NAVCOMSYS was called early in October to analyze and resolve CINCLANTFLT communications requirements to be provided by this communication center and/or NAVCOMSTA Norfolk. It was decided to move the SUBLANT circuits out of the CINCLANTFLT Wire Room for more space and to terminate additional circuits there. The advent of the Cuban build up escalated the rate of progress with the work reaching completion around 20 October 1962.

Many new circuits were being installed in the wire room while the traffic build up was developing, causing some decrease in handling efficiency. The additional on-line circuits had increased from 14 to 30, creating a need for relaying many incoming messages. Grouping messages with several addressees had to be transmitted over numerous circuits. A tape segregator would have been useful but was not available and traffic was slowed by having to pass the taped message from one teletype to another for transmission.

Teletype and cryptographic equipment was obtained from every available

source. The cryptographic equipment came from locations previously discussed. Teletype equipment came from NAVCOMSYS Washington and some was borrowed from the Radio Operators School and the NAVCOMSTA, Norfolk. The CINCLANT operations center switchboard, (manual), was expanded to a maximum with a subsequent decrease in operator service. Internal office and war room changes generated a vast amount of telephone installation work. Additional message reproducing equipment was required to handle the increased message load. The classified and unclassified message centers kept four duplimat machines in steady operation during peak periods of heavy traffic.

Initially assigned communications personnel were at 90% allowance, but this was not sufficient to meet the increased work load. Crews were placed on port and starboard watches and augmented by TAD personnel from other stations and from the Radio Operators School. This increase facilitated more rapid processing of messages but occasionally contributed to inefficiencies. New positions were established and internal procedures developed to cope with the facility expansion. Message processing aids such as file bins, message assembly tables and other items were prefabricated locally to expedite traffic. Multilith mats were used on incoming teletype machines with the mat passing immediately to a multilith machine for reproduction of the desired number of copies for internal distribution. Teletype machines were installed in the OPCON Center for rapid delivery of "Shot Gun" copies to the War Room Staff. Outgoing high precedence messages were sent to the wire room for immediate transmission before internal processing through the message center. These many changes expedited traffic but also contributed to poor message accountability, caused an increase in the number of service messages and generated queries on transmission and delivery information.

Minimize was implemented by JCS message 16883, 222300Z October 1962 and CNO message 222328Z October 1962. This was supposed to reduce the flow of non-essential traffic leaving the circuits available for passing important information. Certain types of messages and some special circuits are exempt from the minimize procedures. To impose service restrictions based on minimize criteria would require rigid screening at every communication station and/or thorough indoctrination of all message originators. The communicator is more likely to strive for sufficient circuits to satisfy the

user's demands, while at the same time praying for the originators to give some thought to communications economy.

Messages with a precedence of "Flash" or "Emergency" were processed and delivered very rapidly. The next lower level "Operational Immediate" became so commonplace that 8-10 such messages would arrive simultaneously at the classified message center. All work on messages of lower precedence is supposed to stop until the processing of a high precedence message is completed, but when previous messages are of the same precedence, processing is done in order of arrival. On some days 50% of the messages were operational immediate but generally averaged 15-30%. On occasion a high precedence message of 15-18 pages would arrive requiring extra time for processing. During periods of heavy traffic screening of high precedence messages was attempted to expedite those of greatest importance.

Over-classification of messages was attributable to the nature of the contingency operations. During one period 21-29 October 1962, 1,482 TOP SECRET IN/OUT messages were handled and 37,050 copies were produced and distributed. At the same time over 165,000 copies of SECRET messages were produced and distributed. As the installation of on-line cryptographic equipment progressed message classification became less important, however, the high precedence plagued the hard working communications personnel throughout the whole period.

Previous message traffic averaged 34,900 messages per month and increased to 115,700 during November. The highest number of IN/OUT messages for any one day was 4,388 which occurred on 25 October and required almost 6,000 transmissions. (see enclosure (3) for traffic chart). Shortly after this date the results of the internal communications changes began to take effect, new personnel became familiar with their duties and the backlog of traffic started to decline. Communication service to CINCLANT, though much expanded, resumed a degree of normalcy.

The Cuban crisis had demonstrated that military operations of a contingency nature tend to involve all governmental agencies and military departments to the degree that control must be exercised at the highest level of the Government. Communication facilities must be flexible, reliable and immediately responsive to such command and control requirements.

All major commands and installations of importance which may be related to contingency planning should be included in an interlinking network plan. For purposes of economy the required circuitry should be designated but not engineered. Commercially leased circuits in use by DIA and the three services should be included in this network plan. When conditions indicate

that a contingency operation is imminent, the various preplanned elements necessary to provide the initial communication requirements should be activated and formed into a command and control network. Additional commercial circuits can then be leased to meet unforeseen requirements. In this manner communication facilities can be developed in advance of the traffic build up which always precedes an impending operation.

This ZI network in conjunction with overseas circuits must provide sufficient voice and teletype channels to support the operation and must necessarily contain the Washington complex as a focal point. Voice ciphony equipment must be available and installed at key locations while spare equipment should be readily accessible for deployment. On-line cryptographic equipment must also be in use and available for installation. However, the future programming and installation of all cryptographic equipment should insure that two prerequisites are met: compatibility of all sets and the ability to net the equipment into a system, thus permitting flexibility in operational use. Otherwise rapid and reliable communication operating procedures in support of joint operations will not be in step with current equipment capabilities.

Mobile equipment with trained teams of personnel must be readily available for immediate commitment. Here again compatibility of equipment must exist to insure flexibility in tying force elements together. Communication links from the battlefield to the rear area are already provided by the tactical units and their support organizations. These lines must be extended permitting direct linkage from the scene of action back to our seat of Government. Centralized planning and control is essential to support this concept of operation.

This operation uncovered many other communication problems which require need improvement or solution.

1. "Minimize" procedures should be changed, otherwise this restriction on the use of communication circuits will continue to have very little effect. When minimize is imposed all commands should immediately brief those personnel authorized to release messages. The practice of using speed letters should be encouraged. Major command staffs should review internal administrative procedures to insure that outgoing letters can be quickly cleared for release, thus reestablishing the use of correspondence as a primary means to communicate. Minimize should be imposed before the traffic backing develops - not afterward. Information addresses should be reduced, only sending copies to those organizations who require the material.

2. The practice of borrowing personnel and the use of TAD personnel to support additional requirements should be continued. However, procurement action should be initiated in advance of an operation.

2
Better utilization of skilled personnel can also be facilitated by only using specialists at positions requiring specialized training.


3. All services and major commands should implement the use of cite numbers in messages; for ready reference, to standardize procedures and to insure correct delivery to the office of action.

4. Joint communication procedures should be followed by all communication centers to assure similarity of operational procedures and to prevent delays in passing traffic.

5. Tactical frequencies assigned organizations for use at the scene of action must be thoroughly coordinated at the joint level to eliminate intercomponent frequency conflicts. A joint frequency panel has been established at this command to assist task force commanders on all frequency matters.

Many benefits were derived from this crisis. Good communications equipment is in the hands of the operating forces. Some commercial circuits required for continued use are still being leased. Procedures for obtaining circuits from DCA have been streamlined. Many communications personnel from all services experienced the pleasure of working together to build and operate a large communication system. In summary this was a very beneficial exercise.

MESSAGE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS CINCLANT/FLT MSG. CENTER



CHAPTER IV

INITIAL ACTIONS

The period 1-22 October is selected as the initial phase of Cuban Contingency Operations. It was in these three weeks that Command and Staff actions were taken, relating directly and indirectly to the Cuban situation, with minimum public notice, to improve the readiness posture of the Atlantic Command. The need for secrecy was dictated by the fact that while increasing evidence of a Soviet offensive build up in Cuba accumulated, the Soviet government continued its protestations that arms shipments to Castro were all defensive weapons. Within the Staff the information relating to reconnaissance operations and the build up was extremely closely held, being disclosed on a strict "need to know" basis. During this period normal command and staff activity continued and served in many instances to provide "cover" for initial actions in our build up. It was not until 20 October that routine functions were overtly subordinated to the requirements of Cuban Contingency Operations.

On 1 October CINCLANT notified CINCLANTFLT and CINCAFLANT, that he desired responsible commanders to take all feasible measures necessary to assure maximum readiness to execute CINCLANT OPLAN 312 by 20 October. Addressees were told that the 312 Plan would be modified to include many features of CINCAFLANT's proposed "ROCKPILE" and that target priorities would be modified to include the "KOMAR PGMs" at Mariel in Priority ONE. Further, the boundary between Joint Zones East and West would be moved to the East to permit the Naval Task Force to concentrate on supporting the Guantanamo Naval Base. CINCLANTFLT and CINCAFLANT were directed to recommend jointly the new boundary line. Prepositioning of necessary aviation ordnance and support material was directed in advance of the JCS approval of the modified plan. CINCLANTFLT was further directed to report any required movements not possible within currently allocated operating funds.

Pursuant to this directive for increased readiness, Navy forces were earmarked for 6, 12 and 24 hour reaction times with a record kept in the CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT War Room of units designated, locations, and types of aircraft. It is noted that at this time, the Air Force units committed to the 312 Plan were under OPCON of CINCSTRIKE. Arrangements were therefore made direct with COMJAC on 16 October for daily status reports on 312 Plan forces. These reports were made until 26 October at which time they were superseded by CINCAFLANT JOPREPs to CINCLANT.

On 3 October the Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet issued CINCLANTFLT OPORD 41-62 for the blockade of Cuba. The operation order provided for

the assignment of and logistic support of naval forces assigned to Joint Task Force 122 for the blockade.

COMCRUDESFLT SIX was nominated by COMSECONDFLT as CTF 123 for operations under this OPOD. Forces would be provided to CTF 123 from forces earmarked for Task Group 123.2. Two additional AO's would also be provided. Neither this Operation Order nor the Blockade Annex to CJTF 122 OPLAN 316 were executed. They were, however, the forerunners to the quarantine operations which were ultimately placed into effect.

The increased flow of Soviet/Bloc shipping had become a source of concern to CINCLANT and the need for prompt information on these ships required that the VP Patrol effort in the Key West/Caribbean Area be increased. Along with the increase in surveillance, arrangements were made for the quick delivery of significant photographs by jet aircraft to CINCLANTFLT and CNO if required. This action was also initiated on 3 October 1962.

On 4 October CINCLANT published Change 20 to Annex D, (Intelligence), to CINCLANT OPLAN 314. This Annex also applied to the 316 OPLAN. The change was generated due to the acquisition of new military equipment in Cuba which improved enemy ground air defense and long range fire power at sea for the "KOMAR PGM" boats.

Because of developments in Cuba and the increasing air capability of the Cuban forces, CINCONAD, on 5 October directed that the southern Florida picket ship be retained on station for an indefinite period, in lieu of a previously planned withdrawal. The 26th CONAD Region was directed to continue to provide the necessary picket ship to the 32nd CONAD Region.

On 6 October CINCLANT directed increased readiness to execute the 314 and 316 Plans as well as 312. In a message to CG XVIII Airborne Corps, CINCLANTFLT and COMTAC, (CINCAFLANT INTERIM), and sent for information to CINCSRIKE among others, CINCLANT called attention to the requirement for relocation and prepositioning of troops, aircraft, ships, equipment and supplies. It was suggested that much of this could be accomplished with minimum disturbance to current operational and training commitments and within budgetary limitations. In addition, it noted that consideration should be given to the amount and nature of prepositioning that could be profitably accomplished in the event of lifting budgetary limitations as necessary. CINCLANT requested recommendations by 15 October as to the feasibility, of this action and an estimate of the readiness posture which could be achieved along with additional costs involved.

The comments from U.S. Atlantic Fleet Forces on these measures were generally as follows:

A CVA with an embarked Air Group should be maintained in, or south of the Jacksonville-Mayport areas on a continuing basis along with supporting ships. If Budgetary limitations were removed, selected elements of the Striking and Covering Force should be maintained on a rotational basis in the Caribbean area. The permanent relocation of certain Marine units for the 312 Plan would decrease reaction time for Marine elements involved. The relocation involved prepositioning a Marine Air Group at Key West and the assignment of an additional 1/3 Marine Division/Wing Team to the Atlantic Command along with appropriate amphibious shipping.

It was further recommended that one VMA squadron be maintained at Roosevelt Roads along with one GV for aerial refueling. The Guantanamo garrison would be reinforced and dependents evacuated. Prepositioning of additional ground support personnel and aerial tankers would be required to increase readiness.

On 9 October CINCSRIKE informed JCS, CINCARSTRIKE and CINCAFSTRIKE that the response to CINCLANT's message of 6 October on increased readiness insofar as it applied to STRICOM forces would be prepared by his Headquarters since the action addressees were not in a position to assess the overall impact on the command. CINCSRIKE requested additional information on which to base his reply including; estimated duration of prepositioning; time of initiation of prepositioning; period allowed for completion of prepositioning; degree of prepositioning of forces contemplated based on prescribed phasing of the 314 Plan; and any JCS guidance which would aid in compilation of reply. This message was passed to CINCLANT.

On 8 October JCS referred to CINCLANT a memorandum from the SECDEF concerning "the contingencies under which military action against Cuba may be necessary and toward which our military planning should be oriented." SECDEF listed the following categories as likely possibilities:

- a. Soviet action against Western rights in Berlin calling for a Western response including among other actions a blockade of Communist or other shipping enroute to Cuba.
- b. Evidence that the Castro regime has permitted the positioning of bloc offensive weapons on Cuban soil or in Cuban harbors.

c. An attack against the Guantanamo Naval Base or against U.S. planes or vessels outside Cuban territorial air space or waters.

d. A substantial popular uprising in Cuba, the leaders of which request assistance in recovering Cuban independence from the Castro Soviet puppet regime.

e. Cuban armed assistance to subversion in other parts of the Western Hemisphere.

f. A decision by the President that the affairs in Cuba have reached a point inconsistent with continuing U.S. national security.

SECDEF requested the JCS views as to the appropriateness of the above list of contingencies and answers to the following:

a. The operational plans considered appropriate for each contingency.

b. The preparatory actions which should now and progressively in the future be undertaken to improve U.S. readiness to execute these plans.

c. The consequences of the actions on the availability of forces and on our logistics posture to deal with threats in other areas, i.e., Berlin, Southeast Asia, etc.

SECDEF stated that we can assume that the political objective in any of these contingencies may be either:

a. The removal of the threat to U.S. security of Soviet weapons systems in Cuba, or

b. The removal of the Castro regime and the securing in the island of a new regime responsive to Cuban national desires.

SECDEF stated that "inasmuch as the second objective is the more difficult objective and may be required if the first is to be permanently achieved, attention should be focused upon a capability to assure the second objective." He further indicated that he had asked the Office of International Security Affairs to initiate discussion with the State Department as to the political actions which should precede or accompany the various military actions being planned.

CINCLANT in response recommended adding raids by Cuba against CONUS as another contingency under which military action against Cuba may be necessary.

He named plans considered appropriate to cope with the various contingencies that might arise. The plans are as follows:

Item a. Order JTF 122 to execute Annex India, (psychological operations), of his 314 Plan. Additionally alert forces for CINCLANT's 312 and 314 Plans. CINCLANT planning directive 11" is applicable.

Item b. Alert the forces for the 312 and 314. Start countdown for the 314 and at appropriate time execute the 312 followed by the 314.

Item c. Execute 312 followed by 316 or 314.

Item d. Execute the 312 followed by the 314 or 316 depending on urgency and degree of opposition expected.

Item e. By special operation order establish a patrol to prevent continued traffic.

Item f. Execute 312 followed by 314.

Item g. (Raids by Cuba against U.S.), same as for item f.

CINCLANT listed preparatory actions which should now and progressively in the future be undertaken to improve U.S. readiness to execute these plans as being:

a. Study and refinement of applicable plans.

c. Without unduly derogating training or readiness for other critical missions, commence prepositioning of forces.

d. MSTS shipping should be designated for required lifts and operated in a manner to insure their availability.

e. Preposition Army heavy equipment to staging bases.

This reduces transportation requirements for ground support gear.

h. Homeport some AMFIB shipping in North Carolina ports.

i. CINCLANTFLT has already provided for maintaining a CVA ready in the Mayport area.

j. Withdraw PHIERON and BDT from MEB deployment.

CINCLANT expressed concern with "providing for cover and deception operations which would mask effectively U.S. preparation for a military assault." He minimized the unfavorable aspects of these actions on availability of forces and on his logistics posture to deal with threats in other areas by stating:

a. "The forces are in a more ready status when alerted than at any other time. The alert should not interfere with training unless it is unduly prolonged. Logistics items prepositioned will not be available for use in other areas nor would they be if we are to be ready."

On 10 October the JCS by message to CINCLANT, JCSSTRIKE, Service Chiefs and information to 3d USMCMAF, CINCLANTFLT JTF 122 and COMTAC noted a shortened deadline to reply to the SEJDEF Memorandum and called a conference of operations and logistics planners at the Pentagon at 1400 on 12 October. The purpose of the conference was to develop answers to the SEJDEF Memo along the lines of the CINCLANT message on improved readiness posture for Cuban Contingency Operations, and for specific actions to be taken to increase readiness and reduce reaction time for the 314 Plan both under current budget ceilings and with budgetary restrictions lifted.

In connection with reduction of lead times, conferees were to determine requirements, methods, and costs:

a. Preposition forces, shipping (including charter, requisition or activation), Army heavy equipment (including procurement of additional sets), and certain supplies:

b. Provide additional facilities such as ports, airfields, staging areas.

storage and handling facilities, and troop accommodations.

In the meantime the JCS had queried USCINCEUR and CINCPAC as to availability of amphibious forces assigned to them for implementation of CINCLANT contingency plans. In reply both noted the impact that transfer of troops would have with CINCEUR stressing the effect on allies and CINCPAC on training and rotation of forces to West Pac.

As a result of the JCS conference, it was concluded that execution of CINCLANT 314 would:

- a. Preclude simultaneous, (D-5 to D+2), reinforcement of either CINCEUR or CINCPAC using troop carrier or MATS aircraft.
- b. Inhibit for 5 to 7 days capability for conduct of Berlin airlift contingency plans by withdrawing all C-130 aircraft from EUCOM.
- c. Make inadequate for reinforcement of CINCEUR the available logistic support units for filling the port package.
- d. Deplete critical logistic support units of Army forces remaining in CONUS.

Actions taken or being taken to improve readiness for the 312 Plan were:

- a. Selected ammo stocks for Navy and Marine forces were prepositioned at Florida and Caribbean bases and available in AE and CVA type ships. Action was underway to position Marine aviation support equipment from available resources without reduction of normal operations.
- b. For the Air Force, selected items of equipment and initial requirements of war consumables were being prepositioned. It was estimated that essential requirements would be in place about 20 October.

With respect to the 314 Plan, the Army had directed command attention to readiness training, supplies to accompany troops to the Objective Area had been positioned at or near home stations, and a resupply schedule had been prepared to provide air and surface resupply to TF 125 from CONUS Depots.

Additional Army actions to increase 314 readiness included:

- a. Prepositioning of 64 units with equipment, supplies and increments of resupply to assume a D-5 posture.
- b. Same as above for 56 units to assume a D-8 posture.
- c. Re-positioning of selected units to reduce movement time from home station to POE.

On 13 October CINCLANT modified the 312 OPLAN. The significant modification to the plan was the deletion of CJTF 122 from the task organization. Also, COMTAC assumed the role of CINCAFANT in the plans.

Commensurate with the CINCLANT requirements for increased readiness posture for Cuban contingencies, the Second Marine Air Wing directed Marine Air Groups 14 and 31 to preposition certain aviation equipment at the U.S. Naval Air Station, Key West on a priority basis. The USS GRANT COUNTY was made available for sealift of material.

Because of the complexity of civil affairs connected with a substantial military effort, the JCS requested CINCLANT to provide information on his civil affairs requirements and the length of time civil affairs companies might be required for Cuban contingencies. On 17 October CINCLANT advised the JCS that one civil affairs area headquarters, four civil affairs groups, and eight civil affairs companies would be required. These units would be employed for a period of about six months.

Preparations for the implementation of Psychological Warfare Operations in support of the 312 Plan and Annex India to CINCLANT 314/316 OPLANS were initiated on 19 October by CINCLANT.

As the build up continued, additional actions were implemented. To assist in developing an adequate air defense posture in the southeastern United States, the JCS approved several specific actions as requested by the Commander Continental Air Defense Command. Additional fighter aircraft were deployed to Homestead and Patrick Air Force Bases and those units based at Tyndall were placed in and alert status for augmentation as necessary. A Navy F4D Squadron was ordered to Key West to augment Air Defense forces in the area. CINCONAD coordinated air defense requirements for southern Florida with CINCLANT to ensure maximum effectiveness and utilization of forces.

Because of its unique location and due to the paucity of military installations capable of supporting a large scale military effort, heavy reliance was placed on the facilities at Key West. These facilities supported CINCLANT, CINCONAD forces and a command post for the 3rd Army advance echelon which would defend the Florida Keys.

Due to the heavy base loading at Key West, close liaison between Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine units using Key West facilities was required. The shortage of equipment at Key West, made it necessary for units to provide some of their own ground handling equipment, bedding, etc. for their forces.

Key West also played an important role in reconnaissance activity. A joint Air Reconnaissance Coordination Center, under the direction of RADM R. Y.

McElroy, Commander Key West Force, was established. This center provided:

- a. Coordination of all air reconnaissance operations in the Cuban peripheral area.
- b. Coordination and control of communication and alert warning nets.
- c. Assistance in the identification of air reconnaissance flights penetrating the ADIZ and provided clearance for such flights through the Key West warning areas.
- d. Coordination and control of fighter support as required.

CINCONAD provided representation in the Center to facilitate the interchange of intercept information.

Heavy base loading and saturation of facilities was not limited to Key West. The problem of staging bases for Troop Carrier Aircraft also required a solution since the bases at MacDill and McCoy were to be used as fighter bases for the 312 Plan. The conclusions reached indicated that every available military air installation in Florida would be required to carry out the Army Concept of Airborne Assault. The Naval Air Station at Sanford, Florida was approved for use as an additional staging base and direct liaison between COMTAC and CO, NAS, Sanford was authorized for planning purposes. The CG XVIII Airborne Corps stressed the need for Opa-locka Airfield near Miami to support Army Forces. CINCLANT negotiated for the use of the field which permitted its ultimate use for prepositioning of materials.

The use of Strategic Air Command bases at Homestead, MacDill and McCoy was required by CINCLANT forces. In order to accommodate the AFLANT units at these fields, action was initiated to relocate SAC aircraft from these bases. Subsequent arrangements were made between the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Command and SAC aircraft evacuated to other airfields. Complete cooperation between SAC, CINCLANT, TAC and the Department of the Air Force enabled CINCLANT to preposition his forces and materials at these vital installations for the possible execution of Cuban Contingency Plans. The heavy concentration of aircraft at MacDill, Homestead, McCoy and Key West was of great concern to CINCLANT and the evacuation of SAC aircraft reduced the risk to some extent.

On 20 October, CINCLANT proposed a scheme for the capture of a Russian SA-2 site intact in conjunction with the execution of the 312/316 OPLANS. It was considered that the action would provide the U.S. with an unparalleled

opportunity to increase knowledge of Soviet SAM capabilities and, thus, would assist the over all general war capability.

The scheme for the operation as proposed by CINCLANT would be in one of two options. Option one consisted of not launching air strikes against a selected SA-2 site.

Under Option two, two SA-2 sites would be selected. Precise air attacks would be launched to destroy only the fire control system on one site and only the launchers and missiles on the other sites.

The scheme was forwarded to CINCAFLANT and CINCARLANT for coordinated comments on the feasibility of the concept.

CINCAFLANT and CINCARLANT stated that option one might be feasible with seaborne forces but would be extremely hazardous if attempted by airborne forces. As far as option two was concerned, these commanders agreed that this option was theoretically feasible, but impracticable. The fine target selection required in this type of maneuver was considered impossible due to the inter-related proximity of components. Furthermore, enemy capability could include launching a missile from one site using fire control radar from another site. CINCAFLANT/CINCARLANT recommended that all SAM sites be destroyed as forcefully and rapidly as possible in the initial assault. It was pointed out that it might be possible to locate remaining unassembled components in Cuba for post hostility study.

CHAPTER V

CINCLANT CONTINGENCY STAFF OPERATIONS

On 20 October CINCLANT assumed the responsibilities of CJTF 122. This placed a heavy additional requirement on the CINCLANT Headquarters. The new chain of command, for plans and for operations when directed, from JCS to CINCLANT to Service Component Commanders to Service Task Force Commanders demanded that CINCLANT have a truly Joint Staff adequate both in numbers and in tri-service representation to plan for and conduct the projected operations. Normal assignment of Army and Air Force officers to CINCLANT was as follows:

<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>
10	1	2
20	2	3
30	1	1
40	3	3
50	8	4
60	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	16	15

These numbers were increased by two Army and four Air Force officers upon absorption of the JTF 122 nucleus staff of CINCLANT.

It was readily apparent that augmentation of the CINCLANT Staff would be required. On 19 October CINCLANT announced that Lt. Gen. Louis W. Truman, USA was relieved as CJTF FOUR by Maj. Gen. Sory Smith, USAF and requested CG, CONARC to direct Lt. Gen. Truman to report to CINCLANT as Deputy Chief of Staff for Cuban Planning and Operations.

Lt. Gen. Truman reported to CINCLANT the morning of 20 October. After discussion of organization, it was decided that Lt. Gen. Truman would become the CINCLANT Chief of Staff for Cuban Contingency Operations, and that a separate CINCLANT Contingency Staff would be organized.

This Contingency Staff reached a peak of 113 officers and 69 enlisted with inputs as follows:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT	36	6
CJTF 4	32	18
CINCSTRIKE	12	23
CJTF 122	9	6
CONARC (Civil Affairs)	2	4
OTHER	18	16

By 0800 on 22 October the Contingency Battle Staff was organized on a three section basis with 20 officers per section.

Officers not assigned to the Contingency Battle Staff were assigned supervisory, administrative, intelligence, planning or communications duties.

The CINCLANT Contingency Staff was charged with all aspects of Unified Command actions in connection with the 312, 314 and 316 OPLANS. All other CINCLANT responsibilities were retained by the integrated CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT Staff. This arrangement provided, in effect, two CINCLANT Staffs on the same level with both overlaps and gaps in areas of responsibility. These difficulties were reduced to manageable proportions by the professional competence and outstanding cooperation which was continuously evident at the supervisory and command levels in both staffs. Through a process of adjustment, evolution and arbitrary decisions the two staffs arrived at satisfactory working arrangements.

The danger of escalation, particularly in the initial stages, made it imperative that full CINCLANT capabilities for general war be maintained while at the same time the requirement to operate the Contingency War Room had taken the services of four of the twelve officers assigned to the CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT Joint War Room, including the Army, Air Force, and Marine officers. Responsibility for Emergency Actions in connection with plans not originally included in 312, 314 or 316 (Fire Hose, Shoe Black) was given to the CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT War Room.

The contingency staff gradually merged with the CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT Staff with cooperation and coordination so outstanding that it was difficult to distinguish between them. The role of the Contingency Battle Staff changed

from that of primary action agency of the Contingency Staff to that of monitoring actions, compiling reports and maintaining status boards and files. In recognition of this, the Contingency Battle Staff went to a four section watch on 1 November and was gradually reduced in size from then until its disestablishment on 3 December.

Planning Problems Encountered.

During the build-up of forces and the prepositioning of materials for the execution of Cuban Contingency plans, it became apparent that a shortage of amphibious shipping existed. Also the existing military airfields in southern Florida were saturated. This saturation resulted in a heavy risk in the event of a successful air attack or missile bombardment of these fields.

The requirement for additional amphibious shipping for ARLANT forces, particularly LST's, was considered essential to ensure a rapid build-up and delivery of forces and armored equipment into the objective area in the execution of the 316 OPLAN. Initially four LST's were allocated to ARLANT to deliver Task Force CHARLIE to the objective area. During the build-up of forces, elements of Task Force CHARLIE conducted training operations in the Georgia-Florida area. During these exercises it was evident that additional LST's would be required to transport the armored units to the objective area if they were to arrive when needed. Since there was no additional LST shipping available in the Atlantic Fleet, it was necessary to charter four commercial LSTs for a period of 60 to 90 days. It was determined that the original four LSTs allocated and the four chartered LSTs were still insufficient to meet Army requirements. In order to alleviate the shortage of LSTs the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet recommended that the Chief of Naval Operations activate eleven LSTs from the Atlantic Reserve Fleet. These eleven LSTs would require rehabilitation and, when activated, they were to be manned by a minimum crew ready for immediate use. They were to

be allocated to the Army for essential surface lift. A determination was made also that more emphasis should be placed on IST types rather than on roll-on roll-off types.

As planning developed it became apparent that it would be necessary to charter twenty commercial cargo ships and preposition them at ports for outloading to reduce reaction times. Action was taken upon CINCLANT's recommendation to do this on 26 October. At this time Military Sea Transportation Troop Transports were removed from schedule trips and held in east coast ports ready for outloading.

The question of operational control of MSTC commercial shipping was not resolved in early planning. This problem was eventually resolved and it was agreed that the appropriate MSTC commander would sail ships upon request to a designated control point where the ships would report to a designated force commander for operational control.

In the area of Air Defense, the rules of engagement for operations in the Key West-Cuban area were confusing and unclear. In the early stages of planning CINCLANT and CINCONAD each had separate rules for their forces. In an area such as Key West which lies within a few minutes of Cuba by jet aircraft, it became abundantly clear that the rules of engagement needed clarification. There was a need to issue one set of rules which were applicable to both CINCLANT and CINCONAD Forces.

CINCLANT took action on the problem by issuing a directive which set forth protective measures to be taken in the event of attack and which defined hostile acts committed by enemy forces. This directive was approved by the JCS and promulgated for compliance by all concerned.

Initial plans for defense of the Key West area did not earmark a specific "HAWK" unit for deployment. Although this problem was solved with the deployment of an Army Hawk unit to the Key West area, the assignment of a "HAWK" unit in plans would have been appropriate.

Air Defense radar facilities at Key West Ground Control Intercept site were inadequate in terms of overall space and number of radar scopes. The increase in tactical commitments including peripheral reconnaissance flights precluded the release of all the GCI radar equipment for Air Defense. The scope of air operations was unforeseen. Consequently, equipment was not adequate to meet all operational requirements. The addition of an Air Force mobile radar and GCI site provided a means for tactical control of Air Force aircraft in Western Cuba and thus enabled the normal Key West radar to conduct operations in the regular spaces allocated. Emergency funding was approved

for the construction of a new Ground Control Intercept facility at NAS Key West.

Force Levels.

In the area of force levels for the CINCLANT 312/316 OPLANS it became apparent that the tactical fighter and troop carrier aircraft listed in the 312/316 plans were not adequate for the tasks assigned. Because of the build-up of Cuban military potential an increase in Air Force forces was required. Accordingly, CINCLANT recommended to the JCS that they be increased as follows:

Military Emergency Zone

Because of the large amount of air operations which would occur in the southern Florida area upon the execution of the 312/134/316 OPLANS, it was necessary to provide a method and means for the control of nonessential air traffic. This nonessential air traffic included local civilian and non-tactical military air operations.

After considerable coordination with the FAA and CINCONAD a Military Emergency Zone (MEZ) was established in southern Florida. This zone would

become effective at the commencement of hostilities, or earlier if directed. The emergency security control of air traffic (SCAT) program would be implemented within the Military Emergency Zone immediately upon establishment of the zone. Further, upon establishment of the MEZ, all civilian and non-tactical military traffic scheduled to terminate, depart or overfly the MEZ would be diverted, cancelled, or terminated.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Plans, proclamations, ordinances, a command structure, personnel requirements, and a detailed military government directive (developed at D/A in coordination with CINCLANT and sent by DOD to State Department for coordination) were prepared. Plans provided all major combat echelons with CA support during combat.

Civil Relief

The need for civil relief supplies in Cuba was anticipated and, since the Department of the Army was responsible for providing the supplies, a request was made to that Department to ensure the availability of the supplies. The Department of the Army upon approval of the JCS provided the following estimate for civil relief supplies to support Civil Affairs operations:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>D+4 to D+10 (short tons)</u>	<u>D+20 to D+120 (short tons)</u>
BEANS	114	1450
FLOUR	1824	23200
LARD	114	1450
MILK	6202	80915
MEAT	114	1450
EGGS	114	1450
MEAT AND MILK	1824	23200
MEDICAL SUPPLIES	4.5	175

Substitution of items could be accomplished where it was in the best interest of the U.S. and where such substitution was not inconsistent with the general objective of the basic mission.

New Orleans was to be used as the load out port.

Casualties

Ascertaining the number of casualties which may result from military operations is difficult, particularly if the possibility exists that the estimates of casualties that might occur was required. However, the need for best The JCS requested CINCLANT to provide information on casualties based on 316 operations and to take into account the latest intelligence information available relating to Cuban capabilities.

CINCLANT in conjunction with medical representatives from each of the services, prepared the estimate of casualties for the 316 OPLAN.

The estimated number of casualties including those killed in action, wounded in action, missing in action, non-battle sick and injured are indicated in the table below: (Reference Department of the Army Field Manual FM-101-10)

TOTAL CASUALTIES

<u>DAY</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
D	1753	100	2484	125	4,462
D+1	1397	61	710	90	2,258
D+2	931	56	599	65	1,651
D+3	972	55	588	60	1,675
D+4	1067	54	577	55	1,753
D+5	1140	52	562	54	1,808
D+6	357	40	551	60	1,008
D+7	354	35	541	55	985

<u>DAY</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
D+8	351	30	522	50	963
D+9	357	25	522	45	949
D+10	<u>395</u> 9,074	<u>20</u> 700	<u>516</u> 1,100	<u>41</u> 700	<u>972</u> 18,484

CINCLANT advised the JCS that the foregoing estimates were based on best professional judgment, but that they should be used with caution since the spectrum of resistance might range from absolute submission by the Cubans to all out resistance. It was further pointed out that estimate of casualties based on the assumption that the enemy may employ tactical nuclear weapons was not meaningful because operations could cause severe losses. On the other hand, a hit on minor troop concentrations might not be significant. 1

Staff were preparing to alert CINCSSTRIKE for the transfer of operational control of both Army and Air Force units designated for the revised OPLAN 316 and 316. In the meantime, however, the Commanding General, USCONARC and CINCSSTRIKE reached an agreement on a major change in the task organization for STRAC OPLAN 316. Effective 13 October Combat Command G, 2nd Armored Division was deleted from Task Force Charlie and a comparable force from the 1st Armored Division designated as its substitute. The Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps was directed to inform Headquarters, USCONARC concerning the detailed composition of the substitute 1st Armored Division force as soon as it could be determined. It was also agreed that no major unit changes would be made in the task organization for the present.

Major Deployment Problems affecting the Implementation of the OPLAN.

During the month of October 1962 the responsibilities of the Commanding General, USCONARC, both in that capacity and in the capacity of CINCSSTRIKE, led to the assignment of CONARC troops to operational missions and extensive training exercises which had a relative bearing upon his capability for quick reaction under OPLAN 316. The two major troop dislocations which thus affected the USCONARC's capability for reaction were the use of CONARC troops in Operation "RAPID ROAD" at Oxford, Mississippi and the major CINCSSTRIKE training exercise "THREE PAGES" held at Fort Hood, Texas, on 1 October.

Operation "RAPID ROAD" involved the use of forces earmarked for OPLAN 316 during the early part of October. In addition to the OPLAN 316 units at Oxford, Mississippi, Lt Gen Hamilton Howze, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps was designated by the Department of the Army on 1 October as the field commander at the scene of operations. General Howze was relieved of the command responsibility at Oxford on 1 October 1962. Units involved included five Battle Groups from the 5th and 1st Airborne Divisions, as well as some Military Police Battalions. By 1 October, however, the major units had been deployed to their home stations. When USCONARC on 17 October directed the return of all CONARC units to their home stations--with the exception of those involved in Exercise "RAPID ROAD" and Exercise "THREE PAGES"--only two MP Battalions still remained at Oxford did not present a serious problem for USCONARC.

Of equal importance during the latter part of October was the CINCSSTRIKE training exercise, "THREE PAGES." As it was being executed, this exercise was planned to involve both the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions in a series of three PTX phases of three days duration each. The PTX phases were to be followed by two live-fire phases of three days duration each. During each of the PTX phases a subordinate 1st Armored Division was to maneuver against a Combat Command of the 2nd Armored Division. Two Brigades and two Combat Commands were scheduled to take part in the live-fire phases. This exercise had just begun when the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Staff were preparing to alert CINCSTRIKE for the transfer of operational control of both Army and Air Force units designated for the revised OPLANS 312 and 316. In the meantime, however, the Commanding General, USCONARC and CINCSTRIKE reached an agreement on a major change in the task organization for STRAC OPLAN 316. Effective 19 October Combat Command [illeg], 2nd Armored Division was deleted from Task Force Charlie and a comparable force from the 1st Armored Division designated as its substitute. The Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps was directed to inform Headquarters, USCONARC concerning the detailed composition of the substitute 1st Armored Division force as soon as it could be determined. It was also agreed that no major unit changes would be made in the task organization for the present.

Troop Deployment Problems affecting the Implementation of the OPLANS.

During the month of October 1962 the responsibilities of the Commanding General, USCONARC, both in that capacity and in the capacity and in the capacity of CINCARSTRIKE led to the assignment of CONARC troops to operational missions and extensive training exercises which had a relative bearing upon his capability for quick reaction under OPLAN 316. The two major troop dislocation which thus affected the [illeg] USCONARC's capability for reaction were the use of CONARC troops in Operation "RAPID ROAD" at Oxford, Mississippi and the major CINCSTRIKE training exercise "THREE PAIRS" held at Fort Reed, Texas.

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Of equal importance during the latter part of October was the CINCSTRIKE training exercise, "THREE PAIRS." As it eventually evolved, this exercise was planned to involve both the 1st and [illeg] Armored Divisions in a series of three PTX phases of three days duration each. The PTX

phases were to be followed by two live-fire phases of [illeg] hour duration each. During each of the PTX phases a Brigade of the 1st Armored Division was to maneuver against a Combat Command of the 2nd Armored Division. Two Brigades and two Combat Commands were scheduled to take part in the live-fire phases. This exercise had just begun when the Joint Chiefs of Staff

directed USCONARC to bring the units contained in the task organization for OPLAN 316 to the highest state of readiness for possible implementation of the plans.

On 20 October, the Commanding General, Fourth Army indicated to CONARC that he could not implement LOGPLAN DEUTSCHMARK until the pertinent units were released from Exercise "THREE PAIRS" and until the composition of the substitute force had been determined by the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps. The exercise additionally involved a number of supporting units which were not included in the task organization for OPLAN 316. Some of these, however, were included on the troop lists as supporting units. CG USCONARC directed III Corps and Fourth Army on 19 October to prepare plans for the return of these units to their home stations on a 12 hour notice. By 20 October all units included in OPLAN 316 either as combat or as supporting units were being processed as directed by USCONARC for possible implementation of the OPLANS.


Early on the morning of 21 October 1962 all units as shown in the Task Organization for OPLAN 316 and in current Department of the Army station lists were ordered to return to their home stations.

Also on the 21st of October CINCARLANT directed the movement of the 6th Battalion, 65th Artillery (HAWK) to Key West, Florida as soon as possible but not later than 1530 hours, 24 October 1962. Upon arrival at Key West this unit was to be placed under the operational control of the Commander, CONAD, Key West. The unit was not to delay movement because of personnel or equipment shortages as these factors would be taken care of subsequent to arrival at the operational site. At the same time, Fourth Army was directed to take immediate action to bring Battery B, 59th Artillery (AW) and the Automatic Weapons Training Battery to operationally ready status on an austere basis. The two units were to be capable of airfield defense and one battery was to be readied for a CONUS move as soon as possible.

Even though the units assigned to OPLAN 316 had not yet been placed on DEFCON Status by the morning of 21 October, USCONARC/CINCARLANT directed the establishment of Emergency Operations Centers on a 24 hour basis at all CONUS Armies, the Military District of Washington, Army Corps Headquarters, and at all Class I installations at which STRAC and STRAF units were located.


Arrangements were also made with the Department of the Army for the mobilization of high priority Army Reserve and Army National Guard units in the event that OPLAN 316 was implemented. USCONARC/CINCARLANT

312 OPLAN NAVAL TASK FORCE COMMAND CHART



OPERATIONAL CONTROL.


CINC LANT



 OPERATIONAL COMMAND

----- SERVICE COMMAND OR CONTROL,
OR OPCON IN RECORD WITH
REGULATING OF APPLICABLE
SERVICE.

316 OPLAN
Naval Task Force Command Relations Diagram



SECRET

recommended to the Department of the Army that each unit be mobilized on 30-day to meet three separate requirements: (a) forces required by the group list to CONJUNCT OPLAN 314; (b) forces for the defense of the mainland; and (c) forces for the defense of the Florida Keys, coastal defense, prevention of sabotage and subversion and for rendering assistance to civil authorities. The first category included Army reserve units consisting of two Civil Affairs Headquarters, Type B, two Civil Affairs Groups, five Civil Affairs Companies and two Consolidated Psychological Warfare Companies. Forces in the second category included three Army National Guard Automatic Weapons Battalions, one from the state of Florida and two from Alabama. The third category was drawn mainly from the Florida Army National Guard, including elements of two divisions, the 51st Infantry Division and the 46th Armored Division, as well as four Transportation Corps light truck companies and the 317th Military Police Battalion. Also included in the latter category was the 61st Engineer Battalion USAF.

Temporary operational control of Army and Air Force units included in OPLANS 314, 314, and 314 was transferred from CINOSTRIKE to CONJUNCT by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at approximately 0130Z hours, 22 October 1964. CINOSTRIKE passed this information to CINARLANT and CONJUNCT formally directed CINARLANT to assume temporary operational control of the designated CINOSTRIKE forces.

Despite the fact that CINOSTRIKE had already been relieved of operational control over forces participating in the contingency plans, he the Commanding General, USMCNARS as CINARSTRIKE to place his entire command on DEFCON 3 status effective 0300Z hours, 22 October. This directive included the requirement to return all personnel then on leave status and to complete all actions required by lesser DEFCONs. As an exception to the directive, however, CINOSTRIKE decided to continue both Exercise "THREE PAIRS" and Exercise "SHORT LINE" until 27 October at a level of activity which could be achieved with the forces remaining available to him. This action was taken with the permission of the Joint Chiefs of Staff subject to his own discretion. CINOSTRIKE felt that such continuance would provide proper cover for the contingency plans.

Preparations for the first major troop movements were made on 22 October when the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the loading and movement of Task Force CHARLIE, 1st Armored Division. The movement was to be made by rail to either Fort Stewart, Georgia or to a rail port of embarkation. This determination of an embarkation destination was to be made at a later time. The Department of the Army permitted the Commanding General, USMCNARS to determine the disposition of this force consistent

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Recommended to the Department of the Army that [illeg] units be mobilized on SnDay to meet three separate requirements: (a) forces required by the troop list to [illeg] OPLAN 316; (b) forces for the defense of [illeg]/ and (c) forces for the defense of the Florida Keys, [illeg] defense, prevention of sabotage and subversion and for rendering assistance to civil authorities. The first category included Army reserve units consisting of two Civil Affairs Headquarters, Type B, two Civil Affairs Groups, five Civil Affairs Companies and two Consolidated Psychological Warfare Companies. Forces in the second category included three Army National Guard Automatic Weapons Battalions, one from the state of Florida and two from Alabama. The third category was drawn mainly from the Florida Army National Guard, including elements of two divisions, the 51st Infantry Division and the 46th Armored Division, as well as four Transportation Corps light truck companies and the 317th Military Police Battalion. Also included in the latter category was the 841st Engineer Battalion USAR.

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Despite the fact that CINCSRIKE had already been relieved of operational control over forces participating in the contingency plans, he the Commanding General, USCONARC as CINCARSTRIKE to place his entire command on DEFCON 3 status effective [illeg] hours, 12 October. This directive included the requirement to return all personnel then on leave status and to complete all actions required by lesser DEFCONS. As an exception to the directive, however, CINCSRIKE decided to continue both Exercise "THREE PAIRS" and Exercise "SHORT LINE" until 27 October at a level of activity which could be achieved with the forces remaining available to him. This action was taken with the permission of the Joint Chiefs of Staff subject to his own discretion. CINCSRIKE felt that such continuance would provide proper cover for the contingency plans.

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Commanding General USCONARC to determine the [illeg] of this
force consistent

with operational requirements for armored units in Task Force CHARLIE, CINCLANT OPLANS 314 and 316. At the same time, III Corps recommended that the 1st Armored Division be designated a STRAC unit immediately in order to provide a plausible cover for the activity incident to the division's readiness preparations and movement.

It was pointed out to CINCLANT on 22 October that conditions at the Key West Naval Base were marginal at best to support OPLANS 312, 314 and 316. In view of the austere facilities available at Key West it was necessary that detailed planning factors be provided to the Commander, Key West Forces to insure that existing base support facilities were not exceeded. CINCLANT was informed that group support equipment, maintenance spares and personnel such as cooks and bakers would have to be provided to support Army elements. Due to limited billeting facilities, the Army would have to provide tents and bedding for some of its units and personnel. The picture was brightened somewhat, however, with the information that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the use of Opa-locka Airfield for Army units and CINCLANT was authorized to move units to that location at his discretion and as required to support the operational plans.

Planning for the surface echelon assault wave required the use of Army amphibious and floating craft. The availability of such craft, however, was complicated by the double factors of their scarcity within the active Army inventory and the fact that they would undoubtedly require maintenance time in the Florida area prior to their move into the objective area. For these reasons, USCONARC requested authority from the Department of the Army to move the boat units assigned to OPLAN 316 from Sunny Point, South Carolina and New Orleans, Louisiana to Florida beginning after darkness on 22 October. CG USCONARC pointed out that it was also desirable to move the Army floating craft company from Fort Eustis simultaneously with the movement of the boat companies. At the same time a desire was expressed to move the communications elements supporting the Commanding General, JDP-FLAK from Fort McPherson, Georgia to Key Largo, Florida.

The Office of the Chief of Information, Department of the Army alerted USCONARC to the fact that field press censorship units might be immediately required by CINCLANT due to the possibility of imposing field press censorship in support of OPLAN 316. CG USCONARC accordingly recommended to the Department of the Army that two Army Reserve Units--the 21st and 210th Field Press Censorship Detachments, both of Lodi, New Jersey--be alerted for immediate mobilization upon implementation of OPLAN 316.

On 17 October commensurate with DEFCON THREE, CG USFONARCO notified all stateside armies that they were authorized to recall personnel from leave status.

The morning of 18 October brought a flurry of activity as many of the supporting units for OPLAN 316 were ordered into positions which would support the implementation of the plan. The 3rd Missile Command (Provisional), was directed to move as soon as practicable from 1300Z home to on-board Air Force Base, Florida to provide logistical and administrative support for the proposed CINARLANT forward headquarters. Action was next taken directing Third Army to assemble, assemble and prepare for movement to selected staging airfields an Army Staging Area Command headquarters for each pre-designated staging base. Third Army was also directed to complete activation of the Third Army's Headquarters, Army Staging Area Command (Provisional), and to move it to its designated destination as soon as possible. Third Army was next directed to issue the necessary instructions and orders to expedite the movement to their destinations of all units assigned to the ASA: support team. The Commanding General, 2nd Logistical Command was directed to prepare a detachment of thirty-five officers and sergeants for movement to Opaloka Air Base to establish a proposed logistical field headquarters. Finally, the 60th Transportation Group, (Movement Control), was alerted for movement to the Florida area where the headquarters would operate under the direct control of the proposed Peninsula Task Command. The group's major mission of providing liaison teams at all staging bases in Florida and at all surface ports of embarkation being used in OPLAN 316.

In addition to the support units, action was taken on 18 October to move the first of the combat units requiring relocation for implementation of OPLAN 316. The first unit move so directed was that of the 2nd Battalion, (Medium Tank), 89th Armor, 1st Infantry Division from Fort Benning to Fort Stewart, Georgia where it was to be held for eventual movement through the port of Savannah, Georgia. At the same time, Fourth Army was directed to move the first, second, fifth, and sixth increments of Task Force CHARLIE to Fort Stewart, Georgia. The prepositioned units of Task Force CHARLIE were scheduled for eventual movement through the port of Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The third and fourth increments of Task Force CHARLIE were to be held at Fort Hood, Texas while the Headquarters, 1st Armored Division was to be positioned at either Fort Stewart, Georgia or Fort Hood, Texas, depending upon which location was considered more desirable. XVIII Air Corps was authorized to relocate the 1st Airborne and 2nd Airborne divisions for amphibious operations in the initial assault phase, including landings at New Orleans, Louisiana, Cherry Point, South Carolina and Fort Fisher.

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On 21 October commensurate with DEFCON THREE, [illeg] USCONARC notified all stateside armies that they were authorized to recall personnel from leave status.

The morning of 23 October brought a flurry of activity as many of the supporting units for OPLAN 316 were ordered into positions which they would occupy upon implementation of the plan. The 3rd Missile Command Provisional was directed to move as soon as practicable after 1300Z hours to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida to provide logistical and administrative support for the proposed CINCARLANT forward Headquarters. Action was next taken directing Third Army to [illeg], assemble and prepare for movement to selected staging airfields-and Army Staging Area Command Headquarters for each responsive staging base. Third Army was also directed to complete activation of teh Third Army's Headquarters, Army Staging Area Command (Provisional) and to move in to its designated destination as soon as possible. Third Army was next directed to issue the necessary instructions and orders to expedite the movement to their destinations of all units assigned on the ASA troop list. The Commanding General, 2nd Logistical Command was directed to prepare a detachment of thirty-five officers and ninety-five men for movement to Opa-looka Air Base to establish a proposed [illeg] field headquarters. Finally, the [illeg] Transportation Group, [illeg], was alerted for movement to the Florida area where [illeg] headquarters would operate under the direct control of the proposed Peninsula Base Command. The group's major mission [illeg] teams at all staging bases in Florida and at all surface ports of embarkation being used in OPLAN 316.

In addition to the support units, action was taken on [illeg] October to move the first of the Combat units requiring relocation for implementation of OPLAN 316. The first unit move so directed was that of the 2nd Battalion, (Medium Tank), 69th Armor, 2nd Infantry Division from Fort Banning to Fort Stewart, Georgia, where it was to be held for eventual movement through the port of Savannah, Georgia. At the same time, Fourth Army was directed to move the first, second, fifth, and sixth increments of Task Force CHARLIE to Fort Stewart, Georgia. The prepositioned units of Task Force CHARLIE were scheduled for eventual movement through the port of Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The third and fourth increments of Task Force CHARLIE were to be held at Fort Hood, Texas while the Headquarters, 1st Armored Division was to be positioned at [illeg] Fort Stewart, Georgia or Fort Hood, Texas, depending upon which [illeg] was considered more desirable. [Illeg] was authorized to relocate the [illeg] for amphibious operations in the initial assault phase, [Sentence illeg]

Virginia. In addition to the boat units, two terminal service companies were included at this time to provide proper support for the outloading of assault troops and for subsequent unloading of equipment and supplies either over the beaches or in captured ports. Surface vessels included in the amphibious echelon consisted of two freight service (FS) vessels, the Beach Discharge Lighter, (BDL) John U.D. Page, and three tugs.

A number of problems arose to plague USCONARC/CINCLANT in the early phases of prepositioning troops to attain a readiness posture for possible implementation of OPLAN 316. The U.S. Army Transportation Terminal Command, Atlantic created the first problem when they notified CG USCONARC that the ports of Savannah, Georgia and Charleston, South Carolina would be used to outload the 1st Armored Division from its prepositioned location at Fort Stewart, Georgia. USCONARC immediately informed the Department of the Army that the port of Savannah had been rejected in favor of Fort Lauderdale, Florida in the light of overall requirements. The use of the ports of Savannah and Charleston would cause serious disruptions in the movement schedules because of the tight turnaround times developed by the contingency planners in those schedules. CG USCONARC consequently did not contemplate changing the current movement schedules except as might be required by operational necessity. Another problem arose concerning the provision of rail cars for the required surface movement of both combat and support units. The office of the Chief of Transportation directed USCONARC to request the required rail equipment from the Defense Transportation Management Service, (DTMS), for immediate positioning at designated home stations. The Chief of Transportation further recommended that the affected units begin loading their equipment, etc., as soon as rail cars were in position. Later the same day, however, DTMS informed the Transportation Officer at Fort Hood, Texas that they could furnish only 11 day coaches for the movement of the first increment of Task Force CHARLIE. This was sufficient only for the first train which was scheduled to depart Fort Hood at 2000Z hours that day. The availability of troop cars for the second and third trains of the first increment as well as for the subsequent increments was unknown to DTMS at that time. No problems existed, however, with regard to the flat cars required to move the 1st Armored Division's equipment.

A major problem involving the use of the 1st Armored Division troops, however, was the shortages of both equipment and personnel. CG USCONARC authorized Fourth Army to use equipment assets of the 2nd Armored Division to satisfy some of the shortages. These equipment assets were restricted for use in equipping the 1st Armored Division, only. Furthermore, the personnel assets of the 2nd Armored Division were not to be used to meet any personnel shortages at that time.

The Cuban crisis brought to light the fact that both the 5th and 1st Special Forces Groups had been depleted of Spanish speaking personnel as the result of moving an entire company to the Caribbean Command in July 1962. The Commanding General, USCONARC felt that some attempt should be made to retrieve at least a portion of these Spanish speaking personnel for use in the Cuban operations. A recommendation was consequently made to CINCLANT that he, in turn, query CINCARIB as to the availability of four Special Forces Operational Detachments, Type A, all Spanish language qualified, to support OPLAN 316. The answer, if made available, would be attached to the 5th Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. On 10 October in response to a query from CINCLANT, CINCARANT furnished a revised listing of the major Army combat elements for OPLAN 316 as follows:

5th Airborne Division

1st Airborne Division

Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division

(Two Battle Group Task Forces)

1st Infantry Division

Co. D (1st Tank), 66th Armor

1st Battalion, 92nd Field Artillery

2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery

Surface Epsilon

Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division

(Two Battle Groups, reinforced with the 69th Armor)

2nd Battalion (Med Tank), 69th Armor

Task Force CHARLIE, 1st Armored Division

2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery

1st Battalion, 92nd Field Artillery

5th Artillery Group

Floating Reserve

Headquarters, 1st Armored Division

Brigade of the 1st Armored Division

2nd Infantry Division

(Two Battle Group Task Forces)

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The Cuban crisis brought to light the fear that both the 5th and 7th Special Forces Groups had been depleted of Spanish speaking personnel as the result of moving an entire company to the Caribbean Command in [illeg] 196th. The Commanding General, USCONARC felt that some attempt should be made to retrieve at least a portion of these Spanish speaking personnel for use in the Cuban operations. A recommendation was consequently made to CINCLANT that he, in turn, query CINCARIE as to the availability of four Special Forces Operational Detachments, Type A, all Spanish language qualified, to support OPLAN 316. The teams, if made available, would be attached to the [illeg] Special Forces [illeg] at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

On [illeg] October in response to a query from CINCLANT, CINCARLANT established a revised listing of the major Army combat elements for OPLAN 316 as follows:

Air Echelon

8th Airborne Division
101st Airborne Division
Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division
(Two Battle Group Task Forces)
Battle Group Task Force
1st Infantry Division
Co. D (Lt. Tank), 66th Armor
1st Battalion, 92nd Field Artillery
2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery

Surface Echelon

Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division
(Two Battle groups, reinforced with the
2nd Battalion (Med Tank), 69th Armor)
Task Force CHARLIE, 1st Armored Division
2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery
1st Battalion, 92nd Field Artillery
54th Artillery Group

Floating Reserve

Headquarters, 1st Armored Division
Brigade of the 1st Armored Division
2nd Infantry Division
(Two Battle Group Task Forces)

On-Call Echelon

Brigade, 1st Armored Division
8th Battalion (Med Tank), 34th Armored
3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery
Headquarters, 2nd Infantry Division and
supporting forces, if required.
52nd Artillery Group

On 24 October further actions were taken to improve the U.S. Army's air defense capabilities in the Florida area. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the move to Florida of the 2nd Missile Battalion, 52nd Artillery -- minus one battery -- from Fort Bliss, Texas and the 8th Missile Battalion, 15th Artillery from Fort Lewis, Washington; both of these units were intended for the defense of Homestead Air Force Base, Florida with the exception of two batteries of the 8th Missile Battalion. These two batteries were scheduled for the defense of Patrick and MacDill Air Force Bases, respectively.

Also on the 24th, an advance party of the 6th Missile Battalion, 65th Artillery, (HAWK) arrived at the Key West Naval Air Station. The planned operations for the movement and emplacement of an entire HAWK Battalion in the Florida area for the defense of the Key West and Boca Chica Naval Air Stations were proceeding without any significant problems. Problems had unknowingly been created in Virginia, however, on the preceeding day. HAWK missiles for the defense of the Key West Area had departed Letterkenny Ordnance Depot at 1700Z hours, 23 October, loaded on 12 tractor-trailer combinations. Virginia State Police stopped three of the trucks because of a 2,000-pound overload each and directed them to return to the depot. The missiles finally departed for Florida at 2400Z hours, 23 October.

With the 1st Armored Division preparing elements of Task Force CHARLIE for their relocation move to Fort Stewart, Georgia, CINCSALANT recommended to the XVIII Airborne Corps that Headquarters, 1st Armored Division relocate to Fort Stewart simultaneously with those increments of Task Force CHARLIE which were scheduled for immediate relocation. In conjunction with this move a Division Rear Command Post was authorized for Fort Hood, Texas. By positioning Task Force CHARLIE at Fort Stewart and if the LST's were made available to the outloading port of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Task Force CHARLIE could be introduced into the objective area at an earlier date.

The Chief of Transportation, 1st Armored Division, made an attempt on 24 October to alleviate some of the problems caused by the necessity to transport heavy equipment for the units assigned to or supporting OPLAN 3. He authorized the use of USAX 100-ton heavy duty flat cars assigned to STIA.

rail equipment pools to satisfy such movement requirements provided they could not be satisfied through commercial or other DOD interchange fleet capabilities. Exception, however, was made for the cars assigned to the STRAC pool at Fort Lewis, Washington which could be used only with the prior approval of the Commanding General, USCONARC. Upon completion of the required movements, the STRAC pool cars were to be returned to their original pools unless otherwise directed by the Chief of Transportation or by the Commanding General, USCONARC, as appropriate. Transportation officers were to be warned, however, that army-owned heavy duty flat cars were not to be used for the loading of any equipment which could be carried on carrier-furnished cars of lighter capability.

On 25 October CINCLANT was able to confirm to CINCLANT that Fort Lauderdale, Florida was the outloading port for the first increment of Task Force CHARLIE. The first elements of the 1st Armored Division had begun moving to Fort Stewart, Georgia, on the morning of the 26 October 1962. The four increments of Task Force CHARLIE which were being moved immediately to Fort Stewart consisted of four reinforced battalions with an approximate strength of 3,500 officers and men. Headquarters, 1st Armored Division, was also moving with a total strength of 295 personnel. While original movement schedules called for the retention of the third and fourth increments of Task Force CHARLIE at Fort Hood, Texas, planning was already underway on 26 October to move the entire division to Fort Stewart with the exception of certain units numbering approximately 1,000 personnel. These latter units were scheduled for outloading in other areas. It was planned to unload all wheeled vehicles upon arrival at Fort Stewart for eventual overland convoy movement to the outloading port. Tracked vehicles and other selected equipment, with the concurrence of the Defense Transportation Management Service, (DTMS), were to remain loaded on rail equipment. Plans had been completed as of 26 October for the move of the fifth and sixth increments of the Task Force, but rail equipment had not yet been spotted in the home station area. Nevertheless, USCONARC/CINCLANT estimated that the move of all four scheduled increments to Fort Stewart would be completed by 2400Z hours, 29 October.

Original planning for the Cuban contingency had envisioned a logical procedure for implementation of operations plans through OPLAN 312 to OPLAN 314 and thence to OPLAN 316. CINCLANT had previously indicated to CINCLANT that complete execution of Phase II of OPLAN 314 created serious problem areas since the major portion of the U.S. D-Day assault capability under that plan would be extremely vulnerable to enemy atomic strikes. It appeared to the USCONARC/USARLANT staff that the logical course of action was to execute the OPLAN 316 seven-day phase, prepositioning forces and supplies as necessary to insure that the initial combat forces could meet reduced reaction times.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred with CINCLANT on 26 October that further planning and preparation for OPLAN 314 should be suspended and that all effort should be concentrated on refinement in planning for OPLAN 316.

CINCLANT forwarded to CINCARLANT on 26 October his ideas concerning the Army's use of Key West International Airport during emergency operations. CINCLANT suggested that CINCARLANT develop plans to use the field for those Army aircraft which exceeded the capacity of available shipping. CINCLANT also pointed out that the Naval Air Station at Key West -- which had been suggested by CINCARLANT as an alternate facility -- was fully committed to the support of high performance aircraft and would not be available for use by Army aircraft. In addition, implementation of OPLAN 312 would result in a heavy concentration of Air Force and Navy aircraft in the Key West area both prior to and during the initial phases of the plan. For this reason, Army aircraft might possibly interfere with actual combat operations. CINCLANT proposed, therefore, that no Army aircraft be flown into Key West International Airport in any sizeable numbers until shortly after D-Day, OPLAN 312.

CINCARLANT decided by 26 October to preposition certain emergency supplies and aerial resupply in the forward area because of the imminence of a possible implementation of OPLAN 316. He informed CINCLANT that he intended to preposition supplies at intermediate staging bases as soon as the Army Staging Area Commands intended for those bases were operationally ready.

In revising the movement schedules for the surface echelon of OPLAN 316, USCONARC/CINCARLANT changed the outloading port for the third and fourth increments of Task Force CHARLIE from New Orleans, Louisiana, to Fort Lauderdale, Florida. This change united all six increments of the Task Force for outloading through the same port in order to speed up its introduction into the objective area by from one to three days. The revision of the movement schedules also changed the arrival time of the third increment -- the 2nd Battalion, (Medium Tank), 69th Armored -- in the objective area from D+3 to D-Day.

On 26 October CG USCONARC directed the Second Army to establish a forward logistical base as soon as possible, to move both the 2nd Logistical Command and the balance of the 507th Transportation Group, (Movement Control), to Ops-locka Air Base, Florida.

On 27 October the Department of the Army accepted the change of outloading ports for the third and fourth increments of Task Force CHARLIE, 1st Armored Division, announced by CG USCONARC. CG USCONARC directed Fourth Army to move the third and fourth increments of Task

Force CHARLIE to Fort Stewart, Georgia, to join with the other four task forces which were already there. Thus the entire Task Force would be constituted in one location and could move as an integral force to the same port for outloading.

Steps were taken on 27 October to provide aviation support for the forward echelon of CMCARLANT headquarters. The 130th Aviation Company, (Provisional), was organized on that date with an authorized strength of 18 Officers, 13 warrant officers, and 91 enlisted men.

A problem had arisen by this time in connection with the use of the Roll-on, Roll-off vessel, the USNS TAURUS, as a carrier vessel for the initial assault phase of the troop landings. This type of vessel contained no provisions for off-shore or stream discharge of cargo from the rail and merchandise decks when participating in an amphibious operation. To overcome this difficulty, The Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, recommended the provision of a properly positioned and secured derrick crawler crane on board the vessel. This type of crane could be made available from one of the Transportation Corps STRAC terminal service companies located at Fort Story, Virginia. These requirements were to be completed prior to moving to Port Everglades, Florida, for the initial loading.

CMCARLANT was able to report by 28 October that both the First Increment of Task Force CHARLIE and the Headquarters, 1st Armored Division, were located at Fort Stewart, Georgia. The Third Increment of Task Force CHARLIE -- consisting of the Brigade Train Element, 1st Armored Division -- was ready to move on a 24 hour notice. The Fourth Increment -- consisting of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Artillery -- was located on flat bars at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and was prepared for immediate movement. The Floating Reserve, which had been alerted so as to arrive at Fort Stewart, Georgia, after Task Force CHARLIE, planned to move on 28 October. The 2nd Battalion Force was alerted for loading, which was to commence approximately 15 November.

Also on the 25th of October the XVIII Airborne Corps and the U.S. Army Transportation Center at Fort Eustis, Virginia, again requested authority to position the boat and floating craft units assigned to OP AV 316 in southern Florida. XVIII Airborne Corps merely stipulated that they be positioned at the southernmost point in Florida at which they could be properly supported, while the Transportation Center specifically requested positioning at Fort Lauderdale, Florida. This prepositioning action would insure that the landing craft and auxiliary craft were available for rendezvous with the Navy Task Force at both the time and date

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Force CHARLIE to Fort Stewart, Georgia, to join with the other four [illeg] which were already there. Thus the entire Task Force would be constituted in one location and could move as an integral force to the same port for outloading.

Steps were taken on 27 October to provide aviation support for the forward echelon of CINCARLANT headquarters. The 100th Aviation Company, (Provisional), was organized on that date with an authorized strength of 18 Officers, 13 warrant officers, and 91 enlisted men.

A problem had arisen by this time in connection with the use of the Roll-on, Roll-off vessel, the USNS TAURUS, as a carrier vessel for the initial assault phase of the troop landings. This type of vessel contained no provisions for off-shore or stream discharge of cargo from the main and mezzanine decks when participating in an amphibious operation. To overcome this difficulty, The Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, recommended the provision of a properly positioned and secured 40-ton crawler crane on board the vessel. This type of crane could be made available from one of the Transportation Corps STRAC terminal service companies located at Fort Story, Virginia. These requirements were to be completed prior to moving to Port Everglades, Florida, for the initial loading.

CINCARLANT was able to report by 18 October that both the First Increment of Task Force CHARLIE and the Headquarters, 1st Armored Division -- was ready to move on a [illeg] hour notice. The Fourth Increment -- consisting of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Artillery -- was located on flat cars at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and was prepared for immediate movement. The Floating Reserve, which had been alerted so as to arrive at Fort Stewart, Georgia, after Task Force CHARLIE, planned to move on 28 October. The On-Call Force was alerted for loading, which was to commence approximately [illeg] November.

Also on the 28th of October the XVIII Airborne Corps and the U.S. Army Transportation Center at Fort Eustis, Virginia, again requested authority to position the boat and floating crafttransits assigned to OPLAN 316 in southern Florida. XVIII Airborne Corps merely stipulated that they be positioned at the southern most point in Florida at which they could be properly supported, while the Transportation [illeg] specifically requested positioning at Fort Lauderdale, Florida. This prepositioning action would insure that the landing craft and auxiliary craft were available for rendezvous with the Navy Task Force at both the time and date

required in OPLAN 316. The Transportation Center planned to initiate the movement on 30 October if approval was forthcoming, with the complete positioning of the craft in the desired location by 2 November.

A lack of proper storage space for loaded equipment cars at Fort Stewart, Georgia, created a major problem for the elements of the 1st Armored Division arriving at that station. Certain cars -- particularly those with tracked vehicles -- were to be kept with loads intact in order to facilitate movement of Task Force CHARLIE to the port area. Rail storage at Fort Stewart consisted of some six and one half miles of railroad siding capable of holding approximately 140 flat cars. In an attempt to solve this problem and to prevent any undue delay, CINCARLANT initiated action to procure additional rail siding capacity in the vicinity of Fort Stewart and particularly requested appropriate rail storage at neighboring Hunter Air Force Base. This latter request was apparently denied by the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force. CINCARLANT thereupon requested the Department of the Army to secure the proper approval for use of Hunter Air Force Base facilities at the Department level. Late that same afternoon the Strategic Air Command, (SAC), instructed the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, to give maximum support to the Commanding General, Fort Stewart, Georgia, by providing on-base rail sidings at Hunter Air Force Base. The Strategic Air Command, however, desired to be kept informed as to whether the meeting of this requirement caused a serious interruption of the SAC mission.

CINCARLANT informed the Commanding General, Third Army, on 29 October that he was being relieved of the responsibility of providing support to the air elements of Task Force 125 under OPLANS 314 and 316. CINCARLANT was then in the process of transferring this responsibility to the proposed Peninsula Base Command which was to be established in Florida for just such purposes. Third Army was directed to make available to the new command all the units which had been designated by either Third Army or USARLANT to furnish support to Task Force 125 within the State of Florida. Such designated units were to be placed under the operational control of the Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command. Third Army was also directed to furnish the new command with copies of all support plans which had previously been developed for this mission. Third Army however, was to continue to be responsible for the operation of a personnel replacement center and for administrative and logistical support of the Peninsula Base Command and all of its assigned and attached Army units. The new directive, moreover, did not in any way affect Third Army's assigned mission under JDP-FLAK nor any other assigned missions in support of OPLAN 316.

The Department of the Army authorized CG USCONARC/CINCARLANT on 29 October to issue movement directives for all those units which, at that time, were assigned to, or in support of, OPLAN 316. These directives, however, were to be effective as orders only upon receipt of instructions from higher headquarters to implement OPLAN 316.

Several logistical problems arose on 29 October in connection with preparations to implement OPLAN 316. Assault operations in the early phases of OPLAN 316 required the use of landing craft in greater quantities than were available in the currently authorized Transportation Corps STRAC boat units. These units, moreover, would require replacements for currently authorized craft which might become unserviceable or might require extensive maintenance as a result of the assault operations. It was determined by CINCARLANT that a total of 31 Landing Craft Utility, (LCU), were in storage at the Charleston Transportation Depot. Only one of these was considered operational, moreover, and it was already earmarked for shipment to USAREUR. The depot did have an in-house maintenance capability for processing a total of three craft for issue in an operational status within a period of two to three weeks time. On a selective basis, this required time might be somewhat shortened. The remaining 27 craft would have to be processed by contract in commercial facilities, a process which would require a minimum of five to six weeks for completion. At the same time, CINCARLANT was able to announce that the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, had approved the preloading of the two Roll-on, Roll-off ships and the four available LST's. While the two Roll-on, Roll-off ships had previously been scheduled to outload from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, CINCARLANT was now preparing plans to load them out of Savannah, Georgia, in view of the fact that the troops were located in nearby Fort Stewart. CINCARLANT intended to proceed with the loading of the vessels and, if time permitted, to rehearse the unloading as well. Since neither of the two Roll-on, Roll-off vessels were of the combat category, CINCARLANT was of the opinion extraordinary measures would be required in order to insure proper unloading of priority supplies and equipment at the objective area. The establishment of the Army Staging Area Commands at the intermediate staging airfields gave Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, a chance to evaluate their support capabilities and to consider the development of problems, circumstances which could provide valuable information for future operations of this type. That Headquarters consequently established liaison teams which were to visit each Army Staging Area Command to determine the status of support rendered by the commands, the validity of the requirements which were placed upon them, the problem areas brought to light during the execution phase of OPLAN 316, and the development of recommendations for future actions.

By 29 October CG USCONARC was apprised of the specific locations of the HAWK and NIKE-HERCULES air defense battalions which it had made available for the defense of strategic locations and installations in the Florida area. The 6th Battalion, 65th Artillery, (HAWK), was located in the general Key West area, with A Battery at the western tip of Key West, B Battery on the beach nearest to Cuba in Key West, and C and D Batteries at the Boca Chica Naval Air Station. The 8th Battalion, 15th Artillery, (HAWK), was located in the vicinity of Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, with A and C Batteries located at that airfield itself. B Battery was located at Patrick Air Force Base, while D Battery was located at MacDill Air Force Base. All four Batteries of the 2nd Missile Battalion, 52nd Artillery, (NIKE-HERCULES), were located in the vicinity of Homestead Air Force Base.

Provisions of OPLAN 316 clearly stipulated that DAVY CROCKETT and other atomic delivery weapons were not to be taken into the objective area. By 29 October CINCARLANT required certain information for planning purposes in the event that atomic delivery means were ordered into the objective area. Information had already reached CINCARLANT concerning the number of operational HONEST JOHN and LONG JOHN units but no information had been developed concerning the DAVY CROCKETT Weapons Teams. CINCARLANT therefore requested information from Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies as to the number of DAVY CROCKETT Weapons Teams -- both XM28 and XM29 -- which were to remain at their home stations with crews and equipment and which could be maintained in an on-call status to be brought forward if required.

Once again on this date, CINCARLANT pointed out to the Department of the Army that it was considered imperative that immediate authority be granted for Army use of the Key West International Airport. CINCARLANT planned to move a base support echelon, which included an aircraft maintenance company of 125 men and an airfield operating detachment of 75 to Key West. CINCARLANT emphasized to the Department of the Army that either Key West International Airport or equivalent space at the Key West Air Station was essential to the success of Army Air Operations in the objective area.

The Commanding General, USCONARC, on 29 October described to the Department of the Army the command organization which he, as CINCARLANT, had established for the implementation of his assigned missions under OPLAN 316. By this time, he had moved the nucleus of his command post to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, where it would control the communications hub, movement actions, and logistical flow, and where it would provide CINCARLANT with tactical command. The Advance Tact-

ical Air Command, (TAC), command post, which controlled troop carrier and flight aircraft, was physically located in the same building. A complete staff with all liaison and computer service was also available there. Additionally, CINCARLANT had directed the establishment of the Peninsula Base Command comprising the State of Florida, the headquarters of which were to be located at Opa-locka Air Base. The 2nd Logistical Command was selected as its command and control headquarters. Liaison detachments from the Army Material Command, port, medical control, and from pertinent Department of Defense agencies were either already located at Opa-locka Air Base or were moving into position. This entire organization, immediately responsive to the Commanding General, USCONARC, as CINCARLANT, afforded maximum flexibility, control, and coordination.

The Headquarters, Peninsula Base Command, became effective on 30 October 1962, with a total complement of 185 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 511 enlisted men. In addition to the mission of providing administrative and logistical support to all Army units and elements in the Florida area, the new command was responsible for all emergency supplies and aerial resupply to include receiving, storing and rigging, and outloading as required. The command was also intended to supervise and coordinate the movement of replacements and medical evacuees. The forces and activities of the Peninsula Base Command were restricted to the geographical limits of the State of Florida.

At this point, the Commanding General, USCONARC, transmitted to the Department of the Army the feelings of CINCLANT, with regard to the operational control of the Antilles Command, U.S. Army. CINCLANT felt -- and the Commanding General, USCONARC, agreed -- that the Antilles Command should be immediately assigned to CINCARLANT. This would allow for time to clear up command arrangements, bring the Antilles Command up to date on the situation, and enable that command to prepare plans for the staging of Latin American units which might be committed to the objective area. The Department of the Army was requested to take appropriate action with the Joint Chief of Staff to effect the desired transfer of control.

On 30 October the arrival of the USNS COMET, the USNS TAURUS, and the U.S. Army BDL JOHN U. D. PAGE at Savannah, Georgia for loading with equipment and supplies of the First Increment, Task Force MARBLE, brought to light several additional problems involving the use of these vessels. The major problem concerning the use of the COMET was that both No. 3 and No. 4 decks had a clearance of only ten feet, six inches, which precluded their use for either tanks or two and one half

ton trucks. These two decks, therefore, had to be used for one-quarter ton jeeps or for some other such cargo which could utilize this low headroom. The COMET, moreover, discharged aft and it was intended that it would discharge into the BDL JOHN U. D. PAGE off-shore for further discharge over the beach. Both the COMET and the PAGE, however, had a normal speed of approximately eight knots, thus requiring about three and one half days for the journey from Savannah, Georgia, to Fort Lauderdale, Florida. It was considered that if these two vessels were to carry the First Increment of Task Force CHARLIE, they would have to move forward or they would never arrive in the objective area as scheduled. The TAURUS presented still another problem in that although it was a faster ship -- approximately 14 knots -- it had no ramps between decks and so had to discharge directly from each deck. A permanent ramp had been constructed at her normal berth in New York City but such facilities would not be available in the objective area. This meant that the Roll-on, Roll-off capabilities of the vessel could not be used to their fullest intent and capacity.

Shortages of available landing craft for amphibious operations into the objective area led to the change in OPLAN 316 on 30 October. CINCARLANT decided that the BARC, (Barge, amphibious, resupply, cargo), units of the Transportation Corps would fill the gap resulting from this lack of available landing craft. The BARC's would be available for immediate use upon arrival in the objective area. They, moreover, possessed both an amphibious and a land capability which made them adaptable for the movement of emergency requirements from shipboard to inland distribution points. CINCARLANT, therefore, directed XVIII Airborne Corps to place the 554th Transportation Platoon, BARC Operation and Maintenance, in the surface echelon of OPLAN 316. Planning details provided that the BARC's be deck loaded on cargo vessels and that they be made ready for drop discharge at the destination. Second Army was directed to alert the 554th Transportation Platoon, (BARC Operation and Maintenance), at Fort Story, Virginia; with three BARC's for actual movement. Sixth Army was directed to maintain the 14th Transportation Platoon, (BARC Operation and Maintenance), with three BARC's in a state of readiness for future movement if directed.

With all increments of Task Force CHARLIE having departed their home stations at Fort Hood, Texas, and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, CINCARLANT was able to report the impact on rail transportation which this partial division move entailed.

The Department of the Army had given its approval on 31 October 1962 to the concept of preloading the vessels intended for the use of Task Force CHARLIE. The Roll-on, Roll-off vessels were now scheduled for preloading at Savannah, Georgia, but the four LST's earmarked for Task Force CHARLIE remained as previously scheduled for outloading through Fort Lauderdale, Florida. CINCARLANT announced on 31 October that the Department of the Army had confirmed his authority to move the first increment of Task Force CHARLIE to Fort Lauderdale to execute invasion rehearsals and the preloading of the four LST's. Action to initiate the move, however, was held in abeyance by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics pending a final coordination on the location of the LST's.

New logistical problems were encountered at this time in connection with the four LST's which were earmarked to transport the various increments of Task Force CHARLIE to the objective area. It was pointed out that the planning factors used in developing OPLAN 316 were based on use of the modern LST which was basically a 1,000 weight-ton vessel. Therefore, four LST's were considered sufficient, since the total weight requirements for the First Increment of Task Force CHARLIE approximated 3,900 weight-tons. The four LST's which were allocated to CINCARLANT for transporting Task Force CHARLIE however, were of the old type which had a maximum capability of 1,000 weight-tons, but only 500 weight-tons capacity for a normal over-the-beach landing. World War II experience proved that those vessels could be loaded up to 500 weight-tons for over-the-beach operations without encountering too much difficulty. Loads of up to 800 tons per vessel required a causeway landing or at least waterproofing of the vehicles since the vessels would not then be able to move in close enough to the beach. There was a strong feeling in CINCARLANT that these factors warranted an attempt to obtain a fifth LST, thus giving Task Force CHARLIE a carrying capacity of approximately 3,000 weight-tons for an anticipated over-the-beach landing. This meant that even with the fifth vessel, Task Force CHARLIE's equipment would have to be reduced if that force intended to land over-the-beach. As far as CINCARLANT was concerned, it was not a matter of space, but rather one of weight and the manner in which the tonnage was to be landed. This problem consequently led directly to another, that of providing waterproofing kits for the vehicles to be landed from amphibious vessels. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, CG USCONARC, announced on 31 October 1962 that only one such kit was available to the Command. It was the consensus of the logistical planners at USCONARC that, as a precautionary measure, the Department of the Army should develop a requirement for waterproofing kits for at least one Armored and one Infantry Division. The assault forces could not possibly be expected to land all of their vehicles across the beach in water less than 30 inches deep.

CINCARLANT proposed the charter of a fifth LST in order to alleviate some of the problems thus created in connection with transporting Task Force CHARLIE to the objective area. One such vessel under civilian ownership, the CAL-AGRO, was berthed at Ocean City Terminal, Savannah, Georgia. A preliminary inspection of the vessel by CINCARLANT representatives indicated that it was in good shape and that approximately three days would be required to bring it close to its original configuration. The owners had agreed to make it available at a nominal charter fee. On 31 October CINCARLANT requested the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, (CINCLANTFLT), to make the necessary official inspection of the vessel and to determine the practicability of chartering and operating it in view of CINCARLANT's deficiency in this type vessel.

Further actions were taken on 31 October to move units into a positioned location at Fort Stewart, Georgia. Those units which moved on this date consisted mainly of the Signal and Medical units which were required to accompany Task Force CHARLIE into the objective area. These included a Field and an Evacuation Hospital, a Medical Group Headquarters, two specialized Medical Detachments, a Signal Group Headquarters, and a Signal Platoon. The Medical Group and the two hospitals were directed to move their currently assigned personnel and with full TOE equipment. Additional professional personnel were to be provided by USARLANT when required. Because of the scarcity of the type of professional personnel required for the two specialized detachments, they were directed to move without them. USARLANT would also furnish these professional personnel if and when they were required.

On 30 October 1962 CONARC forwarded a recommendation to the Department of the Army for the immediate transfer of the Antilles Command, U.S. Army Caribbean, (ANTCOM, USARCARIB), to the control of CINCARLANT. The Department of the Army replied on 1 November that they preferred to transfer ANTCOM at such time as CINCLANT OPLAN 312 was implemented. The reasoning of the Department of the Army for this delay was that such a move appeared to be more compatible with the current operational requirements of both CINCLANT and CINCARIB and that it also was in agreement with the planning accomplished up to this point and with the authority accorded to CINCLANT in major emergencies. If CINCLANT and CINCARLANT still felt strongly about immediate transfer, the Department suggested that CINCLANT, after appropriate coordination with CINCARIB, submit such a recommendation directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Task Force CHARLIE completed its relocation to Fort Stewart, Georgia, by 1 November 1962. All tracked vehicles of units comprising

the Task Force remained loaded on rail flat cars which were stored in holding areas in the immediate vicinity of Fort Stewart. While all wheeled vehicles had been offloaded for future convoy movements, they were retained in a combat loaded condition. On 1 November Task Force personnel conducted firing practice of crew-served weapons and conducted service practice with artillery pieces on loan from the National Guard. The entire Task Force was placed on a three hour Alert status for movement to the ports of embarkation. At this point, it was estimated that the personnel of the Division Floating Reserve would arrive at Fort Stewart on 2 November, with equipment arriving on 4 November. The Division Floating Reserve was scheduled to commence a training program on 5 November which was designated to increase the individual combat proficiency of all personnel. Full-tracked vehicles of the Floating Reserve -- like those of Task Force CHARLIE -- were to remain loaded on rail flat cars. These cars, however, were to be stored at holding areas in the vicinity of the port of Savannah, Georgia. Wheeled vehicles were to be offloaded but to remain under combat load. The Floating Reserve was to be held on a six hour alert for eventual movement to the ports of embarkation. As of 1 November the JCS On-Call Force was still located at Fort Hood, Texas, but was scheduled to begin its move to Fort Stewart, Georgia, about 4 November. At Fort Stewart this force would accomplish the same training program as the Division Floating Reserve. CINCARLANT considered a ten day alert status adequate of this latter force.

Because of the wide-spread interest which would be aroused by the proposed military actions in Cuba, an additional specialized unit was organized on 1 November 1962 to meet these specific needs within the objective area. The 1st Press Camp, (Provisional), was organized at Fort Eustis, Virginia, with an authorized strength of thirteen officers, one warrant officer, and eighty-one enlisted personnel and assigned the mission of providing information services, facilities, and administrative support for accredited news media representatives who would operate with the U.S. Forces in the objective area. This unit, although stationed at Fort Eustis, Virginia, was under the operational control of USCONARC.

On 2 November, the 1st Armored Division announced that it was preparing to commence specialized training for all driver personnel of Task Force CHARLIE. The division planned to send four M48 tanks, four M41 tanks, and one M59 to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, where driver training would be conducted for all tank commanders and drivers of the First Element as well as for certain supervisory personnel. A total of 20 personnel were involved in the first of such training courses for Task Force CHARLIE. The division planned to ship the personnel to Fort Lauderdale by commercial bus while the equipment would be shipped by rail.

In addition to the driver training program proposed by the 1st Armored Division at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, CINCARLANT had proposed the practice loading of the various increments of Task Force CHARLIE on the four allocated LST's. A port call for the first increment of the Task Force was issued by the U.S. Army Transportation Terminal Command, Atlantic, on 3 November, with the personnel and equipment scheduled to arrive at Port Everglades, Florida, on the following day. At the same time XVIII Airborne Corps recommended that the entire first increment be loaded on four allocated LST's as provided in the original planning. Information available to the XVIII Airborne Corps indicated that the LST's could be beached in the objective area while carrying maximum capability loads. In order to give additional assurance, one of the four LST's would carry a complete causeway pier of four sections. This would enable the LST's to carry the maximum planned weights since they would not be required to beach. The XVIII Airborne Corps recommended that these procedures be carried out in a practice landing as a preliminary to actual operations in the Assault Phase of OPLAN 316.

At this time CINCARLANT proposed changes to those echelons of units scheduled for a later arrival in the objective area. It was pointed out that the Division Floating Reserve was scheduled to arrive in the objective area on cargo ships on D+10 and could unload at any of four possible locations. The availability of the Floating Reserve closed ashore was estimated at D+12. Planning factor estimates for the number of tanks in the objective area on D+12 were approximately 300. Not all of these tanks would be in the immediate area of operations and many already would have suffered combat losses. USCONARC/USARLANT planners concluded that operations at that point would favor an infantry-heavy rather than a tank-heavy force. They therefore pointed out that a substitution for tactical reasons could be accomplished by swithhing the 2nd Battalion, 81st Armor, from the On-Call Force to the Division Floating Reserve, displacing the 2nd Battalion, 52nd Infantry. The latter unit would then become part of the On-Call Forces. This switch, however, would have to be accomplished within the shipping currently allocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Floating Reserve. The XVIII Airborne Corps was given until the following day to make a firm recommendation in this regard.

In preparation for actual assault phase movements, the boat and floating craft units of the Transportation Corps had been moved forward to the St. Petersburg, Florida, area. The units were under the command and/or control of the 159th Transportation Battalion, (Boat), from Fort Eustis, Virginia. An additional boat company and a 100-ton crane from the U.S. Army Transportation Terminal Command, Gulf, were also added to the amphibious element of the surface echelon. CG USCONARC directed on 3 November

that, upon arrival at St. Petersburg, Florida, the 103rd Transportation Battalion (boat) for operational control for the duration of the Cuban emergency. Upon termination of the operation, the unit and the equipment would revert to the control of the Commanding General, Fourth Army.

Permission for the Army to use Key West International Airport as a staging field for Army aircraft enroute to the objective area was obtained on 3 November. On that date the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army to initiate action with local authorities for use of the airport. Once the pertinent negotiations were completed, CINCLANT, was authorized to begin, at his discretion, to preposition supplies, equipment, and personnel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff limited the immediate use of the airfield to the prepositioning of only logistical support and required operational facilities. No aircraft were to be moved to the field until directed.

On 4 November, the 1st Armored Division was queried by higher headquarters as to its capability to maintain its current operational readiness posture and its current deployment configuration without significant reduction of combat readiness. In reply, the 1st Armored Division pointed out that Task Force CHARLIE was at full TOE strength in both personnel and equipment and was in the highest possible state of readiness. All equipment was combat loaded and tracked vehicles remained loaded on flat cars in holding areas in the vicinity of Fort Stewart. Personnel of the entire Task Force were psychologically ready for immediate combat and were on a three-hour alert for movement to a designated port of embarkation. All Task Force personnel, moreover, were restricted to the Fort Stewart reservation and had with them only that clothing prescribed by OPLAN 316. The 1st Armored Division estimated that this alert posture could be maintained for an additional two weeks time -- or until about 12 November -- without significantly affecting the Task Force's combat readiness. Personnel of the Division Floating Reserve were scheduled to close at Fort Stewart on the following day, but all equipment had already arrived. All wheeled vehicles were already offloaded and the tracked vehicles were scheduled for offloading commencing on 11 November. Like Task Force CHARLIE, the personnel of the Division Floating Reserve were in alert status and were restricted to the Fort Stewart reservation. This group, however, did have military winter clothing in addition to that prescribed in OPLAN 316. Although the units were still short a few key personnel and a few items of equipment, they were placed on a twelve-hour alert status. The 1st Armored Division felt that this posture could also be maintained for approximately two weeks without significantly affecting readiness. The JCS MacFall Force had not yet reached Fort Stewart by 4 November. The 2nd Brigade and the 3rd Battalion, 1st Artillery, had already commenced their move but were not scheduled to close at Fort Stewart until about 12 November. All vehicles of this force, including tracked vehicles were to be unloaded upon arrival. Personnel of

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On 4 November, the 1st Armored Division was queried by higher headquarters as to its capability to maintain its current operational readiness posture and its current deployment configuration without significant reduction of combat readiness. In reply, the 1st Armored Division pointed out that Task Force CHARLIE was at full TOE strength in both personnel and equipment and was in the highest possible state of readiness. All equipment was combat loaded and tracked vehicles remained loaded on flat cars in holding areas in the vicinity of Fort Stewart. Personnel of the entire Task Force were psychologically ready for immediate combat and were on a three-hour alert for movement to a designated port of embarkation. All Task Force personnel, moreover, were restricted to the Fort Stewart reservation and had with them only that clothing prescribed by OPLAN 316. The 1st Armored Division estimated that this alert posture could be maintained for an additional two weeks time -- or until about 28 November -- without significantly affecting the Task Force's combat readiness. Personnel of the Division Floating Reserve were scheduled to close at Fort Stewart on the following day, but all equipment had already arrived. All wheeled vehicles were already offloaded and the tracked vehicles were scheduled for off-loading commencing on 11 November. Like Task Force CHARLIE, the personnel of the Division Floating Reserve were in alert status and were restricted to the Fort Stewart reservation. This group, however, did have military winter clothing in addition to that prescribed in OPLAN 316. Although the unit was still short a few key personnel and a few items of equipment, they were placed on a twelve-hour alert status. The 1st Armored Division felt that this posture could also be maintained for approximately two weeks without significantly affecting readiness. The JCS On-Call Force had not yet reached Fort Stewart by 4 November. The 2nd Brigade and the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Artillery, had

already commenced their move but were not scheduled to close at Fort Stewart until about 12 November. All vehicles of this force, including tracked vehicles were to be unloaded upon arrival. Personnel of

this force were equipped with some garrison-type clothing in addition to the prescribed military winter clothing. It was planned to place the On-Call Force on a five-day alert status subsequent to their arrival at Fort Stewart, but they were to be prepared to assume a six-hour operational readiness posture when OPLAN 316 was implemented. Although not required, the 1st Armored Division planned to place this force under the same uniform and off-post restrictions as the Task Force and the Floating Reserve. The 1st Armored Division concluded that a somewhat lesser state of readiness approximately a 24 hour alert status -- could be maintained for an additional 30 days, or until about 30 December, provided that certain of the restrictions placed on Task Force CHARLIE and the Division Floating Reserve were relaxed. Measures proposed by the 1st Armored Division included a controlled relaxation of pass and uniform policies for all concerned and controlled offloading, and reloading of full-track equipment for Task Force CHARLIE in order to permit firing practice and maintenance operations. In addition to the above situation, queries had also been made as to the possibility of a "Stand-Down" for these forces. The 1st Armored Division assumed that this phrase meant a DEFCON 4 status or perhaps an even lower readiness condition. If this assumption were correct, Task Force CHARLIE would require a maximum of 48 hours to regain its current operational readiness posture, while the Division Floating Reserve would require approximately 72 hours. The On-Call Force could meet any required readiness posture commensurate with the time required to move and deploy Task Force CHARLIE and the Division Floating Reserve. The 1st Armored Division felt, however, that if a "Stand-Down" condition were ordered, some consideration should be given to the phased return of the divisional elements to their home Station at Fort Hood, Texas.

The 1st Armored Division announced on 4 November that it intended to continue the driver training courses for operation of tracked vehicles which it had begun two days earlier in the vicinity of Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The division requested authority from CINCARLANT to dispatch an additional 80 personnel to Fort Lauderdale for such training as soon as the first group completed its training phase. The division also requested authority to leave the pertinent equipment at Fort Lauderdale until all this training was completed.

CINCARLANT had previously requested an additional LST for the movement of Task Force CHARLIE due to weight limitation of the old-style LST's. By 4 November, however, it was determined that CINCARLANT's requirements had increased to four additional LST's because of the incorporation of an eight-inch howitzer battalion and a different mix of tanks resulting from the substitution of elements of the 1st Armored Division for those of the 2nd Armored Division. By that time CINCLANT

had already requested the Commander, Military Sea Transport Service, (COMSTS), to investigate and report on the availability of LST's for charter. CINCLANT again reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a suitable LST, the CAL-AGRO, had been located at Savannah, Georgia, and that the vessel was urgently required by CINCARLANT for training purposes. He requested that authorization for the charter of this vessel be expedited so that it could be made immediately available to CINCARLANT.

A dockside rehearsal of offloading operations from the USNS COMET to the EDL JOHN U. D. PAGE was conducted at Savannah, Georgia, on 4 November 1962 by the 2nd Battalion, (Medium Tank), 69th Armor, in conjunction with representatives of the U.S. Army Transportation Terminal Command, Atlantic. Two problems were revealed during this rehearsal, the first of which was that the USNS COMET, under her current load, was approximately 18 inches too low in the water to marry her ramp with that of the EDL PAGE under full ballast. This problem was solved at the time by piling four tanks aft on the EDL PAGE. The representative of the U.S. Army Transportation Terminal Command, Atlantic, on the other hand, recommended a solution which called for removing fuel from the COMET's after storage tanks in order to raise her 24 inches at the stern. This expedient, however, was dependent on how far the COMET would have to steam before refueling and, in addition, was contrary to her current orders. The second problem was the lack of adeptness of the COMET's crew in handling her own lifting gear. Skilled commercial stevedores assisted and instructed the members of the crew in this operation during the rehearsal. The solution recommended by the Atlantic Terminal Command's representatives was that eight skilled heavy boom operators from Fort Eustis, Virginia, be assigned to the ship's complement. The 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor, had no way of determining the feasibility of these recommended solutions nor of determining whether they had already been or would be implemented. These, moreover, were technical problems which representatives of the Transportation Corps would be expected to solve.

The retention of Task Force CHARLIE at Fort Stewart, Georgia, in a readiness condition without prospect of immediate implementation of OPLAN 316 caused some fiscal repercussions by 5 November. The major problem concerned the holding of tracked vehicles on rail flat cars for immediate movement to the port areas. As of this date, a total of 367 commercial and 130 USAX rail flat cars were under load in the Fort Stewart - Savannah, Georgia, area. Of these, 135 commercial and 75 USAX rail flat cars held equipment for Task Force CHARLIE. All units other than elements of the Task Force were directed to unload their equipment as soon as possible. The 135 commercial flat cars held by Task Force CHARLIE cost the government \$8.70 per day per car in demurrage charges, or a total cost of \$1,080 per day.

This problem would necessarily be unsolved as long as Task Force CHARLIE was held in a readiness conditions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the request for the charter of one additional LST on 5 November and granted authority to the Commander, Military Sea Transport Service, to charter the LST CAL-AGRO at Savannah, Georgia. The JCS directed that the vessel be made available to CINCARLANT for training purposes as soon as the charter arrangements were complete.

Third Army recommended on 5 November 1952 that all of its units which had been placed on DEFCON 3 status on 22 October be permitted to reduce their readiness posture to DEFCON 4 status by 9 November. In justifying this recommendation, Third Arm pointed out that maintenance, training, and morale would be affected significantly if these units were held in their current readiness posture beyond 9 November. Third Army estimated that if these units were placed in DEFCON 4 status they could regain their earlier readiness posture within 72 hours.

The 1st Armored Division announced on 6 November that all elements of the Division Floating Reserve had closed at Fort Stewart as of 1200Z hours the previous day. The estimated arrival of the On-Call Force was now moved forward to 11 November. In the interim, the 1st Armored Division had accomplished certain changes to the forces for OPLAN 316. The 2nd Battalion, 81st Armor, had been substituted for the 2nd Battalion, 52nd Infantry, in the Division Floating Reserve and the latter unit was now in the On-Call Force. In addition, the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Artillery, had been added to the On-Call Force.

In response to an inquiry from CINCARLANT, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps -- also designated as Commander, Joint Task Force Cuba -- submitted a number of comments and recommendations on the composition and use of the forces allocated to OPLAN 316. He pointed out that the forces currently allocated to OPLAN 316 involved a Battle Group, two Brigades and a Task Force taken from three separate divisions. This resulted from recurring increases in both the force requirements and force availability as new intelligence information on Cuba was made available. The Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, concluded that the command structure and the utilization of the forces in Task Force 125 could be markedly improved if the entire 1st Armored and 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions were included in the Air and Surface Echelons of the Task Organization. This seemed to him to be the next logical step in the development of a stronger plan. If this conclusion proved to be acceptable, a new concept could then be developed for the use of the various elements of the Task Organization. First of all, on D-Day the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions would conduct their planned parachute assault and the Marines, in sufficient force, would secure the beachhead at Tarara. The 2nd Infantry Division would land over-the-beach at Tarara immediately

behind the Marines. The 1st Armored Division would land through the port at Mariel, using the maximum available assault shipping, while the 1st Infantry Division -- less the planned airlanded elements -- would immediately follow the 1st Armored Division through the port of Mariel or possibly through Havana, if that port had already been opened. This would enable the use of the 5th Infantry, the 2nd Armored, or the 4th Infantry Divisions -- the three as a Floating Reserve. The availability of assault shipping, however, was the primary factor which limited the ability to introduce additional forces into the initial phase of the operations. Current planning factors called for a maximum use of the port facilities at Mariel and, unless sufficient quantities of assault shipping were made available, it was extremely doubtful if any more forces -- in addition to those already being used in the OPLAN -- could be placed ashore within the first eight to ten days.

While in the readiness posture for execution of the 316 OPLAN elements of the 1st Armored Division conducted amphibious training in Florida

between 12 November and 10 December. Approximately 4500 officers and men participated in this training.

During the period 19 November to 21 December, a series of joint airborne exercises called "SUN SHADE" were conducted for each battle group of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. These exercises amounted to a rehearsal of the 316 OPLAN in many respects.

The experience gained during the Cuban emergency has resulted in the Army attaining a high state of readiness and the Army was ready in all respects to execute military operations in Cuba in support of U.S. national policy.

CHAPTER VII

NAVAL OPERATIONS

SECTION 1

312/316 TASKS

The U.S. Naval Forces Atlantic, (U.S. Atlantic Fleet), operations during the crisis covered a broad spectrum of operations although actual hostilities with Cuba never occurred. Naval forces involved in the Cuban operations included Attack Carriers, with embarked Air Groups, Anti-Submarine Forces, Amphibious Forces, Fleet Marine Forces, Service Forces, Mine Forces, Submarine Forces, and Naval Air Forces. All of these naval units contributed significantly to the readiness to execute CINCLANT OPLANS 312/316 if directed. They conducted the surface quarantine operation, and they contributed a major effort in photo reconnaissance and ASW operations.

The specific tasks assigned to CINCLANTFLT for 312 operations are as follows:

312 Tasks:

- a. Designation of the Commander Naval Task Force.
- b. Designate for planning purposes and provide naval forces as indicated and required for the Navy portion of 312 operations.
- c. Direct the Commander Naval Task Force to conduct and control operations in support of COMANTDEFCON for the Defense of Guantanamo Naval Base and for the selective air strikes provided for in the plan,
- d. Direct the COMNAVTFOR to control and coordinate all air operations in support of the defense of Guantanamo Naval Base.
- e. Advise CINCLANT of any Navy/Marine air forces which can be made available for air strikes and reconnaissance operations in Cuba which are not committed to the defense of Guantanamo Naval Base and provide these forces to him for OPCON when directed.
- f. Provide forces for the reinforcement of Guantanamo Bay.

g. Provide air defense augmentation forces to CINCONAD as directed.

h. Provide or arrange for the logistic and administrative support of naval forces.

316 Tasks:

For the CINCLANT 316 OPLAN, the Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet was assigned the following basic tasks:

a. Provide the Commander, Naval Task Force, and the Naval forces listed in Annex A, Task Organization and Forces.

b. Support Joint Task Force 122 as required,

c. Provide, or arrange for provision of logistics and administrative support of Naval forces. Assume responsibility for logistic support of PACOM Naval forces when the forces enter CINCLANT's area of responsibility.

d. Provide CJTF 122 staff augmentation in accordance with Appendix II to Annex J to CINCLANT OPLAN 314.

e. Direct COMKWESTFOR to support Joint Task Force 122, as required.

f. Direct COMPHIBLANT to provide a minimum of 4 LST's for initial lift of Army heavy equipment to objective area.

g. Conduct ASW, AEW, Anti-raider, Mine Countermeasures, and other operations in the Atlantic Command area outside the Cuban area of operations, (Joint Zone Cuba), in order to defend the continental U.S., essential bases and areas, shipping at sea, and U.S. forces deploying to or participating in the operations set forth. Conduct ASW operations as necessary within the Cuban area of operations, (Joint Zone Cuba), in support of or in coordination with Commander Naval Task Force.

In addition to these basic tasks the Naval Forces Atlantic were responsible for accomplishing the following tasks during the various phases of 316 operations.

Phase I - Alert Phase. This phase would be executed by CINCLANT when the JCS direct an increased state of readiness for military operations in Cuba. Phase I provides for orderly activation of necessary command and control agencies, the establishment of an advanced state of readiness to reinforce the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, and possible repositioning of certain naval forces.

- a. Activate Naval Task Force headquarters.
- b. Assemble joint task force staff augmentation and place on 4 hour movement notice.
- c. Direct Carib PHIBRON with embarked Marines to deploy to an area within 4 hours steaming of Guantanamo Bay.
- d. Place selected amphibious units on 24 hour sailing notice.
- e. Provide flagship for CJTF 122.
- f. Take all necessary actions to prepare other designated forces for Cuban operations short of actual deployment or interruption of scheduled operations.

Phase II - Pre - position and Deployment Phase. When directed by the JCS, CINCLANT would order this phase into execution to provide for the most advanced state of readiness attainable short of actual hostilities; it requires major deployments and re-positioning of forces. Reserve forces, MATS aircraft, and MSTC shipping will be made available for this phase.

- a. Order joint task force staff augmentation to report to CJTF 122.
- b. Chop Carib PHIBRON to COMANTDEFCOM; when Marines disembarked, sail PHIBRON to CONUS port for re-load.
- c. Provide designated naval forces and direct Commander Naval Task Force, to form and deploy Naval Task Force to vicinity of objective area.
- d. Direct CG FMFLANT to provide air-lifted reinforcement to Guantanamo Bay as required.
- e. Direct COMNAVAIRLANT to assist CG FMFLANT in air-lift of designated Marine forces.

Phase III - Deployment and Pre - Assault Phase. This phase would be ordered into execution by CINCLANT only after the outbreak of hostilities or a United States decision to conduct military operations in Cuba. Upon announcement of D-Day, P-Hour, movements and deployments in progress will be adjusted to meet the established times.

- a. Chop Naval Task Force to CJTF 122.
- b. Continue provision and deployment of naval forces as necessary and

directed; chop forces to Commander Naval Task Force upon departure CINUS ports.

In addition to the tasks outlined above for 312/316 OPLANS, CINCLANTFLT specified that the Commander SECOND Fleet who was Vice Admiral Alfred G. Ward, USN would serve as Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet if directed. Also COMSECONDFLT was directed to be prepared to provide flag facilities for a CINCLANT command echelon in the objective area if required.

Although not specified as Navy tasks in the extant 312/316 OPLANS the Navy provided four TACAN equipped ships in the Florida Straits as navigational aids for CINCLANT strike aircraft and to assist in recovery of ditched pilots. In the area of personnel rescue the Navy was also to provide small craft in the water area adjacent to the air drop zone near Mariel to recover parachutists who inadvertently might land in the water.

The foregoing tasks were modified to conform to changes in the command structure and to meet additional requirements as they developed.

CHAPTER VII

SECTION 2

NAVAL BASE, GUANTANAMO

The U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is a major command of the TENTH Naval District and the Caribbean Sea Frontier. The mission of the base is to maintain and operate medium base facilities. It provides fleet units with the minimum support necessary to the accomplishment of training missions.

There are seven component activities on the Base and they are the: Naval Station, Naval Air Station, Marine Barracks, Hospital, Dental Clinic, Supply Depot, and Public Works. In addition there are two fleet commands, the Fleet Training Group and Utility Squadron 10.

The Guantanamo Bay area was seized from Spanish forces by United States Marines in June 1898 during the Spanish-American War. Although hostilities ceased in 1898, it was not until 1903 that a formalized lease agreement between the new Republic of Cuba and the United States was consummated. In 1934, a treaty between the Governments of the United States and Cuba confirmed the previous lease agreement and gave the United States a continuing lease on the 5 by 9 mile base. This lease could only be voided by the U.S. abandoning the area or by mutual agreement.

Personnel normally assigned to Guantanamo approximate the following:

4,000 military personnel

280 U.S. civilian personnel

2700 dependents

2500 indigenous personnel

Relations between the governments of the United States and Cuba have rapidly deteriorated since the severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961. As a result, policies of military significance concerning Guantanamo have been highlighted since that date. Two policies of major importance were that the U.S. would hold the Naval Base, Guantanamo and that overt action against Guantanamo could result in the Joint Chiefs of Staff directing military operations by CINCLANT in Cuba.

Commander, Antilles Defense Command is assigned responsibility by CINCLANT for the overall coordination of the defense of Guantanamo Naval

Base. CINCLANT's OPOD 1-yr and CINCLANTFLT OPOD 36-61, (superseded by 38-62), provide for the defense of and the evacuation of non-combatants from Guantanamo. These orders call for the rapid introduction of additional forces. However, despite this planned augmentation, it was apparent that in 1962 in the event of a sudden, concerted attack by Cuban forces, certain intelligence, operational, logistical and administrative deficiencies existed. Below are some of the deficiencies and the actions that had been initiated to correct them.

Effective air search radar.

To improve the air search radar capability, CG FMFLANT was directed to position in Guantanamo as soon as practicable the personnel and equipment to support the TPS-15 air search radar. The installation was completed by 22 October 1962.

Lack of electronic intelligence data on SA-2 radar, KOMAR Guidance System, and Surface-to-Surface missile sites.

An aggressive and comprehensive program involving augmentation from outside CINCLANT was instituted to gather intelligence data on the SA-2 radar, the KOMAR Guidance System and Surface-to-Surface missiles. This effort was successful. As for the presence of the KOMAR Class "PGMG" in Cuban waters, on 16 October COMNAVBASE GTMO informed local commands of the actions required to report contact, to track, and to gather intelligence on the KOMARS.

Listing of close-in targets.

On 18 October, in accordance with a request from CINCLANT, COMNAVDEFCON forwarded a list of targets posing a direct threat to the Guantanamo Naval Base. These targets were incorporated in OPLAN 312 target lists and target assignments.

Adequate ground defense fortifications and aircraft revetments.

Based on a study submitted in April 1962, CNO approved funds for improving the ground defense fortifications. Two (2) Mobile Construction Battalions were assigned the task and construction began in September. The labor force was greatly increased as Marine combat units were introduced into Guantanamo. Later, strong representation was made by COMNAVBASE GTMO to construct eight aircraft revetments. It was recommended that this be accomplished upon completion of the ground fortifications. CNO and CINCLANT placed this recommendation under study.

Insufficient ground defense forces.

CINCLANTFLT OPOD 36-61 made provisions for reinforcement of the Naval Base, Guantanamo. Base defense responsibility was assigned to COMCARIBSEAFRON. The major combat unit assigned was a Marine Battalion to be air lifted to Guantanamo on order. On 12 October COMCARIBSEAFRON recommended that at the first sign that hostilities were imminent, a Regimental Headquarters and two (2) Marine Battalion Landing Teams should be placed at Guantanamo and dependents evacuated. He also recommended that: (a) a VMA squadron be maintained at Roosevelt Roads; (b) a VMF Squadron be on alert status at Roosevelt Roads or CONUS; (c) a GV be maintained at Roosevelt Roads at all times; (d) a Destroyer Division be maintained in the Guantanamo vicinity; and (e) a TAO/AOG be prepared to assume responsibility for fresh water resupply. Prior to the receipt of COMCARIBSEAFRON's recommendations, on 11 October CINCLANTFLT directed COMNAVAIRLANT to assign VA-35 to COMNAVBASE GTMO to arrive at McCalla by 18 October for primary close air support missions. Four (4) days later on 15 October, COMPHIBLANT recommended the immediate reinforcement of Guantanamo. Shortly after that CG FMFLANT indicated his intention of prepositioning supplies and ammunition at Guantanamo. On the 18th of October JCS chopped one battalion from the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Camp Pendleton to CINCLANT. This battalion was to move by air direct to Guantanamo as soon as the airlift was available. VA-35 which had been assigned to COMNAVBASE GTMO was in place at McCalla by 18 October. At this point the build up to improve the defensive readiness at Guantanamo was being rapidly implemented. The decision had been made that the adequate defense of Guantanamo required the presence of substantial numbers of attack aircraft, naval gunfire support ships and marine ground forces. The risk of losing aircraft as well as the air strips in case of pre-emptive attack by Cuban forces was accepted. From this time forward the entire combat capability of the Atlantic Command was to be brought to bear on the Government of Cuba. It was no longer a question of who, what or where. Now it was simply a case of when. On 20 October CINCLANTFLT OPOD 43-62 was issued. Part of the mission assigned to Task Force 135 was to be prepared to conduct air strikes to support the defense of Guantanamo. Later in the afternoon of 20 October the following actions took place; (a) COMPHIBLANT directed COMPHIBRON 8 with BLT 2/2 on board to proceed to Guantanamo at best speed; (b) CINCLANTFLT ordered twenty Marine A4D aboard the ENTERPRISE; (c) CG FMFLANT advised CINCLANTFLT of the need for two CONUS based VMA squadrons from AIRFMFPAC to be chopped in place to CG FMFLANT; (d) CINCLANT issued a change to OPLAN 312-62 containing an annex relative to the defense of Guantanamo. The overall responsibility for the defense remained with COMANTDEFCON. Specific tasks assigned were the evacuation of dependents, the reinforcement of defense forces, the holding of Guantanamo for seventy-two hours without outside assistance and the seizure of selected critical terrain. COMNAVBASE GTMO was to direct the air support in the defense.

The defense situation at Guantanamo as of noon on 21 October was as follows: (a) Brigadier General Collins, USMC, Commanded the ground forces; (b) Three marine rifle companies were in position on the main line of resistance; (c) an observation plane was airborne seeking unusual activity in Cuban territory; (d) the ESSEX was underway to provide AAW and surveillance to the west of Guantanamo; (e) one and a half rifle companies from the air-lifted battalion from Camp Pendleton were in place. The remainder of the battalion was due by the night of 22 October; (f) Naval gunfire ships were occupying three fire support areas; (g) two F8U aircraft were providing airborne CAP and two on strip alert during daylight; (h) PHIBRON 8 was within four hours of the base, but out of the sight of land.

To climax an eventful 21 October CINCLANTFLT directed the evacuation of non-combatants and ordered Plan "CHARLIE" of OPORDER 36-61 executed with certain modifications. This action resulted in the following: (a) the BLC embarked on PHIBRON 8 was to be landed; (b) an additional battalion was to be air-lifted from Camp Lejuene by 22 October (with the battalion being air-lifted from Camp Pendleton, Guantanamo would now have three marine reinforced battalions in place).

Adequate air defense and anti-air warfare capability.

Recognizing the shortcomings of his anti-aircraft warfare capability, on 6 October COMNAVBASE CMC stated that the only AAW capability was being provided by F8U type aircraft of Utility Squadron 10 and ships undergoing refresher training. He recommended the following to COMCARLSEAFRON: (a) In view of the fact that whenever a VMF squadron was in the Caribbean there was a VMA squadron on 24 hour alert in CONUS, conversely, there should be a VMF squadron on alert in CONUS whenever a VMA squadron was in the Caribbean; (b) The VMF squadron so alerted should have an all weather capability. Not only would this enhance the anti-aircraft capability but would also provide for improved close air support. COMCARLSEAFRON concurring with this recommendation further recommended to CINCLANTFLT that the HAWK or REDEYE be provided for defense against no warning low level air strikes. On 15 October CINCLANTFLT ordered eight VMF aircraft equipped with Sidewinder displaced from Roosevelt Roads to Guantanamo by 21 October. CINCLANT had also recommended to JCS that one light anti-aircraft missile battalion (HAWK) be transferred from PACOM to LANTCOM as soon as possible. JCS approved and directed that the transfer be accomplished. On 20 October 3d FTFAL was directed to ship the 3rd LAAM (HAWK) battalion in place to CINCLANT. 3d FTFAL requested air-lift for the movement of this LAAM battalion to Navy Point.

Presence of approximately 3000 U.S. national non-combatants.

The presence of non-combatants in a tentative combat zone is always a

a source of great concern to commanders at all levels. In this particular case, CINCLANTFLT in March 1961 had issued his OPORDER 36-61 which provided for the evacuation of U.S. nationals and designated aliens. The situation had deteriorated sufficiently that by midafternoon on 21 October the evacuation of dependents was directed by CINCLANTFLT. Some were to leave by the aircraft which were bringing in the Marine combat units. Most were to be evacuated by the surface ships that had been designated. These ships were the UPSHUR, HYADES, DUXBURY BAY, and DE SOTO COUNTY. COMCARIBSEAFRON was to provide air and surface escort to protect ships and aircraft evacuating non-combatants.

Water supply if water source was cut off.

To provide a means of emergency water resupply in the event the Base water source was eliminated, plans were made to have two TAO/AOG readied to haul water when required. Base defense plans were to include attack to the Northeast to capture the Yteras water plant.

Shortage of surgical teams and whole blood supply.

On 21 October CINCLANTFLT recommended that two surgical teams be deployed to Guantanamo carrying with them fifty pints of whole blood. Teams were designated from New York and Bethesda and they arrived at Guantanamo on 23 October.

GUANTANAMO: 21 October - 17 November.

With the foregoing description of the situation at the Naval Base, Guantanamo and the actions being taken provide background for the developments during the period 21 October - 17 November.

INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS.

The Cuban government radio was being monitored constantly. On 23 October the radio instructed local militiamen and soldiers to report to the military school at San Justo. Medical teams were directed to report to the hospital and the civilian community was told to extinguish lights, store water and remain inside. To add to the mounting tension, several Cuban vehicles including three tanks were observed to the east of the base. Despite this activity it was worthy of note that there was still an absence of announcements to the Cuban people about the build up of U.S. Forces at Guantanamo. There was no noticeable change in the Cuban forces outside the fence line. In order to acquire as much local and tactical intelligence as possible several requests for aerial photographic coverage were submitted. On 28 October, because of an ELINT contact of a KOMAR radar, an aerial photo-

graphic reconnaissance of Santiago, Banes and Bahia De Nipe harbors was requested.

As his intelligence means improved and broadened, COMNAVBASE GTMO was able to gather information and report by 8 November the location of the Cuban Rebel Army, Militia, and Communist bloc Forces in Central and Eastern Oriente Province. Incoming intelligence summaries in mid-November reported that extensive construction was continuing at the Holguin Airfield in Oriente Province. In addition the Soviets were believed to have in Cuba, four tank battalions with 120 M-54 tanks; the SNAPPER anti-tank missile; and, of great tactical significance, a Free Rocket Over Ground (FROG) battalion with 6 launchers and 24 rockets. Because of the fact that the FROG could carry a nuclear warhead, COMNAVBASE GTMO recommended that any movement of FROG missiles into positions which threatened the Base be placed in the category of an offensive act unacceptable to the United States.

OPERATIONS

The original CINCLANTFLT order for the reinforcement of the Naval Base, Guantanamo provided one battalion. The Base defense plans were prepared accordingly. However, by 21 October the planned size of the ground force had been greatly increased. The force would now consist of a ground defense headquarters; a MAG headquarters; RLT headquarters; three reinforced battalions; a HAWK battery, (by 25 October); tanks; 155 and 105 artillery; and three Naval Gunfire support ships. Accordingly, Brigadier General Collins, USMC, as ground defense commander developed a new defense plan incorporating into it the additional forces assigned to him and which was to be in place by 24-25 October.

The air movement of a battalion from Camp Pendleton and another battalion from Cherry Point, North Carolina was executed in a highly efficient manner.

The success of this air movement would have been greatly impaired if the airfield had been exposed to any kind of harassing artillery or mortar fire. As a show of force, COMNAVBASE GTMO directed the elements of VA-35, VMA-331, and VS-10 provide a dawn air demonstration over the Base on 22 October. The duration was to be for 1 1/2 hours. However, because of the increasing tension and the fact that the dependents were still on board the Base, COMNAVBASE GTMO was directed to cancel the air demonstration.

PRETRON 8 arrived at Guantanamo on the morning of 22 October and immediately began to discharge the personnel and equipment of PRETRON 2/2.

In order to clearly delineate Admiral O'Donnell's position as COMNAVBASE GTMO, the Secretary of Defense, on 23 October, gave the Admiral clear authority to respond instantly to any attack on Guantanamo. By this time the massive reinforcement of the Naval Base was far advanced. Approximately 5,000 Fleet Marine Force troops, including their normal allowance of U.S. Navy personnel, had joined some 350 Marine Barracks and Fleet Marine Force personnel already in position. Fleet training had been discontinued and members of the Fleet Training Group were assigned base defense billets.

Reporting the Base Defense situation, COMNAVBASE GTMO reiterated to COMCARIBSEAFRON that, adequate defense against air attack was still the greatest weakness. VU-10 was providing some air defense capability, but this was not sufficient. To correct the situation, the following recommendations were submitted:

- a. Assign a DDG with Tartar missiles until HAWK battery was in place.
- b. Station a 4 plane detachment of WF aircraft at McCalla Air Field to enhance the early warning capability. COMCARIBSEAFRON concurred and requested this support from CINCLANTFLT.

As a continuation of the air build up, the CO of MAG-32 arrived on the afternoon of 23 October. CINCLANTFLT directed the execution of OPORD 45-62, the Quarantine of Cuba.

To improve the air defense, 6 aircraft were directed to fly a one hour dawn patrol. COMNAVBASE GTMO, receiving CAP and on station CAS from the ENTERPRISE and INDEPENDENCE, requested that 2 VFN be on station from sunset to sunrise and 4 VFN be on station at dawn and dusk. CINCLANT directed CINCLANTFLT to provide air support to Guantanamo in the event of an attack prior to or in the absence of an order for execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62.

The air defense was further improved by the arrival of the HAWK battery on 25 October. In addition, the DAHLGREN DLG-12 was directed to load ammunition and proceed to Guantanamo for duty. Once on station the DAHLGREN was to be designated Anti-Air Warfare Command Post for the Guantanamo Defense Area should base power be destroyed. The DAHLGREN was in place by the 27th.

With ground reinforcement complete, the ground defense plan can be described as follows:

a. Windward Sector: Two battalions were deployed abreast on the Main Line of Resistance. In reserve were two more battalions comprised of two companies from the Marine Barracks, two companies of CB's and four companies of blue jackets. Direct support was provided by two batteries; (11 tubes), of 105 mm howitzers; one battery, (6 tubes), of 155 mm howitzers; one tank platoon, (5 tanks); one anti-tank platoon, (5 ONTOS); one flame tank section, (2 tanks); and sixteen 106 mm recoilless rifles.

b. Leeward Section: One battalion was deployed on the Main Line of Resistance. In direct support were one battery, (6 tubes), of 105 mm howitzers; one battery, (6 tubes), of 4.2" mortars; one tank platoon (5 tanks); one anti-tank platoon, (5 ONTOS), and eight 106 mm recoilless rifles.

c. General support for the entire defense was provided by a platoon (2 tubes), of self propelled 155 mm howitzers; a light anti-aircraft missile battery, (32 missiles); and naval gunfire support to be rendered by three DD's.

Air operations from Guantanamo were of significant proportions. SEC 81.7.9 recommended that 10 to 12 SZF aircraft should be based at NAS, McCalla. This would provide better ASW cover and not overburden and dilute TP-56's effort on quarantine missions. It was at this point that CG FMF-LANT made some observations to CINCLANT regarding the vulnerability of aircraft at Guantanamo. The following recommendations were made regarding protection in case of an attack:

a. Base at Guantanamo the minimum number of aircraft to meet operational requirements.

b. Disperse aircraft to the maximum feasible extent.

c. Maintain aircraft in highest state of readiness to execute emergency flyaway.

d. Construct sandbag revetments.

e. Make provision for rapid smoke screening of aircraft.

Shortly thereafter on 1 November, the CG 2nd Marine Air Wing directed that 4 HES helicopters and 20 jet aircraft report to COMNAVBASE GUMC for operations. The HES came in from the USS OKINAWA and the jets were to come from JMF-333 at Roosevelt Roads. On the same day, ME3-7 with 10 officers and 34 enlisted men, arrived at the Base.

Because of his ever increasing air defense capability, it was decided that COMNAVBASE GUMC would exercise command and coordination control of all Anti-

Aircraft Warfare Forces within a 100 mile radius of the Base.

By 5 November tension seemed to be easing somewhat.

Further improvement in the situation was evidenced when, on 7 November the Russian government agreed to have U.S. ships close aboard for the photographing of missiles on the deck of certain ships departing Cuba.

So these were days of continuing what had become a daily routine. Sonar contacts were kept in constant surveillance. A careful check was kept of all surface operations involving merchant ships, particularly those carrying cargo to or from Cuba. The activity of the Cuban labor force was normal. Water flow was uninterrupted. CIA continued to provide intelligence on the enemy situation. The ground defense forces conducted live firing exercises. The Cuban government press and radio continued to place considerable emphasis on the demand for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Guantanamo.

ADMINISTRATIVE HIGHLIGHTS

The evacuation of dependents was carried out very efficiently. Despite the personal hardship of leaving their husbands, fathers, pets and belongings there was a minimum of complaining and confusion. CNO sent the dependents a message delivering his congratulations and respects on the manner in which they were carrying out the evacuation. Except for two instances, where further hospitalization at Guantanamo was necessary, all non-combatants were evacuated by 1630 on 22 October.

Except for two or three occasions the normal number of Cuban workers reported for duty during the entire crisis. The few interruptions were

as a result of harassing tactics on the part of the Cuban military. Such tactics as disrupting the transportation and lengthy interrogation and search were used. However, the workers were not abused in the process. At no time did COMNAVBASE indicate the slightest doubt about the loyalty or motives of his Cuban labor force, nor was there any overt act on their part that should have created such a doubt. Workers attitudes and job performances were excellent. As a matter of fact, certain on-board Cubans volunteered for extra duties. For example, 40 Cubans were standing watches with the Base Police as the second man in a police patrol. A significant development was the bringing forward of evidence of 2 employees cooperating with Cuban authorities in the harassment of Base employees. These two were discharged. Thirteen others suspected of strong pro-Castro feelings resigned.

The Voice of America continued to broadcast and on 22 October the highlighted program was President Kennedy's speech on the Cuban situation. This speech was translated into the Spanish language.

An Air Force C-135 carrying ammunition crashed on 23 October killing the entire crew.

By 24 October a circuit from Guantanamo to the White House was ready for operation.

On 31 October COMNAVBASE reported to CNO that a source reported the recovery of an American pilot whose aircraft was reportedly shot down by Russian forces on 29 October somewhere between Banes and Gibara. CNO replied that the UN was arranging for the delivery of the shot down pilot, Major Anderson, to the Naval Base.

A problem of great concern to COMNAVBASE was the water supply. Except for one occasion on 31 October when the 12 inch water line between the Yateras River and pump house #5 sustained a leak, water service was normal. As emergency measures however, 2 tankers and a water barge were available for fresh water resupply. The water problem just like the Cuban labor force never became critical.

On 3 November 2 Marines were critically injured when they inadvertently entered a mine field. Four other Marines and a Navy corpsman were wounded when they attempted to remove the injured Marines. The latter 5 personnel were not seriously injured. On 6 November 2 Marine sentries accidentally ran a Ford pick-up truck through the fence line. The truck overbarried about 20 feet inside Cuban territory. A short time later it was removed by the Marines. A Cuban officer present at the scene would not speak, so he was told that a Base official would wait at the northeast gate for one hour for

any discussion of the incident. No Cuban officials appeared at this meeting and the matter was considered closed. Another casualty resulting incident occurred at 2330 on 8 November. A Marine sentry shot and wounded 2 other Marines when they did not respond to his challenge.

GUANTANAMO: 18 November - 1 December

As the United States government became convinced that the missiles, missile launching equipment and offensive bombers were being dismantled and prepared for return to Russia, the Naval Base entered a period of watchful waiting. Planning and preparations for both offensive and defensive actions continued. As the sailors and marines became more accustomed to their surroundings and situation, the problems inherent in field living under combat conditions became the issue of the moment. Eating, sleeping, working and recreation - existing until combat began or until the situation returned to normal. A schedule was established for relieving the units on the Main Line of Resistance so that the troops could enjoy hot meals. Watches were organized so that the men could have adequate sleep under more comfortable conditions. The CB's with more appropriate equipment added immeasurably to the digging of trenches, clearing of fields of fire, construction of bunkers and command posts. More complete communications were installed. Briefings on the various plans of action, live firing exercises, repair of equipment - time was now available for all of this without detracting from the readiness posture. There were no critical personnel shortages and the troops were well motivated and offensively minded. Deadline equipment was at an optimum low. Logistic support from exterior and local sources was outstanding. And, if such a state is possible under the conditions as they existed, the situation had become normal. Mail arrived. Athletic programs were organized. Exchange facilities were made available. Thought was given toward sending liberty parties to other Caribbean islands for rest and recreation. And last but not least was the luxury of the rumor - and the most common one - "home for Christmas."

Credibility of this rumor mounted on 21 November when the quarantine of Cuba was lifted.

By 28 November 1962, the situation had so improved that most of the reinforcing Marine units had been ordered returned to their home stations and plans were being made to have dependents back to Guantanamo by Christmas.

Nevertheless, defense of the base still was considered of the utmost importance. The following is the defense concept that was established:

a. Defense of NAVBASE GTMO with Forces Immediately Available.

(1) Ground Defense Forces.

Marine Barracks, Naval Base, MCB, and NAS personnel were organized and equipped to form 6 rifle companies, one weapons company, and one artillery battery to man primary ground defense positions. These forces were augmented by Fleet Marine Forces to include: one rifle company, one artillery group, (155 mm gun platoon and 155 mm howitzer battery), one reinforced tank platoon, and one Anglico Platoon.

(2) Surface Defense Force.

A minimum of three surface fire support capable: destroyer type ships.

(3) Air Defense Force.

Four VMA aircraft were in place at Leeward Point together with a detachment of VU-10. A battery from the 3rd LAAM Battalion to be in place.

(4) Foregoing defense forces maintained equivalent of DEFCON THREE at all times.

b. Reinforcement of NAVBASE GTMO (LANTFLT FORCES).

(1) A PHIBRON with embarked BLT is in position in the Caribbean.

(2) Air lifted Battalion in place at Camp Lejeune. Maintained in readiness to provide for arrival first company 12 hours and remainder of battalion within 24 hours.

(3) It should be borne in mind that other Cuban plans are predicated upon accomplishment of at least the foregoing reinforcement and the evacuation of dependents and non-combatants.

c. CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62.

Readiness times in terms of S-Hour following receipt of execution orders:

(1) FIRE HOSE (Selective SAMS)	24 Hours
(2) SHOE BLACK (Selective Targets)	48 Hours
(3) FULL HOUSE (ALL SAMS)	48 Hours
(4) ROYAL FLUSH (All Air Defense)	48 Hours

(5) SCABBARDS 312 (Full 312 Plan)

72 Hours

Delay in execution of foregoing should be accepted until adequate defense forces can be repositioned at NAVBASE GTMO and a proper air strike posture re-generated.

d. CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62

(1) Posture predicated upon readiness to execute within 18 days following E-Day.

e. Summary.

CINCLANT can:

(1) Reinforce GTMO with one battalion by airlift in 24 hours.

(2) Reinforce GTMO with one BLT via surface means in approximately 3 2/3 days.

(3) Initiate selected, (limited), phase of OPLAN 312-62 within 24 hours or the entire plan within 72 hours of receipt of the directive to execute.

(4) Execute OPLAN 316-62 18 days after E-Day.

CHAPTER VII

SECTION 3

CUBAN QUARANTINE OPERATIONS

The establishment of the CINCLANTFLT Quarantine Center was a direct result of events set in motion by the President's broadcast to the nation on 22 October 1962. The next day a Presidential Proclamation was issued on "interdiction of the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba." The same day, 23 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the establishment of a blockade of Cuba. In their message, the JCS gave the reasons and instructions for the blockade.

On the evening of 21 October, in anticipation of the blockade of Cuba, CINCLANTFLT issued his Operation Order 45-62. In OPORD 45-62 COMSECONDFLT was designated Quarantine Force Commander and CTF 136. COMASWFORLANT in his capacity as CTF 81-83 was directed to conduct air surveillance as requested by the Commander, Quarantine Force. Then, on 24 October as directed by JCS and CINCLANT, CINCLANTFLT executed his blockade order. Subsequently the JCS directed that the word "quarantine" be substituted for "blockade" and the order downgraded from SECRET to CONFIDENTIAL.

COMSECONDFLT had issued his Operation Order 1-62 on 22 October. This order established TF 136 with COMSECONDFLT as CTF 136. The organization was divided into three task groups that remained in effect throughout the quarantine. However, some of the units were relieved in kind as the operation progressed. The Task Force organization was as follows:

CTF 136 COMSECONDFLT (Relieved on 13 November by COMCRUSDESFLT SIX)

CTF 136.1 COMCRUSDESFLT SIX with 2-Cruisers; 2-DLG; 1-DDG; 9-DD; 2-DDR; 1-DDG; and 1-EDD assigned

CTG 136.2 COMCARDIV EIGHTEEN with 1-CVS and 4-DD assigned

CTG 136.3 CO, USS ELOKONIN with 2-AO; 1-AE; and 2-DD assigned

The ships of TG 136.1 were given stations initially on an arc of 500 miles from Cape Maysi, Cuba from latitude 27-30N, longitude 70W to latitude 20N, longitude 65W. There were twelve (12) stations on this arc with 47 miles between stations. These stations were assigned the code name "WALNUT". CTG 136.2 took station to the west of the general center of this arc and CTG 136.3 operated as necessary to replenish the ships on station.

This original quarantine line was effective, while at the same time being outside the operational range of Cuban aircraft. Later, it was determined by U.S. aerial reconnaissance that the Cuban Air Force and the Cuban airfields were in a poor state of readiness to launch attacks against ships on the "WALNUT" stations. Consequently with the approval of CINCLANT and JCS the quarantine arc was readjusted closer to Cuba but seaward of the Bahamas Chain. This re-adjustment was accomplished during 30-31 October and the new stations were assigned the code name "CHESTNUT". The units of TF 136 remained in these general positions throughout the remainder of the Quarantine Operations.

A special Quarantine Plot was established in the CINCLANT OPCON Center on 29 October. RADM R.D. Hogle, USN reported as Director and was ultimately assigned a staff of 30 officers and men.

The search effort in an operation such as this one was a monumental task. An average of about 46 ships, 240 aircraft, and some 30,000 personnel were directly engaged in the effort to locate ships inbound for, and outbound from, Cuba. Naval Air Patrol Squadrons and the Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces Atlantic Fleet provided aircraft to search the ocean approaches to Cuba. At the outset of the Quarantine the U.S. Air Force provided six RB-47 aircraft and four RB-50 aircraft to augment Navy search efforts. The six RB-47 aircraft were withdrawn from the quarantine effort after about a week of search operations. The Air Force provided the above mentioned four RB-50 aircraft on a continuing basis to operate out of the Azores and make daily searches of the Ocean Area out to 400 miles south of the Azores. To search this approximately 4,500,000 square miles of ocean, the Navy flew aircraft from such widely separated points as Roosevelt Roads, Guantanamo Bay, Bermuda, the Azores, Argentia, Jacksonville, Key West, Norfolk and Patuxent River. These patrol aircraft did an outstanding job of locating ships in the Cuban trade. Aircraft searches accounted for over 200 sightings of ships of immediate interest to Quarantine Plot.

Surface ships in the Quarantine Force accounted for some 50 sightings. The majority of ships intercepted were first sighted by aircraft and then the quarantine ships were vectored for the interception.

The Remington Rand Univac Sea Surveillance Computer System was the primary method of tracking the merchant shipping to and from Cuba. The best information on point of departure, course and speed for each ship was entered in the computer. A read-out every two hours listed the latitude and longitude of each ship of interest. The computer data was updated by aircraft and ship sightings, by movement reports, and by intelligence information as it became available. This read-out information was plotted in the Quarantine Plot and the data was used to issue instructions to CTF 136 for surface ship efforts and to CTF 81 for routine and special aircraft searches as required.

Beginning on 27 October 1962, the Quarantine Plot commenced issuing SITSUMS. The initial frequency of the SITSUMS was six (6) per day which was reduced to three (3) per day commencing 31 October 1962. These SITSUMS had a three fold purpose: (a) to provide a compact resume of the Quarantine Operations during the SITSUM period involved, to the Commander in Chief and others; (b) to provide a ready source of information to the Quarantine Plot watch; and (c) to provide a historical framework to the Quarantine Plot operations. A total of 85 SITSUMS was issued before they were discontinued on 21 November 1962.

The over-all Quarantine Operations itself may be divided into three phases:

a. FIRST PHASE. From 24 October until 4 November. Many suspicious Soviet ships bound for Cuba turned back. Others with non-suspicious cargo slowed or even stopped, seemingly awaiting guidance from the Kremlin. Gradually these latter ships proceeded to their ports of destination in Cuba.

b. SECOND PHASE. From 5 to 11 November. It was during this phase that CINCLANTFLT promulgated the code name SCOTCH TAPE followed by a numeral to designate a suspect ship which might warrant special attention. This code name facilitated unclassified reference to a particular merchant ship. During this phase, eleven SCOTCH TAPE ships were observed outbound from Cuba. Based upon information furnished in the UN by the Soviets to our delegation, these ships were intercepted and inspected for missiles without actually being stopped or boarded. The masters of the Soviet ships accepted close observation in varying degree, in some cases willingly, in other cases reluctantly.

c. THIRD PHASE. From 11 November until 21 November when Task Force 136 was dissolved. During this period some ships were trailed, and six

additional SCOTCH TAPE ships were designated. However, no offensive weapons were detected on any of these ships intercepted or photographed during this phase.

During the first phase, Quarantine Operations were held in abeyance on 30 and 31 October 1962 during the visit of Secretary General U Thant of the United Nations to Cuba. Mr U Thant was working directly with Premier Castro attempting to explore ways and means to end the Cuban crisis.

In connection with the second phase, great difficulty was encountered in contacting the Russian ships carrying the missiles out of Cuba. The Soviet delegation to the U.N. had provided the United States with the names of nine (9) Soviet ships, the number of missiles that each ship would carry and the date of departure from Cuban ports. In turn, the United States, through the Secretary of State provided the Soviet delegation with three (3) locations at sea where the USN ships could rendezvous with the Russian merchant ships in question for the inspection agreed upon. The name, call signs and hull numbers of all USN combatant ships were indicated in the State Department message. No course, speed, or route information had been provided by the Soviet delegation to facilitate the rendezvous, furthermore, the Soviet ships seemingly made no effort to pass through the designated rendezvous points provided nor did they depart from the port on the dates specified.

As a result, it was necessary to initiate an extensive special air and surface search to intercept the nine (9) Soviet ships. Aerial photography, visual observation and surface photographs were required in order to verify the presence and number of missiles in accordance with the agreement between the United States and the USSR. This air and surface search caused a great expenditure of time and effort which would not have been required had the Soviets lived up to the agreement for a rendezvous between the various ships. Eventually, however, all nine (9) of the Russian ships were located. When intercepted, they appeared well aware of the instructions of their government and cooperated in varying degrees from good to poor. Mention should be made of the excellent capability of the ASW carrier groups to participate in such an effort. An outstanding example of this was in the case of the Russian merchant ship BRATSK. BRATSK had been inspected once by CTG 136.2 by means of surface observations to determine if nuclear material was being transported from Cuba to Russia. Later, CNO requested a recheck of BRATSK with the sensing device. By this time, however, there were no TF 136 forces in position for this assignment. CTG 83.3 (ESSEX ASW GROUP) was involved in ASW operations in a location favorable to intercept BRATSK.

ESSEX aircraft searched for an located BRATSK who was rechecked promptly with negative nuclear indications.

The result of this inspection of Soviet ships removing missiles from Cuba can be recapitulated as follows:

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Soviet Missile Count</u>	<u>CINCLANTFLT Missile Count</u>
FIZIK KURCHATOV	6	6
ANASOV	8	8
DI/NOGORSK	4	4
LABINSK	2	2
AIAPAYEVSK	2	0
BRATSK	2	2
VOLGOLES	6	7
POLZUNOV	6	5
KOMSOMOL	$\frac{6}{42}$	$\frac{8}{42}$

As is evident from the discrepancies between the Soviet count and the CINCLANTFLT count, the exchange of information between the Soviet and U.S. representatives was not entirely accurate.

During Phase Three, CTF 81 continued routine and special air searches as necessary to locate and identify merchant ships enroute to or outbound from Cuba. At the same time CTF 136 was conducting surface surveillance operations on the CHESTNUT line.

Only one ship was stopped and boarded during the entire Quarantine Operation. This was the Lebanese freighter MARUCIA. She was boarded on 26 October by a party from the JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, Jr., DD-850. The cargo was found in order and MARCULA was permitted to proceed on to Cuba.

On Tuesday, 20 November 1962, the President of the United States held a press conference. Among other items of interest made public, the President stated that the Soviets had agreed to remove the IL-28 aircraft in Cuba within 30 days and the President was therefore lifting the Quarantine

of Cuba effective immediately. JCS directed CINCLANT to lift the Quarantine immediately and to return the Atlantic Fleet ships to their respective home-ports and normal operating areas. CINCLANT passed this message to CINCLANTFLT and further directed CINCLANTFLT to carry out the directive of the JCS. While the operations with respect to Cuba were partially relaxed, it is to be noted that CINCLANTFLT on 21 November directed COMASWFORLANT (CTF 81) to be prepared to locate and photograph Russian ships leaving Cuban ports with IL-28 aircraft aboard. (This requirement was expected to obtain within the next thirty days.)

This Quarantine Operation was unique in naval annals and it could well herald a pattern of future naval operations. In the first place, it approached but did not reach, the status of a naval blockade in the accepted sense of the word. In the second place, this operation was directed in great part from the seat of government in Washington. In this connection, there was a steady flow of instructions from Washington to CINCLANTFLT which required rapid dissemination to the operating forces. Also, there was a pressing requirement for a prompt, accurate and complete flow of the current status and results of the operations. Although the CW communications were generally fast and good, the requirement for expediting matters required extensive use of the single sideband voice radio. One problem noted early during quarantine operations was the lack of uniformity in the method of hailing ships. On 13 November CINCLANT outlined procedures for "speaking ships". These procedures proved to be very effective and information received by CINCLANTFLT from the Force Commander and his intercepting ships was complete in scope and adequate to the needs of the operational and intelligence analyses.

The two considerations listed in the preceeding paragraph were fulfilled by CINCLANT readily and with no undue difficulty. It is believed that the reason for these two considerations were possibly twofold. First, the quarantine effort which approached but was short of a naval blockade, provided the United States a position of power from which to conduct diplomatic negotiations. At the same time, if the diplomatic negotiations broke down, the military forces were positioned and poised to commence military operations expeditiously and effectively. Secondly, the operations were closely directed from Washington, presumably to insure that the diplomatic and military endeavors complemented each other and would not at any time be working at cross purposes.

The Quarantine Operations were conducted in a smart manner. The only material damage sustained was in a collision between WASP and HOLDER which occurred as HOLDER was making an approach on WASP for refueling. Even so, the damage incurred did not render either ship incapable of continuing its assigned mission on the CHESTNUT line. In view of the number of ships, aircraft and personnel involved in TF 81 and TF 136, this is a most favorable

commentary on the skill, enthusiasm and spirit of the officers and enlisted personnel involved.

The special Quarantine Plot disbanded on 26 November 1962. In closing out this special Quarantine Plot, it is believed that the procedures and practices established during the operation were sound and will provide a point of departure for future operations.

CHAPTER VII

SECTION 4

TASK FORCE 135

Deployment of the forces which were to become TF 135 commenced with the sailing of INDEPENDENCE from Norfolk on 11 October. With COMCARDIV SIX, RADM Stroh, embarked, INDEPENDENCE was accompanied by ENGLISH, HANK, O'HARE and CORRY. This deployment was directed by COMSECONDFLT in response to a CINCLANTFLT directive that in order to reduce reaction time it was desired, until further notice that a CVA be located in Mayport or operate in or south of the Mayport area to the maximum extent practicable. INDEPENDENCE was scheduled for relief by ENTERPRISE on 27 October. What started as a routine deployment was to become 43 days of steady steaming for INDEPENDENCE before she returned to her home port.

On 18 October CINCLANTFLT directed COMNAVAIRLANT to chop ENTERPRISE to COMSECONDFLT. The latter was directed to sail ENTERPRISE when ready for sea about 19 October with COMCARDIV TWO and Air Group SIX embarked to proceed south and operate under the same instructions which had been given INDEPENDENCE, COMSECONDFLT was further authorized to alter the schedule of INDEPENDENCE at his discretion. It appears that this relief and schedule change came about as a result of a commitment for INDEPENDENCE to take part in a demonstration in the Virginia Capes Area which would have left a gap to the South between 27 October and 6 November.

ENTERPRISE had returned to CONUS after a European deployment on 11 October. When she got underway hurriedly on 19 October to head south, it was announced that she had been sailed to avoid Hurricane ELLA. However, the continued presence in Norfolk of other ships led to some public speculation that her sailing was connected with impending Cuban operations.

On 20 October, RUSH and HAWKINS departed Mayport, to be followed 48 hours later by FISKE, to rendezvous with ENTERPRISE.

Also on 20 October, CINCLANT issued OPORDER 43-62. This OPORD provided the basis for naval actions in support of CINCLANT OPLAN 312.

The concept of operations provided for operations prior to commencement of strikes if practicable or as soon as possible thereafter to include:

Reinforcement of Guantanamo; evacuation of dependents and non-combatants from Guantanamo by COMANTDEFCOM; deployment by CG FMFLANT of a 4 squadron MAG to Key West and squadrons as required to establish a three squadron MAG at Roosevelt Roads. Commander Naval Task Force with shore and carrier based aircraft was, commencing at H-Hour, to strike assigned targets in Cuba and provide air defense and close air support to Guantanamo. COMCARDIV SIX was initially designated Commander Naval Force (CTF 135) and COMCARDIV TWO was to be directed to assume command when appropriate.

Composition of TF 135 was as follows:

INDEPENDENCE with CVG 7

ENTERPRISE with CVG 6

Two destroyer squadrons

One AO

One AE

One MAG (2 VMA, 1 VMF) at Roosevelt Roads.

Additionally, COMSECONDFLT was to CHOP one CVG at Jacksonville to CINCPACFLT. CG FMFLANT upon execution was to deploy one MAG to Key West and CHOP it to CINCPACFLT, and, if not previously directed, reinforce Guantanamo with one air lifted battalion and the required sea lifted echelon. If not previously directed, COMPHIBLANT was to terminate his Caribbean exercise, land a BLT from the ready PHIBRON and CHOP it to COM GTMO Sector, CARIBSEAFRON and retain one PHIBRON with embarked Landing Force in the Caribbean.

Later on the 20th CINCLANT directed COMCARDIVs TWO and SIX to move to position as soon as possible for execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312, and advise ETA. In response to this, COMCARDIV TWO estimated arrival at launch point of ENTERPRISE with RUSH and HAWKINS as 211000Z. He further stated he would get to a more advantageous position, Lat 25N, Long 75W at 211400Z. COMCARDIV SIX reported INDEPENDENCE group on station at 23-10N, 72-24W at 210240Z and ready in all respects.

Commander Antilles Defense Command on the 20th made certain recommendations with respect to control of forces. He requested that CINCLANT OPLAN 312 be

modified so that if it were executed prior to the arrival on stations of CTF 135, all Navy and Marine air units in the Caribbean would be under the control of COMANTDEFCON until CTF 135 was ready to assume such responsibilities as CAP and Close Air Support in defense of Guantanamo. He further recommended that air units at Guantanamo remain under the control of COMNAVBASE GTMO and that CTF 135 allocate targets to these units from the approved target list. These matters and others were clarified by CINCLANT Advance Change to OPLAN 312. This stated that: organic and assigned aircraft will be employed in the defense of Guantanamo as directed by COMNAVBASE GTMO; CTF 135 will control all other aircraft employed in support of overall defense of the base; commencing at S-Hour, CTF 135 will coordinate all air operations in defense of Guantanamo except those within a "coordinating line to be defined and announced by COMNAVBASE GTMO and within which he would coordinate air operations."

By message to COMSECONDFLT, CG FMFLANT and COMNAVAIRLANT, CINCLANTFLT on the 20th directed COMNAVAIRLANT to hold the ENTERPRISE A3J aircraft ashore. COMSECONDFLT was told to direct ENTERPRISE to take aboard a 20 plane Marine A4D squadron. CG FMFLANT was told to provide the squadron and fly planes, personnel and equipment aboard as soon as possible and not later than 21 October. This change in air group composition increased the close air support capability.

On 21 October COMCARDIV TWO informed COMCARDIV SIX (CTF 135) that his present intention on execution of 312 Plan was to strike certain designated targets on initial strikes, plus KOMARs at Bay of Banes and to provide 4 AD for close air support of Guantanamo.

In another message which appears to have crossed this one, COMCARDIV SIX assigned to COMCARDIV TWO a different list of targets. Carrier operating sectors were established with ENTERPRISE between 76-15W and 77-30W; INDEPENDENCE east of 76-15W. Both CVAs were north of Cuba at this time. COMCARDIV SIX requested COMCARDIV TWO to inform him of readiness to attack assigned targets in first strike and stated his desire for early reconnaissance and destruction of KOMARs. In a follow-up message, COMCARDIV SIX further defined approach/retirement areas and stated his intentions to remain north of Cuba until after first day of operations.

On receipt of COMCARDIV SIX message COMCARDIV TWO cancelled his earlier message.

He gave his position in ENTERPRISE with RUSH and HAWKINS at 211600Z as 25-20N, 75-15W proceeding at 25 knots via Baines and Windward Passages to south of Cuba with an ETA of 221600Z. He intended to remain within 150 miles of 18-45N, 76-58W and have FUSKE join up as soon as possible. He

stated he was ready to attack. Again, this message appears to have crossed COMCARDIV SIX message.

Just after this, CINCLANTFLT directed COMNAVBASE GTMO to evacuate dependents and non-essential personnel.

CINCLANT Sit Rep as of 211300Z placed COMCARDIV SIX in INDEPENDENCE with four destroyers on station at 23-06N, 72-24W. COMCARDIV TWO in ENTERPRISE with two destroyers was at 25-42N, 75-48W. While not a part of this force, it is noted that ESSEX with COMCARDIV EIGHTEEN embarked was at Guantanamo.

The crossing of messages between COMCARDIV TWO and SIX was straightened out by COMCARDIV TWO when he informed all concerned that as a result of personal liaison his operational plans had been modified to be compatible with those of COMCARDIV SIX. He reported his force ready and stated he would operate within 100 miles of 25N, 75W and would be joined by FISKE with a still unknown ETA. FISKE made the rendezvous some time prior to 222400Z.

On 22 October COMCARDIV SIX (CTF 135) further refined and expanded his plan. He stated his ability to strike all assigned targets and intended to restrike as might be indicated by post-strike briefing and reconnaissance. He planned to keep 4 CAP and 8 CAS aircraft over Guantanamo during daylight, augmenting as the situation might require. Night CAP was to be provided as required and feasible. Post D-Day minimum sortie rates for CVAs of TF 135 were given as follows:

	<u>D+1</u>	<u>D+2</u>
Base Defense CAP	24	40
Base Defense CAS	88	56
Strike/Restrike	92	56
VF sweep	32	48
Forces CAP	40	36

Marine air sortie rates were:

	<u>D+1</u>	<u>D+2</u>
Strike/Restrike	32	25
VF sweep	12	8

He stated TF 135 was maintaining position to have first aircraft on target within three hours of execution signal. TF 135 was now operating as TG 135.1 INDEPENDENCE Group and TG 135.2 ENTERPRISE Group.

On 22 October JCS established DEFCON III worldwide as of 222300Z. The reason given was the Cuban situation.

On 23 October CINCLANTFLT informed COMCARDIV SIX that upon execution of his OPORD 43-62 it was possible that CINCLANT would direct conduct of strikes against only those targets allocated to CTF 135 by CINCLANT. In this case CINCLANTFLT, in executing 43-62 would specify "allocated targets only." If this should occur, CTF 135 was to strike allocated targets, those defenses essential to penetration, and targets which might constitute a threat to his force. If directed to hit allocated targets only, strike against targets connected with the defense of Guantanamo would be undertaken if the Cuban forces committed an act of aggression against the base or if previously directed by CINCLANTFLT.

During this period there was a large volume of traffic relating to target assignments and weapons selection. Strike plans were modified and refined to cover targets.

Apparently because of the relatively restricted waters between the Bahamas and the north coast of Cuba CTF 135 (COMCARDIV SIX) on 22 October decided to move the Force to the south of Cuba. ENTERPRISE with FISKE, RUSH and HAWKINS commenced movement via Mayaguana and Windward Passages. INDEPENDENCE with ENGLISH, HANK, CORRY and O'HARE followed through Windward Passage. By 241100Z the ENTERPRISE group was on station in the vicinity of 19N, 77W and the INDEPENDENCE Group near 19N, 75W. Destroyer GREENE joined the ENTERPRISE Group.

On 24 October a continuous AEW patrol was established over Windward Passage at the request of COMNAVBASE GTMO. The CVAs alternated days in providing these aircraft.

Also on 24 October CINCLANTFLT directed the CHOP of forces to CTF 135 as provided for in his OPORD 43-62. COMCARDIV TWO became CTF 135. Task organization was established as follows:

TG 135.1 INDEPENDENCE, 4DDs

TF 135.2 ENTERPRISE, 4DDs

TG 135.3 TRUCKEE, SABINE, MAZAMA

TG 135.4 CVG (Cecil)

TG 135.5 VMF 333 (Roos Rds) B VMR 353 Det (Roos Rds)

VMA 331 (Roos Rds) MAG 26 Det (GTMO)

VMGR 252 Det (Roos Rds)

VMA 324 (Beaufort)

VCMJ 2 Det (Roos Rds)

Immediate provisions were made to commence alternate days refuelings of TG 135.1 and TG 135.2 with TG 135.3 positioned between these groups to facilitate movements. Such frequent refuelings were not required by the current operations then in progress but were considered a necessity if the force was to be ready for possible execution of a contingency plan. Alternate day refuelings continued until the departure of COMCARDIV TWO from the area on 5 December. Had any plan been executed, all units would have been topped off or nearly so at any time and could have operated for extended periods without refueling. Fuelings were scheduled to occur at 0630R each day to permit the beginning of limited flight operations on completion. The uncertainties of any readiness for contingency plans required all units to be kept at a high logistics level, thus a considerable effort was made to maintain this level.

COMCARDIV TWO also initiated action at this time to shift the COD base from Grand Turk to Guantanamo to increase the efficiency of personnel air-lifts. Personnel/cargo lifts were aided by sending an occasional destroyer or service force ship under CTF 135 OPCON to Guantanamo. CTF 135 also provided COD services to NEWPORT NEWS and ESSEX whenever these units were within range of COD aircraft.

Action was initiated by COMSERVLANT on 25 October to provide an AR and AD in the San Juan Area by 3 November. USS VULCAN and USS GRAND CANYON were directed to sail with COMCRUDESFLT 12 embarked on GRAND CANYON to act as COMCRUDESFLT REP at San Juan. METU/MOSU personnel were embarked on VULCAN.

The problem of CLOUD loaded AE's became evident on 26 October with an ENTERPRISE ammunition order to MAZAMA. The immediate operational requirements were considered overriding and CTF 135 directed MAZAMA to issue the ammo irrespective of CLOUD requirements. It is not considered operationally feasible to restrict ammo availability of strike group CVA's in such an operation by assigning AE's carrying CLOUD loads to the support of CVA's.

The afternoon of 26 October ENTERPRISE obtained an ECM contact characteristic of SNOOP PLATE radar. HAWKINS was dispatched by CTF 135 to proceed along the bearing, and obtained a disappearing radar contact at 18-53N 75-35W. An AIH was maintained over the contact until relieved by an E1B which obtained a sinker at 18-50N 75-26W. CTF 135 then directed the task force to move to the area south of Jamaica. CTU 81.7.9 sent a 2 ship SAU (WILSON and BASILONE) to the vicinity. Contact was lost and dropped at 271752Z.

Operating areas were shifted on 27 October to operate south of 18N because of increasing submarine activity, with TG 135.2 and TG 135.1 west and east of Jamaica Channel respectively. TG 135.2 continued to the west the evening of 26 October to operate off the southwest coast of Jamaica. COMSECONDFLT chopped DUPONT, HENLEY, W. M. WOOD, C.R. WARE, C. H. ROAN and HARWOOD to TF 135 on 27 October. Because of the increasing evidence of submarine activity, CTF 135, then made the decision to move the operating area to take advantage of the shallow water south and southwest of Jamaica. This move was ideal for submarine protection and an effort was made to operate in the vicinity of shoals present in the area.

The newly assigned destroyers were placed in the task organization as follows:

DUPONT (COMDESRON 22), C. H. ROAN, W. M. WOOD to TG 135.1, C.R. WARE, HARWOOD to TG 135.2, and HENLEY to TG 135.3.

CTG 135.1 was directed to send ENGLISH and HANK to 135.3 when the first two destroyers reported. The assignment of destroyers was continually balanced by CTF 135 according to armament. An attempt was made to obtain a "mix" of sonars, by assigning SQS-23 ships with SQS-4 ships and the SQS-4 was found to be a useful supplement in shallow water. Additional precautions were taken throughout the entire period including all night steaming at dark-en ship, employing evasive steering, zig zagging and avoiding merchant shipping to the maximum extent feasible.

On 29 October the force was moved further west, TG 135.2 to vicinity 18N 80W (west of Jamaica); TG 135.1 to 16N 78W (south of Jamaica); and TG 135.3 logistics support group to the area between. Because of the increased distance and transit time involved the Windward Passage air patrol was secured on 29 October. All TF movements and areas were predicated on remaining within striking distance of all targets throughout the operation.

USS C. R. WARE and HARWOOD joined TG 135.2 on 30 October.

By 3 November force composition consisted of: TG 135.1 - INDEPENDENCE, DUPONT, O'HARE, C. H. ROAN, CORRY and W. M. WOOD; TG 135.2 - ENTERPRISE,

C. R. WARE, FISKE, RUSH, E. A. GREEN, HAWKINS and HARWOOD; and TG 135.3 TRUCKEE, ENGLISH, SABINE, MAZAMA, HENLEY, and HANK.

On 3 November the first Recco flight was tracked by ENTERPRISE beginning what was to be a daily routine commencing at 0600R. This requirement dictated positioning of ENTERPRISE northwest of Jamaica and north of 19N for optimum tracking of flights from a general position south of Cuba. This factor subsequently prevented any great alteration of force position for the remainder of the deployment. The exodus of Russian submarines made this situation acceptable.

A tender was made available at San Juan for TF 135 DD tender availability (TAV) on a four at a time basis. CTF 135 considered this an unworkable solution to the TAV problem because of the distances involved. Due to the number of forces positioned south of Cuba a proposal was initiated to position a tender at Kingston, Jamaica for TAV purposes. USS YOSEMITE was so designated and arrived 12 November. This move plus the availability of the Guantanamo repair facility was considered the optimum positioning of repair services.

The first replenishment was conducted on 6 and 7 November for TG 135.2 and TG 135.1 respectively. Replenishment responsibility was assumed for TG 44.9 (PHIBGRU THREE) which transited the Panama Canal and arrived in the Caribbean Area on 9 November. TG 44.9 assumed TF 128 (Contingency) task organization, dividing into two groups - one stationed in San Juan area and one south of Jamaica. TG 135.3 was able to absorb this additional requirement, continue alternate refuelings of TG 135.1, TG 135.2 and consolidate when required from MSTs tankers in the area.

The problem of non-squawking aircraft became increasingly evident in early November. CAP was launched on numerous occasions by TF 135 to identify non-squawking bogeys approaching the force. This problem continued to plague the task force throughout the deployment.

RADM R. J. Stroh, COMCARDIV SIX, departed INDEPENDENCE on 9 November for LEXINGTON at Mayport. CO, INDEPENDENCE assumed CTF 135.1 on his departure.

On 12 November operating area assignments were expanded to permit TG 135.1 complete freedom of movement 74W to 77W, 16N to 18-30N covering the ocean south of the Jamaica Channel to the coast of Haiti. TG 135.2 was responsible for the Recco and other photo aircraft tracking missions and remained tied to the area northwest of Jamaica including the GTMO OPAREAS. TG 135.3 was given freedom of movement in view of increased replenishment responsibility for TF 128 units (PHIBGRU THREE).

On 14 November TG 135.1 was given an operating area to be within 50 miles of TG 135.2 to permit mutual CAP and readiness support. By this means the tempo of air operations training was increased by providing one fully ready CVA and one CVA with slightly reduced readiness. This method of alternating the ready duty was continued until the departure of INDEPENDENCE and greatly increased the flight operations conducted by both CVA's.

By 20 November TF 135 was composed as follows: TG 135.1 - INDEPENDENCE, DEWEY (COMDESRON 26), C. H. ROAN, and CORRY. O'HARE and W. M. WOOD were at tender availability Kingston and DUPONT at Guantanamo for repairs to shaft bearing. DUPONT was chopped TYCOM on completion repairs, O'HARE was directed to join TG 135.3 on completion TAV. STEINAKER and LEARY were enroute TG 135.1. TG 135.2 - ENTERPRISE, J. KING, LAWRENCE, RUSH, HAWKINS, at sea, FISKE at TAV and C. P. CECIL enroute TG 135.2 RDVU. TG 135.3 - TRUCKEE, PAWCATUCK, KANKAKEE, GREAT SITKIN, MAZAMA with ENGLISH and STICKELL as escorts. HANK was chopped to COMSECONDFLT on 21 November. ENGLISH was chopped to COMSECONDFLT when LEARY joined TG 135.1.

On 22 November TG 135.1 was dissolved and units were detached for CONUS. VA-75 was transferred from INDEPENDENCE to Guantanamo as relief for VA-35. The A-1E INDEPENDENCE tow plane was transferred to ENTERPRISE to continue AA service for TG 135.2 and TG 135.3.

The operating area for TG 135.2 was further shifted into the Western Guantanamo OPAREA. On 25 November a fatal aircraft accident occurred during the catapult launch of an F-8E aircraft on number 4 catapult, to identify a non-squawking bogey. In order to accomplish subsequent repairs and inspection to the catapult, the group retired to the area south and southwest of Jamaica.

The final tender availability alongside YOSEMITE at Kingston terminated on 1 December. RADM J. T. Hayward made an official visit to Kingston 2 December aboard USS J. KING to make appropriate official calls and returned to ENTERPRISE by air 3 December.

On 3 December TG 135.2 shifted operating area to the northeast of the eastern tip of Cuba and inside the Bahama Island chain.

A turnover briefing and conference was conducted on board ENTERPRISE 4 December. RADM R. J. Stroh and selected staff members attended and the official relief of CTF 135 (COMCARDIV TWO) by COMCARDIV SIX occurred at 050300Z. ENTERPRISE with J. P. KENNEDY JR., BROWNSON, C. P. CECIL, STICKELL, LAWRENCE, O'HARE, SOLEY, and TRUCKEE proceeded to CONUS. J. KING and J.R. PIERCE with PAWCATUCK followed from Kingston one day behind. ENTERPRISE returned to Norfolk on 6 December having been continuously at sea for 49 days.

Two extra days were spent in the stream due to high winds preventing going alongside Pier 12.

COMCARDIV SIX in USS SARATOGA (CVA-60) assumed CTF 135 at 050300Z with N. K. PERRY, VESOLE, DYESS and BORDELON. USS ALLAMASH relieved COMSERVRON FOUR in TRUCKEE as CTG 135.3 and with GREAT SITKIN constituted TG 135.3 under CTF 135 (COMCARDIV SIX).

TF 135 continued to operate in the Caribbean Area with one carrier on station and a second carrier in CONUS on call. LEXINGTON had this backup duty from 30 November to 15 December at which time she was relieved by ENTERPRISE. The Task Force was dissolved in time for ships to return to home ports by 20 December.

CHAPTER III

SECTION 5. ASW FORCES AND THE WESTERN ATLANTIC
ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCE OPERATIONS

The Anti-Submarine Force Atlantic, (ASWFLANT), is commanded by VADM E. R. Taylor, USN. VADM Taylor and his staff maintained headquarters at the Naval Base Norfolk, Virginia. Admiral Taylor's ASW forces include Hunter-Killer, ASW Carrier Groups composed of SZF Tracker aircraft and helicopters, destroyers, and submarines. In addition to these forces, long range patrol aircraft and under water sound surveillance stations provide ASW coverage of the Western Atlantic Ocean area.

During the early part of October 1962, the ASWFLANT forces were employed in their normal ASW and surveillance operations. This activity included long range patrols, under water sound surveillance, and HUK group operations. Patrol aircraft were operating from normal employment bases in Iceland, Argentina, Azores, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Guantanamo, and the Continental U.S.

As the Cuban situation began to deteriorate and the possibility of military action became apparent, ASW forces stepped up the tempo of operations in the Western Atlantic. As early as 13 October, ASWFLANT was alerted to the strong possibility of Soviet submarine activity in the Western Atlantic. At this time the MSTB C-119 reported a surfaced submarine 130 miles north of Caracas, Venezuela. The contact was observed on the surface for fifteen minutes and then submerged. Its identity was not determined.

The Soviet trawler SHKVAL was contacted and was kept under surveillance to observe any Soviet submarine replenishing from her. The sudden appearance of the Soviet oiler TEREK in the Atlantic became of prime importance since it was considered likely that submarines would use her for replenishment as necessary. Her movements were watched carefully throughout the period of the crisis.

On 20 October TF forces were alerted to the fact that the Soviet submarine B-11A was developing and her position was carefully surveyed to preclude damage to ships of the ASW force. Throughout the crisis ASW forces located

tracked, or investigated 29 contacts in the Western Atlantic.

On 21 October no submarine contacts were under active prosecution. However, the Soviet ship TEREK was observed by aircraft northwest of the Azores, on course 240 at 15 knots. Upon revisit by ASW aircraft, the TEREK was found to be dead in the water with an unidentified object alongside.

By the 22nd of October it was evident that some kind of action against Cuba would be forthcoming and additional ASW forces would be required in the southern Florida area. Accordingly, four P2V aircraft were dispatched to Key West for the Key West ASW Group (CTG 81.6).

In the Lajes area, VP aircraft operating from Lajes reported a positive ZULU Class submarine refueling from the stern of the TEREK. Both contacts were dead in the water and complete photo and LOFAR coverage were obtained by the aircraft.

DEFCON 3 was set at 222300Z. This action required ASWFORLANT to increase ASW surveillance and to prepare for other more active military measures including activation of the Greenland-United Kingdom ASW barrier. Minimize of communications was also placed in effect world wide on this date.

On 23 October the USS MILLS took up the task of shadowing the Soviet oiler TEREK. MILLS reported the TEREK as being dead in the water with running lights secured. Aircraft operating from NAF Lajes continued to perform daily surveillance in the vicinity of the TEREK to ensure continuous contact and possible Soviet submarines attempting to rendezvous with the ship.

Because of the movement of amphibious forces, COMASWFORLANT VP forces were directed to provide VP ASW surveillance of Amphibious Group FOUR in the Caribbean area. Several ASW aircraft were directed to intercept certain Soviet shipping enroute to Cuba.

On 24 October 17 VP aircraft and 10 submarines were directed to deploy to the Naval Station Argentina to provide forces for an Argentina Sub-Air Barrier.

Task Group 83.2, (Task Group ALFA), which is a HUK unit, was directed to proceed and rendezvous with the USS INDEPENDENCE group and to provide ASW protection. In addition, increased air surveillance was ordered throughout

the Atlantic Ocean; the major effort being centered along the trans-oceanic lines between Europe and Cuba. As of 24 October, CINCLANTFLT advised that at least three known Soviet submarines were operating in the North Atlantic. These three, and perhaps more, could reach the quarantine line within a few days and could be a substantial threat to this force. This action the Fleet Commander advised, could be a deliberate counter action by the Soviets against quarantine forces.

The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force offer of USAF aircraft for aerial surveillance of shipping utilizing B-52 aircraft was accepted and areas for patrol were assigned. On 25 October SAC aircraft sighted the Soviet Ship GROZNY. This sighting was of considerable assistance in keeping GROZNY under surveillance by Navy patrol aircraft.

On the 26th of October CINCLANTFLT reported his concern over the shortage of ASW torpedoes and strongly urged an increase in delivery of these weapons. This was particularly important in view of increased ASW activity. In Argentina, COMBARARGENTIA reported that he was not able to load all aircraft assigned to the Argentina Sub-Air barrier due to the lack of MK-43 torpedoes.

On 27 October there was an increase in requirements for open ocean surveillance, and for ASW in support of the quarantine line. Because of these increased requirements, COMASWFORLANT requested CANCOMARLANT to take the Quonset ASW area under surveillance. The submarine situation in the Atlantic basin indicated that Soviet subs were making their transit in areas east of the Argentina Barrier. COMASWFORLANT recommended that the ASW barrier be transferred to the G-I-UK area. The recommended action was not taken at this time nor at any time during the crisis.

On 28 October Task Group AIFA identified a Soviet submarine found on the surface as a FOXTROT Class submarine. Identifying numbers were painted out and photographs of the sub were obtained.

On 30 October the quarantine was suspended commensurate with the visit of U.N. Secretary General U Thant to Cuba. ASW surveillance flights, however, continued and submarine contacts were prosecuted.

ASW air patrols conducted surveillance operations in the Davis Strait, Iceland, Azores area on 30 October and reported no significant contacts. On the 31st, a Soviet submarine with the number "Q11" painted on one side of its sail, and "911" painted on the other side was forced to surface after 35 hours of continuous sonar contact by ASW surface units.

During the month of November ASW operations continued. In addition, ASW-FORLANT forces participated in surveillance operations for Soviet shipping which were to remove offensive weapons from Cuba. The code word "SCOTCH TAPE" was designated for use when merchant ships were kept under actual surveillance by either air or surface units. Thus the first Soviet ship in this circumstance was designated "SCOTCH TAPE 1." Details of "SCOTCH TAPE" operations are noted in the section on Quarantine Operations.

On 1 November the TEREK was observed continuing on her south westerly course. The CALCATERRA who was shadowing the TEREK observed what appeared to be signals from the TEREK's search light. There was no confirmation, however, that TEREK was actually signalling a submarine. No new submarine contacts were made on 1 November and the Argentina sub-air barrier remained cold.

On 2 November the ELINT trawler SHKVAL was sighted by Canadian forces approximately 500 miles southwest of Argentina and appeared to be moving toward the area of the ASW barrier. Investigation of contacts and surveillance flights continued throughout the period.

The third of November found USS KEPPLER tracking the "F" Class submarine, side number 945 which remained on the surface at 25-25N, 63-40W.

The following day CALCATERRA reported the Soviet Oiler TEREK as dead in the water and that she appeared to be rigging for fueling. Soviet submarine number 945 remained on the surface under the watchful eyes of KEPPLER.

On 5 November, ASWFORLANT was advised by CTG 81.7 (COMCARIBSEAFRON) that an Eastern Airlines aircraft had observed a submarine submerging 69 miles north of San Juan. A P2V aircraft was launched to investigate. Task Group and Task Group Commanders were advised to continue photo coverage of ships leaving Cuba and to expedite delivery of photos to Washington.

The Soviet submarine number 945, designated contact C-18, remained on the surface on 6 November. COMASWFORLANT received information that the Soviet tug PAMIR was believed enroute to rendezvous with C-18. Forces from CTG 81.9, (Lajes ASW group), were directed to locate and photograph the PAMIR. KEPPLER remained with and continued to shadow C-18.

Also on the 6th, Commander Fleet Air Wings Atlantic reported to Commander Naval Air Force that the VPRON readiness could not be maintained at the present tempo of operations. One new submarine contact was reported on this date.

On 9 November, the Russian tug PAMIR finally rendezvoused with the Soviet submarine number 945, and vigilance on the Argentina Sub-Air ASW barrier

continued with P2V, WV, and Canadian Argus aircraft flying an average of 120 hours per day. No significant results along the barrier were noted.

The Azores ASW forces, (CTG 81.9), were called upon again on 12 November to locate the ELINT trawler SMYRCH. A P3A aircraft was launched to search the general area to the north of the Azores. SMYRCH was believed to be the trawler SHKVAL's relief. SHKVAL was being shadowed by HMCS INCH ARRAN and was observed on course 090 at 4 knots.

The Argentia Sub-Air ASW barrier was disestablished on 13 November and units were directed to revert to normal OPCON. Three additional "SCOTCH TAPE" missions for photography were directed. One new submarine contact designated B-35 was reported southeast of Bermuda. The contact was placed under continuous VP surveillance.

The DER R. O. HALE relieved CALCATERRA on 14 November and continued shadowing the TEREK. Surveillance would continue until TEREK was in the vicinity of 55N and was observed on its homeward course. One new submarine contact was reported by a MATS flight southeast of Charleston, N.C., however, it was of low validity. The area was kept under surveillance.

Surveillance of TEREK and the trawler SHKVAL continued on 15 November. A S2F tracker squadron, (VS-24), was deployed to the Marine Corps Air Station at Cherry Point, N.C. for a period of 4 days to provide ASW cover for amphibious operations.

The problem of interference in sonobucy/jcszbel "read out" was brought to light on 16 November by COMFAIRWINGSLANT. The "read out" problem was of urgent operational concern. 450 flight hours were spent on one contact erroneously classified due to the unknown phenomena.

Active shadowing of the Soviet oiler TEREK, the Soviet submarine number 945, the tug PAMIR and the trawler SHKVAL were terminated on 18 November. No new contacts were reported and no significant information on old contacts were made. It was apparent that Soviet submarine activity in the Western Atlantic was declining.

From the 19th through the 20th of November ASW forces were primarily employed in "SCOTCH TAPE" operations with no significant unidentified submarine activity reported. Quarantine operations were discontinued on 21 November and Task Force 136 was dissolved. Air surveillance effort by ASW forces was reduced. The following day CTF 137, operations were discontinued.

On the 25th of November, just as it appeared that the tempo of operations would subside, two new sub contacts were reported. One contact was

evaluated as the USS KITTIWAKE and the TURKISH submarine GUR. Tracking the "SCOTCH TAPE" shipping continued. On the 25th of November "minimize" was cancelled and operations were reverting to normal conditions. No significant activity occurred from the 28th through the 1st of December.

The scope of the air ASW effort during the period 22 October to 21 November is revealed by the following statistics:

<u>Aircraft Type</u>	<u>Sortie</u>	<u>FLT Hours</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
VP	1404	11,302	3907
VS	2022	8,480	2000
HS	918	2,136	952
VAW	371	1,564	280
VW	34	476	1333
<u>Total</u>	<u>4,749</u>	<u>23,958</u>	<u>8,472</u>

In addition to the above, 6,546 men on 4 CVS directly supported the ASW effort. Air Force aircraft also flew 87 sorties and 571 hours in support of ASW.

Active ASW forces were assisted by Units of the Naval Air Reserve. Inspired by the President's message of 22 October, Reservists from Naval Air activities at South Weymouth, Mass; New York; Lakehurst, N.J.; Willow Grove, Penn; Andrews AFB, Washington, D.C.; Norfolk, Va.; Jacksonville, Fla.; New Orleans, La.; and Glenview, Ill., manned their Neptune patrol bombers, Grumman Trackers and Douglas transports for voluntary operations. In so doing, they logged more than 775 hours in logistic flights and some 350 hours of surveillance. More than 620,000 pounds of valuable cargo, and more than 1,000 passengers were transported more than 122,000 miles.

These voluntary operations by the Naval Air Reservists included the sighting and reporting of 190 different foreign surface and underwater craft. They included, Russian trawlers and fishing factories, Russian merchant ships, a Russian electronic ship, and an "unfriendly" submarine.

The foregoing report only spotlights the more significant activities of the ASW forces and cannot adequately depict the many hours of tedious search and tracking by ships, aircraft, and their personnel. The fact that a known Russian submarine contact was prosecuted until forced to surface is a tribute to the courage and determination of the ASW forces.

CHAPTER VII

SECTION 6

SOUTH ATLANTIC FORCE OPERATIONS

The South Atlantic Force (SOLANT) was under the command of RADM J. A. Tyree during the Cuban crisis. RADM Tyree's headquarters is located at the Naval Station Trinidad when the Admiral and his staff are not embarked in a flagship. During the Cuban crisis COMSOLANT was designated as Commander Task Force 137, (Commander Combined Latin American-United States Quarantine Task Force). This force of combined U.S. and Latin American Naval Forces took an active part in the quarantine of Cuba. The details are described in the ensuing paragraphs.

On the evening of 22 October 1962, Commander South American Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, was in his flagship, USS MULLINIX (DD 944), steaming off the northern coast of Chile, engaged in conducting the ASW exercises of Operation UNITAS III with Chilean, Peruvian and United States forces. There had been little warning in the Force that a crisis was building up over Cuba. Therefore, it was with some surprise that the U.S. ships, listening over short wave radio, heard the President say, "This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base -- by the presence of these long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction -- constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated."

The exercises were continued pending other instructions. On Wednesday morning, the 24th of October, COMSOLANT was directed to return to Trinidad with key members of his staff as soon as possible. On request, the senior Chilean and Peruvian officers transferred to MULLINIX to be briefed on the situation. They returned to their ships, command was passed to the senior officer, Captain Maza, Peruvian Navy, and the MULLINIX left the UNITAS III Task Force for Callao, Peru. Upon arrival the morning of the 25th, COMSOLANT and most of the members of his staff boarded the UNITAS U.S. ~~at~~ detachment aircraft and flew to Trinidad, arriving the morning of 26 October.

The Organization of American States backed the President's stand un-animously. CINCLANTFLT ordered the establishment of a quarantine force which would be placed in position to intercept shipping going to and from Cuba to the northeast. However, this force permitted free access to the Caribbean area through the Lesser Antilles passages.

CINCLANTFLT then designated COMSOLANT Quarantine Force Commander Southern Approaches and directed him to form Task Force 137 with MULLINIX as flagship plus South American Forces as assigned. The OAS indicated that nations providing forces to the Quarantine Force desired to operate as a combined force under the OAS, rather than under U.S. command, although they did not object to being placed under a U.S. commander. Accordingly, CINCLANTFLT cancelled his directive and ordered COMSOLANT to report to CINCLANT for operational control. CINCLANT, in turn, designated COMSOLANT Commander Combined Latin American - U.S. Quarantine Task Force, CTF 137, and directed him to form Task Force 137 with Latin American and U.S. forces as assigned.

After a brief stop in Panama, the MULLINIX sailed for Trinidad, arriving on Saturday morning, the 3rd of November. Previously, on 28 October, the Argentine Fletcher-class destroyers ARA ROSALES (ex USS DORCH) and ARA ESPORA (ex USS STEMBEL), commanded by Commander SECOND Destroyer Division, Captain C. Arguelles, sailed from their base at Puerto Beltrano to join Task Force 137. Having only recently returned from an extensive period at sea, most of their crews had been on leave and the ships were undergoing repair when the quarantine was established. Nevertheless, within the space of five days the crews were re-assembled and the ships headed for Trinidad, 4500 miles to the north, at high speed. They stopped only briefly at Rio de Janeiro and Recife to fuel and arrived at the U.S. Naval Station, Trinidad on the morning of Thursday, the 8th of November. Both ships carried a full war complement. As an indication of Argentine Navy pride, the ships ordered and paid for the first load of fuel, on arrival, so that they would be turned over to the U.S. operational control as fully ready as possible.

By the time the Argentine ships arrived, the COMSOLANT staff had begun to expand in order to be able to properly plan and command the southern phase of the quarantine operation. Officers and enlisted men arrived in Trinidad from far places. Many were especially chosen to form Communication-Liaison Teams to be placed aboard the Latin American ships. These officers and men had experience in cryptography and in radio communication and could also speak Spanish or, in a few cases, Portuguese. Since no common crypto system was available for use between CTF 137 and the Latin American ships of TF 137, the Teams took systems aboard the ships and provided the crypto capability. It is fairly obvious that not many officers and men had the special skills called for and that the few who did have would be widely scattered. One chief radioman came from Point Mugu, California, while officers arrived from as far away as Bremerton, Washington and Rota, Spain. One officer came from the USS SPRINGFIELD (CLG-7) at Villefranche in the Mediterranean. COMSOLANT and staff normally consisted of the Admiral, 8 officers and 20 enlisted men. After the augmentation, the staff had expanded to 25 officers and 51 men, of which 10 officers and 20 men were earmarked for the express purpose of assignment to Communications-Liaison Teams.

Even before the arrival of the Argentine ships, the staff had produced COMSOLANT Operation Order 9-62, covering the operations of Task Force 137. This was translated into Spanish with the able assistance of the Argentine officers who, together with their yeoman and aided by COMSOLANT yeoman, translated, mimeographed and distributed the Spanish version in less than two days.

The combined quarantine potential grew as new ships were added to the Task Force. On 9 October the Venezuelan destroyers ARV ZULIA and ARV NUEVA ESPARTA, commanded by Commander SECOND Destroyer Division and CO ZULIA, Captain M. Benatuil, arrived at the U.S. Naval Station, Trinidad. A third Venezuelan ship, the submarine ARV CARITE (ex USS TILEFISH) remained on call in Venezuela awaiting orders to take part in the operation. There was no need for her services at the time, but it was planned to use her in combined anti-submarine exercises later.

On hand to greet the Argentine ships when they arrived in Trinidad was RADM Grunwaldt, the Argentine Naval Attache in Washington. He brought with him CDR Ricardo R. B. Alonso, head of the ordnance branch of the Argentine Navy's purchasing commission in Washington, to become the first foreign officer attached to COMSOLANT staff. He was made Assistant Chief of Staff for Argentine Operations. Shortly after, LCDR Jose Ali Ericeno, who is normally chief of the Venezuelan Navy's communications department, reported in as Assistant Chief of Staff for Venezuelan Operations. These two officers proved to be extremely valuable to logistics and supply matters, as well as in operations.

Meanwhile, the physical plant of the Naval Station, Trinidad and COMSOLANT's headquarters were feeling the impact of the quarantine operations. It became apparent immediately after the combined operation was ordered that Naval Station, Trinidad, which provides all communication support for COMSOLANT headquarters when ashore, would be unable to provide either the number of circuits needed to conduct the operation nor to guarantee the necessary reliability. These limitations were due to lack of equipment, age and obsolescence of the equipment installed and limitations in number of communication personnel. The Naval Station, Trinidad, with the backing of COMSOLANT, asked for and was given the necessary support from COMTEN. Similarly, an Operations Control Center was quickly built in COMSOLANT's headquarters building, the message center was expanded to handle the increased volume of traffic, which had more than tripled due to the crisis, and office space with equipment was made available for the augmented staff.

The departure of Task Force 137 on 12 November 1962 for the initial patrol stations was a history-making event. It marked the first time that

the ships of a combined Latin American-United States Task Force had ever set forth together on an operational mission in defense of the Western Hemisphere. For the Argentine ships, it was the first time in the 20th century that a unit of the Argentine Navy had gone into operations outside its home waters. It was apparent that all participants were aware of their roles in the historic event. After steaming out in special formation for aerial photographs, the ships separated, each to go to her assigned patrol stations. The ZULIA and the NUEVA ESPARTA occupied patrol stations covering the passage between the island of Grenada and the mainland of Venezuela. Further north the ROSALES patrolled the passage between the islands of Dominica and Guadeloupe. The ESPORA patrolled two stations, one in the Guadeloupe Passage and the other off the island of Monserrat. The heavily travelled Anegada Passage was kept under surveillance by MULLINNIX.

As the ships reached their assigned patrol stations, their reports of merchant ship contacts began to reach the COMSOLANT OPCON Center, where they were recorded and plotted.

At the request of COMSOLANT, COMCARIBSEAFRON established a special air search to the seaward of the Lesser Antilles to give warning to Task Force 137 patrolling ships of the approach of merchant ships and also to help establish the shipping density pattern through the passages of the island chain. The information developed by the searches was passed immediately to the ships on patrol and proved to be very useful.

During the time they spent on patrol, the ships of TF-137 reported the following numbers of contacts:

Argentina

ROSALES	6
ESPORA	21
Total	27

Venezuela

ZULIA	40
NUEVA ESPARTA	31
Total	71

United States

MULLINNIX	55
Total	133

The Dominican Republic had offered two frigates, the GREGARIO LUPERON and the CAPTAIN PEDRO SANTANA, to Task Force 137 and these were sailed from Santo Domingo, arriving at San Juan, Puerto Rico on 15 November. They were in extremely poor condition, particularly with regard to their engineering plants, and had to be given an immediate tender availability in order to make them ready of operations. However, the quarantine ended before either of these ships put to sea.

All ships of Task Force 137, with the exception of the Dominican Republic ships, had completed one patrol before President Kennedy announced the end of the quarantine at his press conference on Tuesday, 20 November. Upon receiving this word and the necessary directive from CINCLANT, GTF 137 ordered all quarantine operations discontinued.

At ceremonies, one in San Juan for the Dominican Republic ships and one in Trinidad for the remainder of the Force, Certificates of Participation were presented to each officer and man who had taken part in the operation and engraved brass plates were presented to each ship that had actually gone on patrol.

In Trinidad, after the exchange of social amenities between the officers and men of the force and the loading of fuel and provisions, operational control of the Argentine ships was returned to the Argentine Navy and the ships were sailed for home on 6 December. MULLENBAX sailed for CONUS at the same time. The following day, 7 December, operational control of the Venezuelan ships was returned to the Venezuelan Navy and the ships were sailed for home.

A certain amount of press censorship, by order of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, shielded operations of the Quarantine Forces. Even so, the contribution of the Latin American navies to the quarantine operations was noted by the world press and was viewed as clear evidence of the solidarity of the free nations of the hemisphere. At the invitation of the Argentine Navy, the Buenos Aires daily, LA PRENSA, dispatched its naval affairs specialist, Senor Emilio Ibarra, to cover the quarantine operations from on board the ESPORA. He cooperated completely with the censorship policy.

The Chief of Naval Operations hailed the Latin American participation in the quarantine as an historic milestone in hemisphere relations and personally thanked his counterparts in Argentina, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela for their contributions to the common effort. The Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet viewed the success of the Combined Latin American-U.S. operations as evidence of the worth of past UNITAS operations, which

had laid the foundations for the immediate and easy cooperation of the various navies.

CHAPTER VII

SECTION 7

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

The Submarine Force of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet was under the Command of VADM E. W. Grenfell, USN, with headquarters at the U.S. Naval Base Norfolk, Virginia. As type commander for submarines, VADM Grenfell had 7 submarine squadrons, a submarine division, 5 submarine tenders, (AS), and 6 submarine rescue ships, (ASR), under his command.

As of 18 October 1962 no units of the submarine force of the Atlantic Fleet were employed specifically to support Cuban operations. Force employment was on a normal peacetime basis as consistent with Defense Condition FIVE, (DEFCON 5). SSBN, (Polaris equipped submarines), were on station in assigned patrol areas in normal configuration.

On 19 October COMSUBLANT received verbal information from CINCLANTFLT that the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom ASW barrier might be implemented. COMSUBLANT initiated action to select units and commenced writing directives for the G-I-UK SUBAIR Barrier.

On 22 October COMSUBLANT received CINCLANTFLT's message directing SUBLANT units presently located in Key West or enroute to East Coast ports or operating areas from Charleston, N.C., north. COMSUBRON 12 in Key West received this message about three hours before COMSUBLANT and was making preparations to implement it upon receiving COMSUBLANT's message to carry out this order. By the afternoon of 22 October dispersal from Key West was complete with 11 submarines enroute to Charleston and Norfolk, with USS MARLIN and USS SEA CAT rendezvousing in Miami. All the submarines in the force were then employed as follows:

<u>Submarines</u>	<u>Employment</u>
13 SS	Enroute from Key West and Miami north.
33 SS	At sea providing services, deployed, or conducting training.
3 SS	In port conducting research training checks.
13 SS	In port in upkeep.
14 SS	Undergoing yard work or PSA (Post shakedown availability).
76 SS	ASR

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<u>Submarines</u>	<u>Employment</u>
13 SS	Enroute from Key West and Miami north.
33 SS	At sea providing services, deployed, or conducting training.
3 SS	In port conducting refresher training checks.
13 SS	In port in upkeep.
14 SS	Undergoing yard overhaul or PSA (Post shakedown availability).
76 SS	Total

SSBN

6 SSBN On patrol, (OPCON CINCLANT)

1 SSBN In upkeep in Holy Loch.

2 SSBN Post shakedown availability.
9 SSBN Total

COMSUBLANT received, on 22 October, CINCLANT's message which set DEFCON 3 in the Atlantic Command. COMSUBLANT immediately promulgated an ALCUSUBLANT to the submarine force setting DEFCON 3 to insure that all submarine units were advised. DEFCON 3 was attained throughout the Force including Forces at Holy Loch at 0346Z on 23 October.

COMSUBLANT, anticipating possible implementation of a VP/SS barrier and/or various contingency plans, took the following action on 22 October to increase Force readiness:

- a. SUBLANT units commenced loading out with wartime load and topping off units in port earmarked for initial deployment.
- b. The unit commander, best situated for Cuban contingency operations was designated along with 3 SS and 1 APSS.
- c. Units at sea earmarked for deployment were directed to return to port and load out with wartime torpedo load and top off for possible extended operations.

All SUBLANT forces maintained an uninterrupted readiness posture in accordance with DEFCON 3 until 282048Z November 1962 when CINCLANT set DEFCON 5.

When DEFCON 3 was set on 22 October the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN, the only SSBN in upkeep at Holy Loch, was in the 13th day of a normal 28 day upkeep. At 1400Z, 23 October, 15 hours after setting of DEFCON 3, ABRAHAM LINCOLN deployed to her Polaris patrol area.

USS PROTEUS got underway after LINCOLN deployed and proceeded to the Irish Sea. On 29 October PROTEUS visited her dispersal port of Toberry for familiarization prior to returning to Holy Loch on 31 October.

The schedule of USS THOMAS EDISON undergoing post shakedown availability was expedited by 19 days to permit deployment to the Polaris patrol area by 7 November. EDISON chopped to CINCLANT at 0100Z 14 November.

On 31 October USS GEORGE WASHINGTON was directed to terminate her patrol. She arrived in Holy Loch on 5 November after a 61 day patrol and commenced a normal upkeep.

USS PATRICK HENRY arrived in Holy Loch on 20 November 1962 after a 61 day patrol.

On 24 October CINCLANTFLT directed the disestablishment of the Argentina Sub-Air ASW barrier with all forces reverting to normal operational commanders. Accordingly, COMSUBLANT OPORD 45-62 directed the ten submarines in the barrier to proceed to home ports when chopped to COMSUBLANT by CTC 82.2. No unfriendly submarines were detected by barrier forces during the period the barrier was in effect. On 15 November COMSUBLANT directed TORSK and CUTLASS, who were returning to Norfolk from the barrier, to divert and proceed at best speed to the position of the sinking Greek merchantman CAPTAIN GEORGE to render assistance and attempt recovery of survivors. TORSK and CUTLASS continued on this operation until 17 November when they were released from the SAR mission and proceed to Norfolk. Their search had been fruitless.

In addition to earmarking 3 SS and 1 APSS for CINCLANT's Cuban contingency plans, COMSUBLANT was called upon to make submarines available for covert surveillance of Cuba.

CHAPTER VII

SECTION 8

SERVICE FORCE ATLANTIC OPERATIONS

During the Cuban crisis the Service Force Atlantic Fleet was under the command of RADM Denys W. Knoll, USN, with headquarters located at the U.S. Naval Base, Norfolk, Virginia. In the Cuban crisis the all out effort of the Service Force contributed much to the success of Navy operations. The ensuing paragraphs are not all inclusive and only highlight Service Force operations.

On 15 October 1962, Commander Service Squadron FOUR and a detachment of helicopters from Utility Squadron FOUR (HU-4) embarked in USS TRUCKEE (AO-147) to provide mobile logistic support for PHIBRIGLEX - 62 exercise. In addition to TRUCKEE, the force, designated TF 149, included SABINE (AO-25), MAZAMA (AE-9) and ALDEBARAN (AF-10). The force sailed for the vicinity of Vieques Island, Puerto Rico for the scheduled exercise.

On 22 October 1962 the USS ENTERPRISE and her destroyer screen joined the exercise Task Force and SERVON FOUR provided the logistic support for these ships. Also on this date COMSERVLANT activated the SERVLANT war room on a 24 hour basis consistent with the President's announcement concerning the Quarantine of Cuba.

On 24 October Service Squadron TWO consisting of NEOSHO/KASKASKIA/ELOKMIN/KANKAKEE/CHIKASKIA/GREAT SITKIN/BIDDLE/KENNEDY/STEINAKER/CECIL/STICKELL departed Norfolk to support Task Force 136 operations in connection with the quarantine of Cuba. COMSERVON TWO was designated CTG 136.3.

Ships of the Service Force undergo periodic refresher training in the Guantanamo area. During the early stages of the crisis USS HYADES was conducting training in the Guantanamo area. When the evacuation of dependents from GTMO was ordered, HYADES was included as part of the evacuation element. A total of 290 evacuees were transported by SERVLANT ships from Guantanamo to the CONUS arriving 25 October.

The need for salvage and towing operations was recognized. To meet this need salvage and towing ships of SERVON EIGHT were deployed and were positioned for operations in ports covering the southern U.S. from New Orleans to Norfolk. Others were located at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

As the scope of Naval operations broadened it became obvious that additional tankers would be required to support the fleet. Accordingly,

four tankers from MSTs were assigned to resupply underway replenishment groups. The need for these ships was recognized, and two "black" (NSFO) and two "white" (JP-5) MSTs tankers were assigned to resupply underway replenishment groups.

On 24 October 1962, Task Force 135 was activated for the support of 312 OPLAN operations. Following this action Task Force 149 (PHIBRIGLEX-52 URG) was dissolved and SERVRON FOUR was designated as CTG 135.3 (Replenishment Group).

By 25 October replenishment utilizing ELKOMIN and CHIKASKIA in the southern most sector, NEOSHO and KANKAKEE in the middle sector and KASKASKIA in the northern sector was operating satisfactorily. All forces including TF-136, the two HUK Groups and TF 135 were replenished with dispatch.

On 29 October the underway replenishment group commander for the Quarantine forces, COMSERVRON TWO (CTG 136.3) conferred with VADM A. G. Ward on board the USS NEWPORT NEWS concerning the repositioning of the quarantine line and utilizing 7 stations extending from a point 95 miles north of San Juan to a point 220 miles southeast of Mayport for a distance of 825 miles. Underway replenishment for the force was directed to conform to this line.

As operations progressed, overall logistic support task required a detailed support task organization. Accordingly COMSERVLANT issued his operation order 74-62. This order provided for logistic support, salvage, towing, repair, harbor clearance and such other logistics services as required.

As of 27 October, 35,926 men (excluding Marines) were being supported through COMSERVLANT Reefer Supply. The average daily usage of NSFO was 42,000 barrels. This figure was expected to increase by 5000 barrels upon arrival of the PACOM forces.

Quantities of NSFO were adequate for the major portion of the operations. However, during the period 2-4 November when a total of 3 HUK groups were assigned to TF 136 the daily usage rate became a matter of concern. The problem was solved upon the departure of two of these groups.

The Service Force use of TAO's was considered satisfactory after initial difficulties in "hook ups" were resolved. Resupply by TAO's was reported as satisfactory under good weather conditions.

The problem of lifting personnel to ships deployed in the area of contingency operations became a major one. Most ships deployed on short notice which resulted in some personnel who were on leave or liberty being left behind. Getting the men to their units was complicated by lack of trans-

portation to the operating force.

After a few weeks of operation it became apparent that neither of the two URG's could maintain the existing tempo of operations without periodic relief. In order to maintain the level of support required, it was necessary to form an additional URG staff for employment in successive relief of the two URG's "on the line." Accordingly, COMSERVDIV 21 and a small staff was assembled and scheduled to sail on 19 November.

From 31 October through 19 November, with the arrival of all ships on their assigned quarantine stations, daily underway refueling schedules were utilized to maintain station ships with at least 70% burnable fuel on board. This was accomplished by CTG 136.3 through the use of 3 oilers on station and with the fourth AO in Mayport for fuel, freight, passenger, and mail pick up, or operating south of Vieques for refueling of TF 128 forces (PACOM amphibious units). During this period oilers sought out and delivered their products to the customers and provided general purpose services to the fleet.

On 17 November 1962, forces under Commander Service Squadron FOUR commenced logistic support of TG 128.4, the Pacific Amphibious Group. In addition to the ships which departed CONUS to participate in Exercise PHIBRIGLEX 62, the following SERVLANT ships and MSTS TAO's chopped to Commander Service Squadron FOUR and participated in the Cuban Operations:

USS PAWCATUK (AO-108)

USS HYADES (AF-28)

USS KANKAKEE (AO-39)

USS WRANGELL (AE-12)

USS ALTAIR (AKS-32)

USS GREAT SITKIN (AE-17)

USS RIGEL (AF-58)

USNS PECOS

USNS CHEPACKET

USNS PIONEER VALLEY

USNS HENRY

As of 14 November the total afloat population in all task forces, including troops being supported was estimated at 100,000 in 184 ships.

On 21 November, President Kennedy announced that the quarantine had been suspended and that many of the ships in the quarantine force would be returning soon. Many of the active duty personnel who were extended were to be released. Even after President Kennedy's speech lifting the quarantine operations, however, SERVON EIGHT's ships continued to support ships in the quarantine force.

KANKAKEE (AO-39)

PARCATUCK (AO-108)

NEOSHO (AO-143)

ELOKOMIN (AO-55)

KASKASKIA (AO-27)

CHIKASKIA (AO-54)

SALAMONIE (AO-26)

MARIAS (AD-57)

AUCILLA (AO-56)

CALOOSAHATCHEE (AO-98)

CANISTEO (AO-99)

ALLAGASH (AO-97)

NESPELEN (AOG-55)

ALDEBARAN (AF-10)

DENEbola (AF-56)

HYADES (AF-28)

RIGEL (AF-58)

ALTAIR (AKS-32)

MOBILE ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL UNIT's
2,4,8,10,12

GREAT SITKIN (AE-17)

WRANGELL (AE-12)

NITRO (AE-23)

VULCAN (AR-5)

TUTUILA (ARG-4)

OXFORD (AG-159)

WINDLESS (ARSD-4)

SENECA (ATF-91)

SHAKORI (ATG-162)

MOSOPELEA (ATF-158)

SALINAN (ATF-161)

PAFAGO (ATF-160)

KIOWA (ATG-72)

UTINA (ATF-62)

PAIUTE (ATF-159)

LUISENO (ATF-156)

MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION's
4, 6, 7

CARGO HANDLING BATTALION ONE

MOBILE ORDNANCE SERVICE UNIT 4

MAUNA LOA (AE-8)

Highlights of Service Force Operations:

During one day, Detachment 95 of Helicopter Utility Squadron FOUR transferred 151 men, 39 of them by hoist.

On 27 October 1962, USS TRUCKEE transferred 165 personnel by highline to USS ENTERPRISE.

On 12-13 November, USS TRUCKEE transferred 93 L/T of fleet freight to ships of TF 135, varying from electronic tubes to jet aircraft engines.

Outstanding performance of RIGEL during underway replenishment of 15 and 16 November received plaudits from both ENTERPRISE and INDEPENDENCE.

In one 24 hour period, TRUCKEE fueled and consolidated a total of 23 hours.

On 22 November 1962, TRUCKEE received and delivered 716 bags of mail.

In spite of the past commissioning frustrations and material difficulties experienced by USS KANKAKEE, a newly activated AO, she steamed continuously from 24 October to 5 December and met all commitments expeditiously. Her abilities to accomplish this in the face of the difficulties encountered is a most favorable reflection on the ingenuity and willingness of a hard working crew.

After joining COMSERVRON FOUR on 15 October, USS MAZAMA steamed continuously until 3 December meeting all commitments without incident. In addition to the routine replenishment operations, MAZAMA made one trip to Roosevelt Roads to pick up ordnance items to fill up her CLOUD stocks which were urgently required for Marine Corps back up. During these few hours in Roosevelt Roads, MAZAMA personnel accomplished a task that normally would have required two days. There was no liberty or respite from her heavy work schedule and this short period is not considered of sufficient duration to break her continuous steaming record.

Service Force Units transferred 1024 personnel by Helicopter or Highline.

Six hundred forty eight (648) ships were refueled by fleet oilers.

Summary of Service Force Units Participating:

TRUCKEE (AO-147)

ARCTURUS (AF-52)

SABINE (AG-25)

MAZAMA (AE-9)

CHAPTER VII

SECTION 9

AMPHIBIOUS FORCE ATLANTIC OPERATIONS

On 15 October the Amphibious Force Atlantic was operating under Defense Condition FIVE. The pattern of operations was fairly routine for the middle of the fiscal year's second quarter. Fifteen amphibious ships were deployed either to the Mediterranean or Panama, or else enroute to Norfolk from deployment. An additional twelve ships were deployed to the Caribbean or were enroute as relief. These latter ships plus six others were to constitute the naval forces assigned to Amphibious Brigade Landing Exercise 1962 (PHIBRIGLEX-62) which was just commencing. Four more ships were assigned to a LOGEX at Onslow Beach, North Carolina. The employment of the remaining ships, covered a wide variety of operations such as POM, RFS, AOTU, upkeep and/or tender availability.

A serious problem confronting COMPHIBLANT, Vice Admiral Rivero, at the time was the shortage of AGC type command ships. The TACONIC (AGC-17) was in overhaul. The POCONO (AGC-16) was in the Mediterranean as flagship for CINCUSNAVEUR and the third AGC assigned to PHIBLANT, the MT McKINLEY (AGC-17) was the only one available for operations. On 15 October, COMPHIBLANT embarked on the MT. McKINLEY as Commander Naval Task Force 144 for PHIBRIGLEX-62. He was to sail for the Caribbean on 16 October. COMPHIBGRU FOUR, Rear Admiral Pittard, who was to be Commander Amphibious Task Force 146, sailed on 15 October utilizing the FRANCIS MARION (APA-249) as his flagship. Also in Task Force 146 was COMPHIBRON 12 on the CHILTON (APA-38). Other shipping included two LPH, two APA, three AKA, two LSD, three LST and two APD. Because of the unavailability of a flagship COMPHIBRON TWO, Rear Admiral Craighill, was ashore at Little Creek, Virginia.

On 17 October Hurricane "ELLA" made its impact on the Amphibious Force operations. TF 144 changed its course to a more easterly direction in order to avoid the hurricane. The LOGEX at Onslow Beach was terminated and COMPHIBRON 10, with forces assigned, departed for Little Creek in order to avoid damage. Because of the weather, COMPHIBRON 6, with ships returning from the Mediterranean, was unable to offload at Morehead City so he was directed to proceed to Norfolk.

Despite the hurricane, COMPHIBLANT in Mt. McKINLEY continued toward Vieques with Movement Unit ALFA. On 19 October, although he departed formation, COMPHIBLANT remained in the vicinity of the movement unit rather than proceeding to San Juan as scheduled. His continued presence generated some speculation as to the course of future events.

In the meantime, COMPHIBRON 6 had arrived in Norfolk and was taking on fuel and provisions. He was directed to maintain readiness for sea and retain all troops on board.

Action was initiated on 19 October to secure release of PHIBLANT ships from near term commitments involving minor exercises and lifts. Assuming correctly that these efforts would be successful, COMPHIBLANT would have his entire Amphibious Force either operationally engaged, ready for sea in 24 hours, or committed to regular overhaul (7 ships).

On the 20th, even though ELLA had abated sufficiently to continue with the PHIBRIGLEX drills and operations, an abrupt change in plans took place. COMPHIBLANT assumed direct operational control of PHIBRON 8 and he ordered this Caribbean Ready PHIBRON to proceed at best speed to the Guantanamo operating area. An AKA and LST that had been offloading aviation equipment and personnel at Roosevelt Roads were directed to complete offloading and return as quickly as possible to Morehead City, N. C. The BOXER (LPH-4) concluded ISE and went into Norfolk to embark COMPHIBRON 10. Two LST that were at Panama, under CINCARIB operational control, were ordered to return to Little Creek. While enroute these LST were diverted to Port Everglades, Florida, for assignment with U.S. Army armored units. Two LST which were supposed to relieve the Panama unit were directed to remain at Little Creek. Subsequently, these two ships joined those at Port Everglades.

COMPHIBLANT and COMPHIBRON 12 rendezvoused on 21 October and joined with COMPHIBGRU FOUR. This entire movement unit then proceeded through the Mona Passage to a point south of the mid-part of the Dominican Republic. At the same time the Caribbean Ready PHIBRON 8 consisting of two APA's, an AKA, an LSD and an APD continued toward Guantanamo. PHIBRON 6, with an APA, AKA, two LSD and two LST and BLT 2/6 embarked departed Norfolk to augment the PHIBRIGLEX force. CNO cancelled the minor exercises and lifts that were scheduled, thus freeing, among other ships, an APA and AKA. These two ships embarked an RLT Headquarters, a Marine Air Group Headquarters and the sea-tail of a battalion which had already been airlifted to Guantanamo.

22 October was a day of rapid fire developments. The President announced the quarantine of Cuba. CNO authorized release of Project Tare stocks. DEFCON THREE as well as MINIMIZE world-wide was set.

At this point, COMPHIBLANT was sailing west, south of the Dominican Republic. COMPHIBRON 12, in advance of the main Amphibious Task Force, had been directed to proceed toward Guantanamo Bay under the direct operational control of COMPHIBLANT. Later in the evening COMPHIBLANT retransited north through the Mona Passage, departing the vicinity of Movement Unit ALPHA.

Events were transpiring so quickly that communications had seriously back logged. Even high precedence messages required excessive time for delivery. To bring everyone up to date, on the evening of 22 October, all the commanding officers of ships in company with Movement Unit ALFA were briefed by COMPHIBGRU FOUR.

Meanwhile the 22nd of October had been an eventful day at Guantanamo. Dependents had been evacuated by air and surface. COMPHIBRON 8 had been directed to offload Marine BLT 2/2. These Marines then joined the battalion that had just been flown in from Camp Pendleton, California. One of PHIBRON 8's ships, the DESOTO COUNTY (LST 1171), embarked 92 dependents for return to Norfolk.

Back at Norfolk, COMPHIBRON 10, with an LPH, two AKA, an LSD and two LST assigned, had been directed to outload Marines from Norfolk and Morehead City, North Carolina and sail for the Caribbean.

To summarize PHIBLANT's activities on 22 October - COMPHIBLANT was in position in the Caribbean. One BLT was being offloaded at Guantanamo by PHIBRON 8. COMPHIBRON 6 with a BLT embarked was enroute south. COMPHIBRON 10 was beginning to outload BLT 3/8. The SANDOVAL unit, serving as PHIBRON 2 and providing shipping for still another BLT, was made up and ready to sail when loading ports were clear. COMPHIBGRU FOUR with Movement Unit ALFA and COMPHIBRON 12 were in position in the Caribbean. Within another 48 hours virtually all PHIBLANT ships would be combat loaded or enroute to loading ports.

By the morning of 23 October COMPHIBGRU FOUR and Movement Unit ALFA, following COMPHIBLANT, had retransited north through the Mona Passage. They set course to a position northeast of the Bahama Islands. Here they would meet with COMPHIBRON 6 who was enroute from the U.S. From this rendezvous point, the major portion of the Amphibious Task Force in the Caribbean would be at a point nearly equi-distant to either the Havana area or Guantanamo Bay.

COMPHIBRON 12, who was in the vicinity south of Guantanamo, shifted from the CHILTON to the OKINAWA (LPH-3). The CHILTON was directed to proceed to Morehead City.

Meanwhile, PHIBRON 8 was completing the offloading at Guantanamo. COMPHIBLANT designated COMPHIBTRALANT, Rear Admiral Dempsey, as COMPHIBLANT REP Norfolk. Admiral Dempsey was made responsible for Amphibious Force ships in loading out ports as well as for repairs and reloading in the event a combat situation ensued.

By now COMPHIBLANT was rapidly completing the buildup of his forces to implement the amphibious phase of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62.

On 24 October COMPHIBLANT dissolved the PHIBRIGLEX Task Force 144 organization and activated the Task Force 44 organization. COMPHIBLANT and COMPHIBGRU FOUR conferred, and it was decided that COMPHIBLANT would return to Norfolk, disembark from the Mt. McKinley, shift his flag to Little Creek and assign the AGC to COMPHIBGRU FOUR as his flagship.

Later COMPHIBGRU FOUR effected a rendezvous with COMPHIBRON 8 near San Salvador. The latest changes in plans were discussed, and the two APA's in PHIBRON 8 were directed to return to the CONUS. The MONROVIA (APA-31) was to sail to Norfolk to become the flagship for COMPHIBGRU TWO. The ROCK-BRIDGE (APA-228) was ordered to Morehead City. COMPHIBRON 8 was to shift his pennant from the MONROVIA to the CHILTON (APA-38).

On 24 October the staffs of COMPHIBGRU TWO and CG, XVIII Airborne Corps conferred regarding the armored division lift from Fort Lauderdale by four older LST's. COMSTS also had representatives present. This subject was under continual review throughout the Cuban operation and at the conclusion had not been satisfactorily resolved.

The next day word was received that the JCS had directed CINCPAC to embark the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade from Camp Pendleton, California and sail as soon as ready. COMPHIBGRU THREE, Rear Admiral Johnson, was to provide the shipping. This step appeared to be another incremental execution of actions outlined in the Contingency Plan without execution of the plan itself.

COMPHIBRON 6 and COMPHIBRON 12 reported to COMPHIBGRU FOUR on 24 October. In turn COMPHIBRON 6 was directed to take his squadron to a point northward of Northeast Providence Channel. COMPHIBRON 12 was to proceed to the Coastal waters south of Mayport, Florida. In addition to PHIBRONs 6 and 12, the SANDOVAL unit, ~~ferrying~~ as PHIBRON 2, was to chop to COMPHIBGRU FOUR after loading and departing Morehead City.

COMPHIBRON 10, on the BOXER, joined the remainder of his group off Onslow Beach on 25 October. When RPS, PHIBRON 10 was to take station at a holding area off Florida.

PHIBRON 8 was the last squadron to complete loading. On 27 October the squadron commander was ordered to rendezvous his group off Charleston when loading was completed. At that point he was to chop to COMPHIBGRU FOUR.

The procedure followed with this last Task Group characterized the pattern that had been followed consistently throughout the operation - shipping for a task group would be assembled, a PHIBRON commander designated, the task group fueled, provisioned and sailed to loading ports and only when loaded and RFS in all respects was the task group commander chopped to COMPHIBGRU FOUR.

During the next few days, the Task Groups either continued loading or else were steaming to, or already located in their assigned holding areas. Since no contingency plan had been executed, the prospect of a lengthy holding period became increasingly evident. Planning for this eventuality increased.

In the meantime, not all of the Amphibious Force ships were playing their role as members of the Task Force. For example, in addition to the four LST assigned to working with the movement of the U.S. Army Armored Division at Port Everglades, there was the experience of the TERREBONE PARRISH. This versatile 1156 class LST remained uncommitted to the Task Force 44 organization until 6 November. In the meantime she provided most commendable service. In a period of 25 days this 13 knot LST transported three maximum LST loads, occasionally struggling through heavy weather created by Hurricane "ELLA". She loaded in five ports, offloaded in three ports and steamed a total distance of nearly 5,000 miles.

PHIBRON 6 which had no sooner returned from the Mediterranean when it was ordered to the Caribbean, was directed to sail for Morehead City. Upon his expected arrival on 1 November, COMPHIBRON 6 was authorized to institute a leave and liberty program consistent with the safety of his ships and a 48 hour sailing notice.

On 30 October CINCLANTFLT partially approved COMPHIBLANT's request to activate Amphibious Task Force 128, which was the organization called for in the Cuban Contingency 316-62 OPLAN. Only those forces assigned to COMPHIBLANT, CTF 44 operational control were to be activated under TF 128.

COMPHIBGRU THREE, with the 5th MEB embarked was now enroute to the Panama Canal. Upon chop to COMPHIBLANT, he was assigned task designator TG 44.9. He was directed to submit his task organization for TG 44.9 as well as TF 128.4 since the TF 128 organization would be activated in the near future. (9 November as events transpired). COMPHIBGRU THREE was further instructed to proceed within 24 hours steaming of Guantanamo and, upon arrival, maintain one half of his forces in readiness at sea. The ships of the remaining half could be either at San Juan or Roosevelt Roads for upkeep with the

Marines exercising ashore at Vieques, or, in Jamaican - Dominican Republic ports for liberty. This general plan for the holding period was somewhat modified later but essential features remained.

The corresponding plan for COMPHISGRU FOUR was to keep three BLT's embarked at sea in holding areas in U.S. coastal waters, one BLT, in the vicinity of San Salvador, one BLT at anchor and one BLT in port for liberty, logistic support and upkeep not to exceed one week. Groups would be rotated at weekly intervals.

When loading out was completed on 31 October, COMPHIBLANT disestablished COMPHIBLANT REP at Norfolk but established a REP at Mayport. This measure proved so successful that a PHIBLANT REP was later established at Roosevelt Roads for the benefit of PHIBGRU THREE ships.

At this point a question arose relative to the control of MSTIS shipping involved in the operation. COMPHIBLANT recommended to CINCLANTFLT the following concept for control of MSTIS/commercial shipping: COMSTISLANT area or COMSTIS GULF area places the ship on berth; TF 125 (Army) or TF 129 (Marines) load the ship; MSTIS representative sails the ship to a control point designated by the Naval Task Force Commander in the objective area. Here a designated subordinate of the Naval Task Force Commander assumes operational control of the ship by direct contact and orders the ship to an unloading site or holding area; discharged ships will be sailed by a designated subordinate of CNITF from the objective area to a destination specified by MSTIS authority. CINCLANTFLT and COMSTIS both concurred in this recommendation.

By 2 November all PHIBLANT units assigned to the Cuban operation were loaded and formed into the Task Force 44 organization. The basic operational pattern of the holding operation was now firmly established. Task groups steamed beyond visual range of land in separate holding areas within the 100 fathom curve off the northern Florida coast. Groups maintained north-south locations in the same order of sequence as for movement to the objective area. While in the holding area ships conducted exercises to maintain optimum combat readiness. Each group was required to maintain geographical position, material and personnel readiness to arrive at the objective area well within the required reaction time. Ships were sailed to Charleston and Mayport for replenishment, upkeep and liberty on a rotational basis and as required. This plan minimized ASW, upkeep and replenishment problems, permitted contact between operational commanders, and afforded the upkeep and liberty necessary for material readiness and high morale. The major remaining requirement was for a landing area to conduct rehearsals and provide the embarked troops with exercise ashore. Some units had now been embarked two weeks and this problem was daily becoming more urgent.

CG USCONARC proposed that the four LST at Port Everglades, conduct tank driver training for the first increment of Task Force CHARLIE. (This Task Force was the Army's armored organization involved in the contingency plan.) COMPHIBLANT agreed. This initial proposal to train 66 Army personnel grew eventually into a large scale training exercise encompassing all five increments of Task Force CHARLIE, nearly 2500 Army personnel and eight LST (including four time chartered commercial vessels.)

Close review of the Task Force 128 organization, landing plan and forces assigned for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62 indicated that a change was warranted to make more effective use of the three LPH assigned to support the assault forces. This was the first amphibious operation ever conducted with this number of LPH available. As a consequence of this decision all RED beach surface units were placed under command of COMPHIBRON 8 and all BLUE beach surface units were placed under the command of COMPHIBRON 12. All three LPH were placed under COMPHIBRON 10. As a result, plans were changed accordingly.

As of 4 November, all elements of TF 44 except for two LPH were located in the vicinity of the east coast from Virginia to Florida. The two LPH, OKINAWA and THETIS BAY, were on station between San Salvador and Northeast Providence Channel. The POCONO was enroute Norfolk.

PHIBGRU THREE with nearly 11,000 Marines and Navy personnel of the 5th MEB embarked, commenced transit of the Panama Canal on 5 November. The move was completed on 8 November. While this group was transiting the Canal, Rear Admiral Johnson and Brigadier General Fairbairn, USMC, Commanding General of the 5th MEB flew to Norfolk for conferences at PHIBLANT, FMFLANT, and CINCLANT-FLT. They later visited COMNAVBASE GTMO at Guantanamo before rejoining PHIBGRU THREE.

On 7 November the DUVAL COUNTY, DODGE COUNTY, CHEBOYGAN COUNTY and MIDDLESEX COUNTY, who had been assisting the Army at Port Everglades were chopped to COMPHIBGRU TWO. This was done to provide flag officer liaison with all Army commands concerned with the movement of the armored Task Force CHARLIE.

COMPHIBLANT, on 8 November requested that COMSECONDFLT and COMCRUDESANT afford naval gunfire ships that had not fired within six months, the opportunity to qualify at Culebra. This shortage of gunfire support ships, coupled with the numbers that were not qualified, constituted a serious problem.

COMPHIBLANT activated the Task Force 128 organization on 9 November for forces assigned and for unassigned forces when chopped to CTF 128. Forces assigned but which had not been chopped were listed with suitable notation to that effect. This action afforded improved communications and readiness for the current holding operations as well as the execution of a contingency plan. In addition, it provided the organization readiness posture to execute the full scale amphibious exercise being planned for execution in mid-November at Onslow Beach, N.C.

Pertinent portions of the TF 128 organization were as follows:

CTF 128	Amphibious Task Force	VAEM H. Rivers, USN COMPHIBLANT
CTG 128.3	Atlantic Movement Group	RADM G.F. Pittard, USN COMPHIBGRU FOUR
GTU 128.3.1	Atlantic Movement Group	RADM G.F. Pittard, USN COMPHIBGRU FOUR
CTE 128.3.1.1	Atlantic Movement Element	CAPT J.W. Read, USN COMPHIBRON EIGHT
	ALFA ONE	1 AGC
	MT MCKINLEY (AGC-7) (FF)	
	CHILTON (APA-38) (F)	
	ROCKBRIDGE (APA-228)	2 APA
	CAPRICORNUS (AKA-57)	
	ALGOL (AKA-54)	2 AKA
	LINDENWALD (LSD-6)	1 LSD
	DESOTO COUNTY (LST 1171)	
	TRAVERSE COUNTY (LST 1160)	2 LST
	LIDDLE (APD-60)	1 APD
CTE 128.3.1.2	Atlantic Movement Element	CAPT W.Y. Howell, USN
	ALFA TWO	CG SANDCTAL (APA-194)
	SANDCVAL (APD-194) (CTF)	1 APA

THUBAN (AKA-19)	1 AKA
SPEIGEL GROVE (LSD-32)	
RUSHMORE (LSD-14) (WHEN ASSIGNED)	2 LSD
WAKIYAKUM COUNTY (LST-1162)	
GRANT COUNTY (LST-1174)	
TALBOT COUNTY (LST-1153)	3 LST
CTE 128.3.1.2 Atlantic Movement Element	CAPT J.A. Marks, USN
BRAVO ONE	COMPHIBRON TEN
BOXER (LPH-4) (F) 2	
THETIS BAY (LPH-6)	
OKINAWA (LPH-3)	3 LPH
UVALDE (AKA-88)	
RANKIN (AKA-108)	2 AKA
FT SNELLING (LSD-30)	
SHADWELL (LSD-15)	2 LSD
LORAIN COUNTY (LST-1177)	1 LST
CTE 128.3.1.4 Atlantic Movement Element	CAPT M. Kelly, Jr. USN
BRAVO TWO	COMPHIBRON SIX
CAMBRIA (APA-36) (F)	1 APA
OGLETHORPE (AKA-100)	1 AKA
CASA GRANDE (LSD-13)	1 LSD
WALWORTH COUNTY (LST-1164)	
YORK COUNTY (LST-1175)	2 LST
CTE 128.3.1.5 Atlantic Movement Element	CAPT J.J. Becker, USN
BRAVO THREE	COMPHIBRON TWELVE
FRANCIS MARION (APA-24) (F)	1 APA
VERMILLON (AKA-93)	
YANCEY (AKA-107)	2 AKA
PLYMOUTH ROCK (LSD-29)	1 LSD
WOOD COUNTY (LST-1178)	
SUFFOLK COUNTY (LST-1173)	2 LST
E.B. HALL (APD-107)	1 APD
CTG 128.4 Pacific Movement Group	RADM N.C. Johnson, USN
	COMPHIBGRU THREE
CTU 128.4.8. PACARIB Movement Unit ALFA	CAPT E.R. Crawford, USN
	COMPHIBRON ONE
CTE 128.4.8.1 PACARIB Movement Element	CAPT E.R. Crawford, USN
ALFA ONE	COMPHIBRON ONE
HENRICO (APA-45) (F)	
BEXAR (APA-237)	2 APA
UNION (AKA-106)	1 AKA

COLONIAL (LSD-18)
THOMASTON (LSD-28)

2 LSD

CTE 128.4.8.2 PACARIB Movement Element
ALFA TWO
NOBLE (APA-218)
OKANOGAN (APA-220)
PT DEFIANCE (LSD-31)
GUNSTON HALL (LSD-5)
COOK (APD-130)

CAPT A.H. Higgs, USN
CO, NOBLE (APA-218)

2 APA

2 LSD

1 APD

CTU 128.4.9 PACRIB Movement Unit BRAVO

CAPT W.C. Meyer, USN
COMPHIBRON SEVEN

CTE 128.4.9.1 PACRIB Movement Element
BRAVO ONE
BAYFIELD (APA-33) (F)
RENVILLE (APA-227)
WASHBURN (AKA-108)
BELLE GROVE (LSD-2)
CARTER HALL (LSD-3)

CAPT W.C. Meyer, USN
COMPHIBRON SEVEN

2 APA

1 AKA

2 LSD

CTE 128.4.9.2 PACARIB Movement Element
BRAVO TWO
TWO JIMA (LPH-2) (CTE)
MERRICK (AKA-97)
MATTHEWS (AKA-96)
WHETSTONE (LSD-27)
CABILDO (LSD-16)

CAPT L.E. Harmon, USN
CO, TWO JIMA (LPH-2)

1 LPH

2 AKA

2 LSD

CINCLANTFLT had already advised COMLANTRESFLT that the possibility existed that some, or all of the Reserve Fleet LST might be activated. The ready availability of cargo and certain amphibious type shipping was most critical. Because of this fact, CINCLANTFLT, on 10 November, requested the JCS to authorize COMSTS to charter three additional LST for use by CINCLANT. In addition, CNO was advised of the possibility that all eleven LST of the Atlantic Reserve Fleet might be needed. Developments concerning these LST were followed with great interest at PHIBLANT headquarters. Additional LST would have solved one of the most difficult problems of the Cuban operation i.e. the provision of adequate, timely amphibious lift for the Army Armored Division. As a matter of fact, late in November CINCLANTFLT further recommended to CNO that as many LST as feasible be transferred to class "A" selected Reserve status in the Atlantic Reserve Fleet if it were decided not to activate the eleven LST for the Atlantic Fleet.

CINCLANT notified CINCARLANT, COMPHIBLANT and CG FMFLANT of a planning conference scheduled for 12 November to resolve the problem of over the beach transport of Army forces in the contingency plan. Among the agenda items listed were: chartered commercial LST; Reserve Fleet LST; LCU from Army and Navy resources and turn around shipping after offload of the II MEF. The fundamental problem, however, was not satisfactorily solved because the Army requirements far exceeded the Navy capability.

Upon the arrival of POCONO (AGC-16) at Norfolk on 12 November, COMPHIBLANT shifted his flag aboard.

The deployment of the Amphibious Force remained generally as previously described. However, the two LPH, OKINAWA and THETIS BAY, had returned to Mayport from the vicinity of San Salvador.

COMPHIBLANT authorized COMPHIBGRU FOUR to conduct a full scale landing exercise at Onslow on 16 November. The risk of exceeding reaction time requirements was reduced by careful observation of weather and restrictions on the quantity of equipment landed in order to ensure rapid backloading. It was planned that following the landing, one third of PHIBGRU FOUR would proceed to Norfolk with troops remaining ashore at Camp Lejeune from seven to ten days. They would maintain a readiness to backload within 48 hours. One third would remain at sea in the holding areas off Mayport and one third would remain in Charleston or Mayport.

At 0700, 16 November 1962, the high point of the Amphibious Force participation in the Cuban operation was reached. COMPHIBGRU FOUR, Rear Admiral Pittard, signalled "Land the Landing Force" commencing the largest amphibious landing exercise conducted by the Atlantic Fleet in nearly two decades. It was the first amphibious landing exercise employing three LPH. Six Marine BLTs were landed in the assault, four by surface and two by helicopter. All boat waves landed within one minute of schedule and no boats were broached. The successful execution and remarkable timing, achieved without a prior rehearsal, attested to the professional skill and combat readiness of the Atlantic Fleet Navy-Marine Corps Amphibious Team.

On conclusion of the landing at Onslow on 17 November, the Marine units designated to remain ashore continued the exercise while the remainder backloaded preparatory to return, as previously planned, either to Norfolk, Mayport-Charleston or the holding area.

Before the Cuban operation ended all embarked Marines and five increments of the Army's Task Force CHARLIE would be landed in training exercises. In fact, some of the Marine units made three landings.

Indicative of the easing in tension was CINCLANTFLT's authorization to institute modest leave and liberty programs and to implement such measures as were necessary to improve training and maintenance. Although this required a modification to DEFCON THREE, the ability to meet specified reaction times was maintained.

With the lifting of the quarantine operations on 21 November the tempo of operations began to draw rapidly to a conclusion. Nevertheless, COMPHIBLANT directed COMPHIBGRU FOUR to conduct a landing exercise at Onslow on 28 November.. (This exercise was subsequently cancelled due to inclement weather). In addition COMPHIBGRU TWO was directed to inspect four chartered commercial LST that had been contracted for. He was to determine the specific material, personnel and training requirements necessary to make their use feasible. COMSERVANT was notified that at least two tender/repair ships were required in the Jamaica-Puerto Rico area to maintain the readiness of PHIBGRU THREE ships. Arrangements were made through COMCRUSLANT that the YOSEMITE would remain at Kingston, Jamaica to provide tender repairs for PHIBGRU THREE ships.

By 28 November there were stronger indications of an imminent stand-down. MINIMIZE was cancelled. DEFCON FIVE was set in the Atlantic Fleet (with certain exceptions) and Dispersal Condition FOUR was ordered in CONUS ports. Shortly before midnight, the uncertainty concerning the stand-down was ended. COMPHIBLANT was ordered to load on PHIBGRU THREE ships the maximum number of personnel and equipment of the Marine battalion that had flown from Camp Pendleton, California to Guantanamo. COMPHIBGRU THREE upon completion of loading was to sail to Panama for transit of the Canal and chop to CINCPACFLT. Immediately thereafter a message was received for COMPHIBLANT to return the II MEF to home station.

On 6 December, TF 128, the greatest assemblage of amphibious power in the Atlantic Fleet in a generation, was dissolved and all ships were reverted to normal operational control.

CHAPTER VII

SECTION 10

FLEET MARINE FORCE ATLANTIC OPERATIONS

Throughout the period of the Cuban crisis from 1 October to 15 December 1962, the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic performed its functions as a type commander within the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Additionally, the headquarters functioned as Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Force from 23 October to 6 December.

The scope of preparations and operations by the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic included:

- a. Evacuation of dependents from NAVBASE GTMO.
- b. Reconnaissance flights over Cuban territory, and
- c. Preparation for the defense of GTMO; limited aerial attacks on specified military targets in Cuba; and an amphibious assault by the II MEF in joint operations to seize Cuba.

These preparations and operations were conducted in accordance with CINCLANT OPORD 36-61 (Evacuation and Defense of the Naval Base, Guantanamo); CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 (Joint quick reaction air operations against Cuba and defense of Naval Base, Guantanamo); and CINCLANT OPLANS 314-62 and 316-62 (Joint airborne/amphibious operations to seize Cuba.)

GENERAL SUMMARY

From 1 to 18 October, FMFLANT, at the direction of CINCLANTFLT, accelerated planning and preparations to increase force readiness posture for the execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62. This could be identified as the increased readiness phase.

During 19 to 30 October was the deployment phase. Aviation units were deployed to NAS Key West, NAS Roosevelt Roads and NAS Guantanamo, in preparation for the execution of OPLAN 312. Ground units also were sent to Guantanamo to support the execution of the same plan. The 2nd Marine Division, together with aviation command elements and helicopters were embarking in preparation for the execution of OPLAN 314/316. Some FMFPAC units augmented FMFLANT units at Guantanamo while others were enroute from the Pacific to the Caribbean area in preparation to execute the contingency plans.

By 31 October embarkation had been completed and major units were at or enroute to the Caribbean area. The subsequent period until 28 November was primarily spent in refining existing plans and conducting exercises of deployed units to maintain proficiency of the troops and maintenance of equipment. This was the preparation for prolonged alert phase.

To provide some conception of the magnitude of Fleet Marine Force participation in the Cuban crisis, there were over 40,000 personnel involved. Amphibious shipping numbered 86 ships including 28 MSTB ships. Of the 58 amphibious ships 4 were LPH - the most LPH that had ever been made available for an amphibious operation. There were 387 Marine aircraft including attack, fighter, photographic, tanker, transport, helicopter and observation types. In addition there was a LAAM (HAWK) battalion, 123 artillery pieces, 35 ONTOS and 78 tanks.

The stand down phase from 29 November to 15 December consisted of relaxing readiness measures and the incremental return of all deployed units to home stations to resume normal readiness.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Increased readiness phase 1-18 October.

CINCLANT directed on 1 October that all feasible means be taken to ensure maximum readiness to execute CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 by 20 October. Prepositioning of ordnance and aviation support equipment was authorized.

On 3 October CG, 2d MAF was directed to report to CJTF 122 for planning now and for operations when directed for OPLAN 312. CG FMFLANT was additionally directed to provide to COMNAVBASE GTMO one TPS-15 radar together with technicians to remain until permanent installation of the SPS-40 was completed and operational. This was estimated as not earlier than 1 December 1962. The next day CINCLANTFLT directed that six F8 (F8U) be deployed to NAS, Key West on 19 October and chopped to COMNAVBASE. COMNAVBASE and CG FMFLANT were scheduled to rotate the assignment on a monthly basis.

On 6 October CINCLANT requested recommendations for the development of the highest possible state of readiness to execute OPLAN's 312, 314, and 315 to include prepositioning of troops, aircraft, equipment and supplies. CG FMFLANT's response included:

- a. The assignment of an additional 1/3 Div/Wing Team to this force with elements based in the Vieques/GTMO area.
- b. Preposition of a MAG at Key West.

MAG-26 (helicopter group) returned to New River, N.C. on 11 October. This organization had been engaged in connection with operations in Mississippi with XVIII airborne Corps elements in the suppression of a civil disorder.

From 12-17 October the 4th MEB embarked and sailed with PHIBGRU FOUR for an amphibious brigade landing exercise at Vieques scheduled for 22-25 October.

Conferences and planning for execution of OPLAN's 312, 314 and 316 and the prepositioning of supplies and support equipment continued through 17 October.

Deployment phase 19-30 October.

On 18-19 October, JCS directed that:

(1) CINCPAC chop one reinforced infantry battalion of the 5th MEB to CINCLANT. MATS was ordered to airlift this battalion directly to Guantanamo.

b. A Marine LAAM battalion be designated and chopped to CINCLANT who was directed to arrange for MATS transportation to MCAS, Cherry Point, N.C.

c. CINCPACFLT assemble amphibious shipping in embarkation points in preparation for possible orders to sail and chop the 5th MEB to LATCOM.

In view of the lack of currently available airfields to support operations in Eastern Cuba, CG FMFLANT recommended that VMA squadrons be based aboard CVA upon execution of the contingency plans. The next day 1 VMA squadron was directed to embark on the ENTERPRISE.

CINCLANTFLT issued his OPORD 43-62 on 20 October. This order supported CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316. In it CG FMFLANT was directed to:

a. Report one MAG (1 VMF and 3 VMA) to CINCPACFLT for planning and to deploy this MAG to Key West and chop to CINCPACFLT on execution of this order.

b. Nominate squadrons and support forces sufficient to establish one MAG (2 VMA and 1 VMF) at NAS, Roosevelt Roads for chop, when in place to

c. Reinforce NAVBASE GTMO upon execution of OPORD with an air lifted battalion, if not previously directed.

Late on the evening of 20 October, CG FMFLANT issued a FRAG ORD containing implementing instructions to his forces.

The next morning BLT 2/1 from the 5th MEB began to arrive at Guantanamo. In the meantime, the Caribbean ready PHIBRON 8, with BLT 2/2 embarked, was proceeding to the vicinity of GTMO at best speed. To further improve his readiness posture, CG FMFLANT requested that two VMA squadrons from AIRMED-PAC be chopped in place to CG FMFLANT. This request was approved and on 27 October two VMA squadrons were assigned.

On 21 October a detachment of VMJ-2 chopped to COMFAIRJAX to participate in BLUE MOON reconnaissance flights over Cuba. Later that day CINCLANTFLT directed execution of Plan CHARLIE of his OPORD 36-61. (Reinforce GTMO with 1 infantry battalion for defense of base) specifying that a Regimental Headquarters, Naval Gunfire Spot Team, and Tactical Air Control Party be included. The first elements were directed to arrive the night of 21 October, COMPHIBLANT, previously instructed to maintain PHIBRON 8 and BLT 2/2 within 4 hours sailing time of GTMO, was directed to land BLT 2/2 on the evening of 22 October. COMNAVBASE GTMO, was directed to evacuate dependents and non-essential personnel. Headquarters, RL-6, previously deployed to Vieques as the control group for PHIBRIGLEX, was selected to redeploy by air to NAVBASE GTMO. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Marines with three composite companies (from Headquarters Marine Corps and Marine Corps School, Quantico) of approximately 500 troops on Vieques, and the force Recon Company, at St. Thomas were directed to return to CONUS by air. While these units were returning to CONUS BLT 1/8 commenced air movement from Cherry Point to GTMO.

The next day JCS ordered the 5th MEB (which was to be comprised of four BLT) to load as soon as possible and sail for the LANTCOM. MAG-14 was ordered to report to CINCLANT at Key West and MAG-32 Headquarters was directed to deploy to Roosevelt Roads to assume OPCON of Marine air in that area.

After setting DEFCON THREE on 23 October, CG FMFLANT was directed to embark the remainder of the 2nd Marine Division as shipping became available. This was done and then CG FMFLANT activated the II Marine Expeditionary Force for planning and embarkation and reported to COMPHIBLANT, COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE for embarkation.

In further developments on the 23rd, the 3d MAAM battalion departed by air from 29 Palms, California; BLT 2/1 (PAJBY) closed NAVBASE GTMO; Headquarters

RLT-6 arrived GTMO and chopped to Brigadier General Collins, USMC, the Guantanamo Ground Defense Commander. To complete an eventful day, BLT 2/2 commenced debarking from PHIBRON 8 at GTMO. PHIBRON 8, upon completion of unloading was directed to return to CONUS to embark additional II MEF units.

By 24 October MAG-32 Headquarters was deploying in two echelons - one went to NAVBASE GTMO under the OPCON of CTF 135 and the other moved to Roosevelt Roads and assumed control of MAG-32 elements there. A battery from the 3d IAAM Battalion was ordered to Guantanamo by air to report to the Commanding Officer, MAG-32.

COMPHIBLANT proposed on 25 October that provisions be made for exercising troops ashore in order to maintain efficiency and readiness posture. Mayport, Jacksonville, Savannah and Charleston were recommended by CG FMFLANT and these ports were subsequently used for this purpose. By late in the day all assigned forces were in place at GTMO except the IAAM battery which was in the process of being emplaced.

On 26 October, as a result of an approved recommendation to JCS by CINCLANT, subsequent planning for execution of OPLAN 314 was abandoned in favor of OPLAN 316.

Planning for embarkation of the II MEF, until 27 October, provided for COMPHIBLANT/CATF and CG, II MEF to embark in the MT. McKINLEY. COMPHIBGRU FOUR and CG, 4th MEB were embarked in the FRANCIS MARION and CG, 24 MarDiv was scheduled to embark in the FRANCIS MARION for command of Landing Group West. On recommendation of COMPHIBGRU FOUR and CG, 4th MEB, the FRANCIS MARION was deemed inadequate as a command and control ship for the magnitude of operations planned. The AGC, MT. McKINLEY, therefore, was assigned to the Western Attack/Landing Group. Since the MT. McKINLEY was the only AGC available, the AGC, USS POCONO, then deployed with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, was directed to return as soon as possible for the use of the CATF/CG, II MEF.

On 27 October the Commander, Naval Task Force (CTF 135) recommended redeployment of VMF-333 from NAS Roosevelt Roads to NAS GTMO to augment the air defense capability of the NAVBASE GTMO. CG FMFLANT recommended against deploying the entire squadron to prevent an excessive number of unvetted and unprotected aircraft in a vulnerable area. CTF 135 subsequently directed that 8 VMF and 4 additional VMA aircraft be redeployed from VMF-333 and VMA-331 to GTMO.

The next day, 28 October, CG FMFLANT requested that a detachment of 7 EF10B (F3D-2Q) aircraft be assigned from FMEPAC. Approval of this request

was withheld by JCS pending further developments. The Commanding General also requested and later received OPCON of the 41st Civil Affairs Company to implement the Task Organization of OPLAN 316.

During the next few days II MEF units completed embarkation at Morehead City and the CG, 2d Marine Division shifted command post from Camp Lejeune to the MT. MCKINLEY. COMPHIBLANT requested and received authority from CINCLANTFLT to "place in effect OPLAN 316 Task Organization and communications plan now as they apply to TF 128 only." The authorization applied only to forces currently under command of the amphibious force. CG FMFLANT recommended the 5th MEB, which was CINCLANT Reserve in OPLAN 316, be assigned to the II MEF to be available for immediate commitment in support of Landing Group, West. In addition, the requirement for complete air superiority, additional naval gunfire support, was also emphasized. Subsequently, in response to CG FMFLANT's recommendation CINCLANT released the 5th MEB to CG, II MEF with the provision that it not be committed without prior authority. In turn, CG II MEF released BLT 1/6 (Force Reserve) to Commander Landing Group West.

Preparation for prolonged alert phase 31 October - 28 November.

Embarkation and deployment of major FMFLANT/II MEF units were completed with the shift of the command post of CG, 2d MARDIV on 30 October. Actions during the following period were directed toward (a) maintaining readiness of deployed forces for a prolonged period, (b) the modification and refinement of the designated plans, and (c) occasional deployment of smaller units. These actions are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

a. Readiness.

On 3 November CINCLANT requested an estimate of the time the II MEF could maintain an advanced state of readiness. After consideration of the posture of II MEF units, and recommendations of task group commanders, CG FMFLANT established 20 December 1962 as the terminal date of the period in which satisfactory readiness could be maintained. In view of the possibility of prolonged alert, however, the 5th MEB and Landing Group West were scheduled for exercises ashore for training, physical conditioning of troops, and maintenance of equipment.

The 5th MEB was separated into two increments. One increment was directed to maintain a 24 hour reaction time to augment NATLASE GINM. Individual ships liberty was authorized within the limit of the prescribed reaction time. The other increment was authorized to conduct exercises on Vieques while maintaining a 36 hour reaction time to complete reembarkation. These two increments were scheduled for rotation at 10 day intervals.

Landing Group, West was authorized to conduct a full scale exercise at Camp Lejeune, followed by separation into three increments. The schedule provided for one increment to conduct maintenance and training in Camp Lejeune, one increment on liberty in Florida and Carolina ports, and one increment remaining at sea and conducting landing exercises in the Mayport area. These three increments were scheduled for rotation at seven day intervals. Although a seven day reaction was established by CINCLANT for execution of OPLAN 316, four days was prescribed by COMPHIBLANT.

Of the deployed aviation units, readiness of MAG-14 (Key West) was most critical. The rigid alert required for execution of OPLAN 312 prevented adequate flight time for pilots to maintain proficiency for an extended period. In order to provide MAG-14 with an opportunity to maintain pilot proficiency, CG FMFLANT recommended to CINCLANTFLT that the VMA requirement be reduced to two squadrons with the third squadron on 12 hour standby at home base, or, that an additional squadron be deployed from FMFPAC. Either action would provide a rotation capability for training purposes. It was further recommended that a VMF be deployed from FMFPAC to provide a similar VMF rotation capability. Both requests were disapproved but retained for consideration at a later time.

Stand down phase 29 November - 15 December.

On 28 November CINCLANTFLT set DETCON 5 in the Atlantic Fleet except for forces at Key West, NAVBASE GTMO, and the Naval Task Force.

The following day CINCLANTFLT directed COMPHIBLANT and CG FMFLANT to embark BLT 2/1 at GTMO aboard PHIBGRU 3 shipping, and to sail PHIBGRU 3 incrementally to West Coast ports when loaded. CG FMFLANT was directed to provide airlift for personnel of BLT 2/1 not able to embark with PHIBGRU 3. CG, FMFLANT was further directed to redeploy WMA-121 to home station and

return to normal OPCON. CINCAFLANT released VMA-121 and MAG-14 to CG, FMFLANT. VMA-223 (El Toro) was chopped to normal OPCON. CINCLANTFLT further directed the II MEF less BLT 2/2 and BLT 1/8 (GTMO) to return to home stations.

On 30 November the Commandant of the Marine Corps requested and COMPHIBLANT subsequently directed that BLT 1/7 be returned to the West Coast independently ahead of the 5th MEB to prepare for onward movement to the Western Pacific.

MAG-14, VMA-121, and the Det VMF-235 commenced returning to home bases on 1 December. VMF-122 assumed the 6 plane commitment at NAS Key West under COMWESTFOR previously provided by Det VMF-235.

On 6 December CINCLANTFLT set DEFCON 5 for all Atlantic Fleet Forces at NAVBASE GTMO and in Task Force 135. CG, FMFLANT deactivated II MEF (CTG 129) effective 062400Z December. CINCLANTFLT further directed that a PHIBRON be sailed to GTMO and Roosevelt Roads to embark BLT 2/2 and MAG-32 less VMF-115 and return them to home stations by 15 December. CG, FMFLANT was directed to return by airlift BLT 1/8, the personnel of C Battery, 3d LAAM Bn, and Hq RLT 6. COMNAVBASE GTMO and CTF 135 were directed to return OPCON of forces on departure.

All forces had departed GTMO by 12 December, and BGEN Collins was relieved as Commander Ground Forces, GTMO.

On 15 December all FMFLANT/II MEF contingency deployments were terminated and routine readiness measures reestablished except for MAG-14 and MAG-32 which have been placed on 48 hour reaction for portions of OPLAN 312.

September. General Lemay approved the plan in principle, and directed General Walter C. Sweeney, Jr., COMTAC, to inform Admiral Robert L. Dennison, CINCLANT, that, if he should approve the plan, it would receive the full support of the Air Force. At this time, General Lemay established a target date of 20 October for completion of all Air Force actions. The day following the briefing for the Air Council, the plan was presented to Admiral Dennison and his staff at CINCLANT. The plan was approved, and was adopted by CINCLANT as the air assault portion of existing Cuba Contingency Plans.

Also at this time, command arrangements were established which placed General Sweeney in the position of air component commander to CINCLANT. CINCLANT was to have operational control of all TAC aircraft and those shore-based Navy and Marine aircraft committed to the Cuba Contingency which were not directly related to the defense of Guantanamo.

With the approval of the air assault plan, it was necessary to brief all major commanders who had a specific interest in the plan so that they would know its impact on their mission and forces. This was done. On 15 October, in company with Lt. General Robert B. Luckey, Commander Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic, General Sweeney briefed the Commander, Antilles Defense Command. The next day they flew to Guantanamo, and during the briefing there, they were recalled to Washington to meet with the JCS and Secretary Robert S. McNamara. It was on this day that ballistic missiles were discovered in Cuba.

The Cuban situation had reached its most critical stage -- A direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The possibility of hostilities in Cuba had increased sharply. The newly discovered ballistic missile sites had altered the purpose of the plan from the original objective of defeating Cuban air to one of defeating Cuban air and preventing destructive missile attacks on the United States.

Accordingly, all AFLANT forces were placed on full alert status and moved into their employment bases in Florida. Target priorities were revised. The missile sites were immediately targeted as first priority and target materials were rushed by special air courier to the combat units. Conferences were held with Army, Navy and Marine planning groups to insure maximum integration of effort and the fullest exploitation possible of the air assault plan in the event the invasion plan should be implemented.

As a result of the deployment, TAC aircraft at the Florida employment bases increased very rapidly. Navy and Marine aircraft on the Florida complex were also committed to the control of AFLANT. The total of TAC, Navy and Marine aircraft under AFLANT control was approximately 750, not including airlift aircraft.

committed to the invasion plan. Continental Air Defense Command Forces were also made available to the direct support of the Cuban operations.

October 20th was established as the target date when all essential elements to support the air assault plan were to be in place. Combat forces were ready and crews were thoroughly briefed on their missions and targets. Support equipment and over 11,000 support personnel were on standby. War readiness material such as munitions, fuel and vehicles were in place, more were enroute, and backup depot stocks were available. To exemplify the magnitude of the supply operation, 144,000 rockets and over 3,700 napalm bombs were positioned in support of the Cuba plans. The fuel required to support the operation was calculated at over one million barrels, and this amount and more was readily available. The total tonnage of supplies and equipment, not including fuel that was moved into the employment bases, was over 18,000 tons.

To provide the required communications, 174 voice and 26 teletype circuits were installed, with radio backup for all major circuits. A primary radar site was also moved from Cannon AFB, New Mexico to Key West.

In short, AFLANT forces were ready to execute the air assault plan on 20 October, to sustain operations, and to move into invasion operations, if required.

The target date could not have been met without the full cooperation and willing assistance of all concerned. Teamwork and singleness of purpose prevailed between the military services, and full support was received from the JCS and the Governmental agencies in Washington. Within the Air Force, support of the operation was also unstintingly provided. As examples of this teamwork, Strategic Air Command bombers on alert at MacDill, McCoy and Homestead quietly moved out to less vulnerable bases as TAC aircraft moved in, without confusion or mutual interference. Also, the personnel at the SAC bases, McCoy and Homestead, rendered every assistance in an outstanding team effort that overcame all obstacles. It must also be remembered that SAC mounted a massive 24-hour airborne alert beginning 22 October just before the President made

the Quarantine announcement. The remainder of the force was on 15-minute ground alert, and the strategic missile forces were placed on maximum readiness. SAC bombers assisted greatly in the quarantine operations.

Air Defense Command and Continental Air Defense Forces immediately moved into southern Florida bases to protect the area from air attack and to assist in controlling reconnaissance and combat air patrol flights. Air Force air defense interceptors in Florida flew more than 2,000 individual fighter patrols and maintained a 24-hour orbit of several strategic points off Florida. All North American Air Defense Command Forces were on 5 to 15 minute alert. MATS provided airlift support, air-sea rescue forces, and weather service, all essential to the full success of the plan. Also, within 48 hours of notification, MATS airlifted a force of Marines from California to Guantanamo, Cuba. MATS aircraft assisted greatly in the airlift of the thousands of personnel and tons of cargo into the southeast United States.

It was largely because of the outstanding efforts of the Air Force Logistics Command and the Air Force Communication Service that the 20 October target date was met. In short, it was a full team effort, with air staff providing the guidance and overcoming those obstacles which were beyond the capabilities of the air commands involved.

Many Air Force reserve units were recalled to active duty during the period 28 October through 28 November. The recalled forces consisted of 24 assault airlift squadrons and 6 aerial port squadrons, which represented approximately 14,200 personnel. However, reserve participation in the Cuba crisis did not begin or end with this active duty period. On very short notice, reserve aircraft airlifted, on the weekend of 13-15 October alone, over 700,000 pounds of equipment into the Florida employment bases. In addition, during the crisis period, these reserve fleets airlifted almost two and one-half million pounds more and over 1200 passengers into Florida. Also, during the redeployment phase, the again inactive reserve fleets assisted by redeploying almost 1500 passengers and over one and one-half million pounds of equipment back to the home bases of the regular units.

Besides this invaluable assistance in helping position military forces, and the significant part recalled reserve units would have played had invasion plans been implemented, the reserve aircraft recovery and base support units which were not recalled, were of great help to the regular units of SAC, TAC, and ADC in deployment and dispersal operations.

Air National Guard Forces were not committed and constituted an immediately ready reserve of seven fighter squadrons. Additional Air Guard fighter squadrons were available if the President determined the situation to be serious enough to mobilize those units previously called up for the Berlin crisis. In the event that a threat developed in some other area, these squadrons were readily available to replace TAC squadrons facing Cuba, or to deploy to the newly threatened area. It should be noted, that although Air National Guard forces were not recalled to active duty, Air Guard units and personnel were of considerable local assistance to deploying active Air Force units, notably those of SAC and ADC.

Plans had been developed and distributed to accomplish the rapid mobilization of both Air Guard and Air Reserve Forces. As a result, when reserve units were notified of the recall order late on Saturday night of 27 October, 93% of assigned personnel reported by 0900 hours the next morning, the appointed recall hour. These reserve personnel handled their mobilization tasks in a smooth and professional manner, and with high morale. They deserve great credit for their ability and willingness to respond.

In support of the invasion plan some 634 airlift aircraft of TAC, MATS and the Air Force Reserve were committed to airdrop and airland Army and Air Force personnel, supplies and equipment into Cuba. Included among the Air Force personnel were 7 Air Liaison Officers, 32 Forward Air Controllers, and 6 combat control teams, all to be airdropped along with Army paratroopers. The remaining Air Force personnel were to be airlanded to operate the airfields and handle the airlanding aircraft. Of the more than 17,000 Army personnel to be introduced on D-Day, 14,500 were paratroopers, which is comparable to the U.S. Airborne Forces dropped during the Normandy Invasion. Additional

personnel would follow on after D-Day, including those Marine forces scheduled to make a simultaneous amphibious assault.

In summary, the United States Air Force was ready for the Cuban crisis and the soundness of its internal organization was proven. The validity of Unified Command action was demonstrated; all services were able to join together in a well integrated team effort to gain maximum military effectiveness.

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